Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Chicago Mechanics' Inst.

• Decision Date: 08 April 1909
• Citation: 87 N.E. 933,239 Ill. 197
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: CHICAGO & N. W. RY. CO. v. CHICAGO MECHANICS' INSTITUTE et al.

239 Ill. 197

87 N.E. 933

CHICAGO & N. W. RY. CO.

v.CHICAGO MECHANICS' INSTITUTE et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 19, 1909.

Rehearing Denied April 8, 1909.

Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Axel Chytraus, Judge.

Condemnation proceedings by the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company against the Chicago Mechanics' Institute and others. From a judgment awarding damages to the institute and to James J. McCarthy on property taken, they appeal. Affirmed.George W. Brown, for appellant Chicago Mechanics' Institute.

Craft & Stevens, for appellant James J. McCarthy.

Wilson, Moore & McIlvaine, for appellee.

This was a petition filed January 19, 1907, in the superior court of Cook county, by appellee, to condemn certain property, valued at over $3,000,000, in the city of Chicago, for the purpos of building a new depot and tracks by which to enter same. The jury fixed the value of the property of appellant the Chicago Mechanics' Institute at $44,444.44, and that of appellant James J. McCarthy at $56,010.49. From the judgment rendered on this verdict an appeal is taken by said two property owners to this court.

The main depot of appellee in Chicago is on the North Side, at Wells and Kinzie streets. At the present time the tracks run west from the station, crossing the river by a bridge, and then separate into two divisions; the Galena division continuing west along Kinzie street, and the Milwaukeedivision curving to the north. The proposed new station and tracks will take up all of the three squares bounded by Canal, Clinton, Madison, and Lake streets and considerable of several squares to the north of these three. The plat here given shows approximately the present location of the tracks and depot and the changes proposed. Many of the details, however, are omitted, and in several cases only one line is shown to represent several railroad tracks. The space between Kinzie street and the south line of Carroll avenue, west of the river, is covered with numerous railroad tracks not shown on the plat, as is also the west bank of the North branch of the river:

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It is proposed that the tracks of the Galena division, after running north from the new depot, shall curve to the west and then run west parallel with the present Galena division tracks and about a block north of them, for about a mile, when they are to bend south and join the present tracks. It is also intended that the new tracks of the Milwaukee division shall run north from the depot and curve to the west, then run northwest for somewhat less than a mile, about two blocks west of the present tracks, afterward joining them.

The Chicago Mechanics' Institute claims a fee, subject to a 99-year lease, in a tract on Canal street having a frontage of about 42 feet on that street and running back about 151 feet. Appellant McCarthy claims a fee, subject to a short-term lease, in a tract having a frontage of about 38 feet on Canal street. In November, 1906, the building thereon was partially destroyed by fire and had not been restored at the time the condemnation took place. The record in the case is very voluminous, containing over 3,000 pages.

CARTER, J. (after stating the facts as above).

The two appellants are interested in separate pieces of property and have brought to this court wholly distinct appeals. Several questions, however, are raised alike by, and apply equally to, both appellants. Such questions will be discussed as if they were but a single appeal. The chief question raised by both appellants is the right of the railroad company to condemn for the depot site in question and the right of way for the approaches thereto, which are partially shown on the map given in the statement of the case.

The appropriation of private property against the owner's will is an act which in its nature is harsh and against common right, and therefore the grant of power is to be strictly construed. Lewis on Eminent Domain, § 600; Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co. v. Wiltse, 116 Ill. 449, 6 N. E. 49;Harvey v. Aurora & Geneva Railway Co., 174 Ill. 295, 51 N. E. 163;Gillette v. Aurora Railways Co., 228 Ill. 261, 81 N. E. 1005. The question is clearly one of legislation. Legislative authority might, if it saw fit, prohibit or grant expressly the right to change the location of a passenger station. Whether reasonably exercised or not, the control of such matters is in the Legislature, and the courts must be governed accordingly. This doctrine is conceded by all counsel in the case; but it is argued by appellants that, under the general powers granted to railroad companies, and appellee's charter, it had no right to condemn land for the proposed depot in Chicago, and cannot do so without additional legislation. If appellee has no authority to obtain the land for the depot and approaches in question, then it necessarily follows that the contention of counsel for appellants must be upheld that until such authority has been obtained in the proper way the acts of the company are contrary to law and utterly void and cannot be justified even upon the ground of public need.

