Chicago & N.P.R. Co. v. City of Chicago
Decision Date | 14 February 1898 |
Citation | 49 N.E. 1006,172 Ill. 66 |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Parties | CHICAGO & N. P. R. CO. v. CITY OF CHICAGO. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Cook county court; W. F. Hodson, Judge.
Proceedings for the confirmation of a special assessment in the city of Chicago. The assessment was confirmed over the objections of the Chicago & Northern Pacific Railroad Company, and it appeals. Affirmed.K. K. Knapp and Mark Breeden, Jr., for appellant.
Charles S. Thornton, Corp. Counsel, and William H. Sexton, Asst. Corp. Counsel, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Cook county confirming a special assessment levied by the city of Chicago for the purpose of improving Ashland avenue from the south line of Twenty-Second street to the north line of the South branch of the Chicago river, in the city of Chicago. The Chicago & Northern Pacific Railroad Company filed objections in the county court to the confirmation of the report of the commissioners. By agreement, a jury was waived, and the cause was submitted to the court. The court, on the hearing, found that appellant's property was not assessed more or less than it would be benefited, nor more or less than its proportionate share of the cost of the improvement. All objections interposed were overruled and assessment confirmed. From that judgment the railroad company appeals.
Section 1 of the ordinance, among other things, contains the following: It is said in the argument that the clause in the ordinance in reference to the location of the curbstones is indefinite and uncertain; that it nowhere provides that they shall be set on both sides of the roadway. In Webster's definition of the word ‘either‘ will be found the following: ‘(2) Each of two; the one and the other.’ Under this definition, the language of the ordinance, ‘said curbstones to be set on either side of the roadway,’ would require them to be set on both sides. Indeed, the language used in the first part of the section, requiring the roadway 60 feet on the north to be curbed, shows plainly enough that it was intended by the provisions of the ordinance that both sides of the roadway should be curbed. It is unreasonable to suppose that the city council would require one side of a street to be curbed, and...
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