Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. State Pub. Utilities Comm'n

• Decision Date: 22 April 1915
• Docket Number: No. 9956.,9956.
• Citation: 267 Ill. 544,108 N.E. 737
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO. v. STATE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION et al.

267 Ill. 544

108 N.E. 737

CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

v.STATE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION et al.

No. 9956.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 22, 1915.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Sangamon County; James A. Creighton, Judge.

Citation by the Railroad and Warehouse Commission against the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company. From a judgment affirming an order of the Commission, the railroad company appeals, the appeal being defended by the State Public Utilities Commission, which supplanted the Railroad and Warehouse Commission. Affirmed.

O. W. Dynes and C. S. Jefferson, both of Chicago, and S. D. Scholes, of Springfield, (Burton Hanson, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

M. F. Gallagher, E. B. Wilkinson, Cohn C. H. Fyffe, Everett Jennings, and Timothy F. Mullen, all of Chicago, for appellees.

CRAIG, J.

This is an appeal by appellant, the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, from a judgment of the circuit court of Sangamon county affirming an order of the Illinois Railroad and Warehouse Commission, entered, after a hearing, on a citation issued by it of its own motion, directed to the appellant, requiring it to show cause for the advancement of certain switching charges or rates in what is known as the Chicago switching district. The order appealed from was entered on April 11, 1913, since which time the Public Utility Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1913, c. 111a) has become effective, by which the Railroad and Warehouse Commission is merged into the State Public Utility Commission, so that this appeal is not defended by it as the successor of the Illinois Railroad and Warehouse Commission, together with the Chicago Coal Dealers' Association and the Illinois Manufacturers' Association, by whom the complaint was made, as the representatives of the sellers and consumers of coal of North Chicago.

Much of the coal that is shipped into Chicago from the mines by rail comes from the south and east and the railroads carrying such coal enter Chicago from the south. The railroad tracks of appellant enter and leave Chicago from the north and west. It serves consumers of coal and dealers in that commodity over a large area in the northwest part of the city and suburbs. This coal in car load lots is transferred from the tracks of the coal-carrying roads to the tracks of appellant and by it switched to the various industries and dealers it serves. The switching charges involved are the charges for switching or hauling these cars from the point of delivery on its tracks to the place of ultimate consignment. These switching charges are a part of the entire charge of hauling from the mine to the ultimate consignee and are included or absorbed in the through rate made by the initial carrier to point of destination. When appellant gave notice of raising these switching charges the coal-carrying roads immediately gave notice to the consumers and dealers in coal served by the appellant that these through rates would be canceled and there would be a corresponding rise in the through rate. Complaint was made by the dealers to the Railroad and Warehouse Commission against such increase, which complaint was docketed with the commission as No. 2032. When the increase so made on the through rate by the coal-carrying roads was inquired into, it was discovered that the only cause of the increase was the advance made in switching charges by the appellant and the necessity of including such charges in the through rate, whereupon the Railroad and Warehouse Commission issued the citation in this case against appellant to show cause for demanding of the coal-carrying roads a higher compensation for the terminal services performed by it, and a temporary restraining order was entered prohibiting any change in the rates on coal shipped from points within the state until the matter could be heard by the commission. This citation, which is the case under consideration, was made the subject of a separate proceeding and given docket No. 2033.