This court has repeatedly laid down the rule that, ‘where the termini and general route of the railroad are prescribed by the charter, leaving the determination of details to the discretion of the corporation, the power of the company to fix the location is exhausted after such discretion has been exercised.’ Cairo, Vincennes & Chicago Railway Co. v. Woodyard, 226 Ill. 331, 80 N. E. 882, and cases there cited. It cannot thereafter relocate its road or change its termini without statutory authority, and is without power to condemn land for such purposes. If the building of this depot is the changing of one of the termini of the road, or if the construction of these approaches is a relocation of the road, as laid down in the authorities cited in the case last referred to, then appellants' contention must be upheld. It is very evident, however, from a reading of these decisions, that they do not uphold appellants' position as contended. Some of these authorities, such as People v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 120 Ill. 48, 10 N. E. 657, and Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. People, 143 Ill. 434, 33 N. E. 173,19 L. R. A. 119, hold that, where a railroad company has fixed its terminus in a town or city, it cannot afterward change the location from that town or city, and while there may be expressions in both of those cases, and in others, which, taken by themselves, tend to uphold the contention of appellants that by the ‘terminal point’ of a railroad is meant the depot as located, it is clear from a consideration of the entire cases that the doctrine laid down was that the terminus having been fixed at a city or town could not be removed therefrom, and not that the depot, having been once located within the city or town, could not be changed to another location on its line of road or adjacent thereto within the same city or town. The power granted under a railway charter to fix its terminus at Chicago authorized a company to locate its tracks and fix its terminus at any point in said city, as ‘Chicago’ includes every part of Chicago. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co. v. Chicago & Evanston Railroad Co., 112 Ill. 589;Ligare v. Chicago, Madison & Northern Railroad Co., 166 Ill. 249, 46 N. E. 803. Neither does the construction of new switch tracks or side tracks, or even a new track as a part of the main line, necessarily mean a relocation of the railroad. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio & Chicago Railroad Co., 149 Ill. 272, 37 N. E. 91;Chicago & Milwaukee Electric Railroad Co. v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway Co., 211 Ill. 352, 71 N. E. 1017. Whether appellee has a right to condemn the land for this new depot site, and the approaches thereto, under the statute and its general charter power, depends upon whether such depot site is required for its business and the public needs, as shown in this record. As was said in Cairo, Vincennes & Chicago Railway Co. v. Woodyard, supra (page 337 of 226 Ill.,page 885 of 80 N. E.), quoting from Randolph on the Law of Eminent Domain: ‘A railroad company may continue to condemn for such incidental uses as the growth of business demands.’

In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Wilson, 17 Ill. 123, this court said (page 125): ‘We must presume that the lawmakers had a general knowledge of what accessories were necessary to the convenient operating of a railroad. * * * There can be no doubt that they intended to embrace all such conveniences as would be necessary for the successful conduct of the business of the road, as depots, repairing shops, and the like, under this general designation, without particularly specifying either.’ And again it is stated (page 127): ‘It would be a disastrous rule, indeed, to hold that a railroad company must, in the first instance, acquire all the grounds it will ever need for its own convenience or the public accommodation. * * * We are of opinion that the company still has the right to acquire such lands as it may need for the accommodation of its business, from time to time, by the coercive process pointed out by the law.’

In Marsh v. Fairbury, Pontiac & Northwestern Railway Co., 64 Ill. 414, 16 Am. Rep. 564, we said: ‘The location of railroad depots has must to do with the accommodation of the wants of the public, and when once established a change of affairs may require a change of location in order to suit public convenience. * * * Railroad companies, in order to fulfill one of the ends of their creation-the promotion of the public welfare-should be left free to establish and reestablish their depots wheresoever the accommodation of the wants of the public may require.’

In

Fisher v. Chicago & Springfield Railroad Co. 104 Ill. 323, it was held that the law does not require a railroad to acquire all the land necessary for the...