Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Powell County
Decision Date | 03 July 1926 |
Docket Number | 5944. |
Citation | 247 P. 1096,76 Mont. 596 |
Parties | CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO. v. POWELL COUNTY. |
Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Appeal from District Court, Powell County; George B. Winston, Judge.
Action by the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company against Powell County. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.
Murphy & Whitlock, of Missoula, and S. P. Wilson, of Deer Lodge, for appellant.
L. A Foot, Atty. Gen., and E. M. Keeley and W. E. Keeley, both of Deer Lodge, for respondent.
This action was instituted by the plaintiff to recover taxes which were paid under protest for the year 1924. The property assessed, and upon which the tax was paid, was of four separate kinds, viz.: (1) Certain machinery and electrical appliances located in plaintiff's substation, required and used therein in the transformation of electrical current used in the operation of the plaintiff's trains by electricity; (2) a certain engine with pumps and pipes for the pumping of water for the personal use of the plaintiff's employés at and within the substation; (3) certain shop machinery used for testing and repairing electrical equipment; and (4) comprising certain shop tools located in the plaintiff's repair shops at Deer Lodge used generally for the repair and testing of electrical apparatus. All of such property was classified for the purpose of taxation by the proper officers of Deer Lodge county in class 4 under the Property Classification Act (section 1999, R. C. 1921). It is the plaintiff's contention that all of such property should have been classified in class 2, and a tax of 20 per cent. of its true and full value imposed instead of 30 per cent., as provided for property in class 4.
The only question presented in the case is the determination of the proper classification of the various kinds of property involved.
Upon issue joined, the cause was regularly tried to the court without a jury. The court concluded that all such property was properly classified in class 4, and judgment was entered accordingly, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint and awarding the defendant its costs. The appeal is from the judgment.
So far as applicable, our statutes provide:
Section 1999, R. C. 1921.
And:
Section 2000, R. C. 1921.
The property involved is all embraced in the one return made by the plaintiff company, showing a total valuation placed thereon of $155,875.54. In disposing of this appeal, we think it wholly unnecessary to again indulge in extended review of the proper construction to be placed upon these statutes, the meaning of language...
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