The appellant company does not serve any mine in Illinois that sells coal to dealers or consumers in Chicago, and did not publish in advance through rates and was not made a party to the complaint filed in case No. 2032 before the commission. It, however, seems to have filed or prepared to file an answer in that case, and appeared in response to the citation issued in this case (No. 2033) and obtained leave to have its answer so prepared in case No. 2032 stand as its answer in this case. The substance of the defense interposed by the answer was that appellant is a common carrier organized under the laws of the state of Wisconsin, engaged in intrastate and interstate commerce, and operating approximately 9,000 miles of main railroad tracks, exclusive of double tracking, yards, spurs, and sidings, with extensive terminal facilities in the city of Chicago for the accommodation and expedition of the traffic over its own lines; that during the years prior to August 1, 1911, it voluntarily agreed with the other railroads entering the city of Chicago on a through tariff rate on car load lots of coal covering transportation from the mines in Illinois to points of delivery on its lines in Chicago, by which it received a division of approximately $4 per car, plus 10 cents per ton for all over 60,000 pounds to the car on each car of coal handled over its lines; that in October, 1912, it notified the connecting lines that such division of rates was unsatisfactory and insufficient to compensate it for the services rendered, and that it had adopted a tariff of 20 cents a ton on all coal received in car load lots from the connecting railroads mentioned in the petition in case No. 2032 for delivery over its lines to stations in what is known as the inner zone of the Chicago district. The answer further alleges that for a number of years there has been in force a tariff schedule for hauling coal in car load lots within the city of Chicago and in its immediate vicinity known as the Illinois distance tariff, established by the commission, which provides a rate on car load lots of soft coal of 23 cents per ton where the hauling distance is 2 miles or under, with a graduated scale up [267 Ill. 548]to 58 cents per ton where the hauling distance is not less than 25 miles nor more than 30 miles; that the actual cost of handling cars of coal from connecting lines to the points of delivery on its line within the city of Chicago is approximately $10 per car; that the appellant is not a coal-carrying road and gets no line haul on such commodity, but is required to pay a charge of 45 cents per day for each day a car of any other line is in its possession in making such delivery, and that it requires on an average seven days for the delivery of each car; that requiring it to give the coal-carrying railroads and the consumer the benefit of its terminal connections will interfere with the line hauls over its own lines and require it to pay a per diem charge for the transportation of coal cars on its terminals without receiving a reciprocal per diem charge from other railroads, for the reason that it does not perform a similar service for the other railroads entering the city of Chicago, as it makes no long haul of coal that would be subject to such deliveries, and that requiring it to transport intrastate car load lots of coal at such lower rate will have the effect of placing a burden on interstate commerce, in violation of section 8 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States and the provisions of the act commonly known as the Interstate Commerce Act, and also require the appellant to transport coal over its lines for a less rate, for equal weights and distances, than is charged elsewhere in Illinois, and, in effect, will cause it to discriminate against other commodities and the shippers of other commodities elsewhere and place a burden upon other commerce not so preferentially benefited. The answer further alleges that requiring it to transport coal in car load lots for the benefit of connecting carriers to points of delivery on its own terminals is a violation of its constitutional rights and of section 26 of the Illinois Railroad and Warehouse Commission Act, which prescribes the powers and duties of the Railroad and Warehouse Commission, which, it alleges, is without power or authority to make the order heretofore entered in the cause on December 12, 1912 (the temporary restraining order), requiring appellant to receive from connecting lines of railways at its Chicago terminals coal in car load lots and deliver the same to points on its system at no higher rate than it had heretofore been making for such service, and asks that the restraining order entered in the cause may be set aside and rescinded and the proceedings against it dismissed.

A hearing was had before the commission, at which appellant and the coal dealers' association and parties interested appeared. Evidence was taken, from which evidence, and from other facts found by the commission from the previous proceedings before it bearing on the subject and to which no objection has been made as a basis for the ultimate finding of the commission, it appears that some time prior to September 16, 1908, the Railroad and Warehouse Commission, after a hearing lasting several months, issued an order, known as ‘Rule 23,’ fixing the Chicago switching district and the rates for the different kinds of switching within that district. It seems that immediately prior to the adoption of this rule appellant had been demanding 20 cents per to for its services in making delivery of coal in car load lots received from other roads to the various industries on its lines within the Chicago district and that the other railroads had refused to accede to such demands. Before this rule became effective appellant and other railroad companies obtained a temporary injunction from the federal court restraining the enforcement of such rule.

While this injunction suit...