Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Osborne

• Citation: 52 F. 912
• Decision Date: 17 October 1892
• Docket Number: 68.,67
• Parties: CHICAGO & N.W. RY. CO. v. OSBORNE. SAME v. JUNOD et al.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

52 F. 912

CHICAGO & N.W. RY. CO. v. OSBORNE.

SAME v. JUNOD et al.

Nos. 67, 68.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

October 17, 1892

Statement by BREWER, Circuit Justice:

The defendant in error, plaintiff below, recovered a judgment in the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Iowa for the sum of $225 for alleged overcharges on corn shipped from Scranton, Iowa, to Chicago. The action was brought under the interstate commerce act of February 4 1887; 24 St.p. 379.) The facts material to the inquiry are as follows:

The defendant owns and operates a railroad from Missouri Valley a town on the western border of Iowa, to Chicago, Ill Scranton is a town in Iowa on the line of this road, 88 miles east of Missouri Valley, and therefore so much nearer Chicago. The Fremont, Elkhorn & Missouri Valley Railroad Company owns a railroad running east and west through Nebraska; and connecting with the defendant's road at the town of Missouri Valley. Blair, Neb., is a point on that road, 13 miles west of Missouri Valley. While the Fremont Elkhorn & Missouri Valley Railroad Company is an independent corporation, a majority of its stock belongs to the defendant company, and thus the defendant company controls its operations.

During the month of January, 1888, there was in force a local tariff of rates charged on the defendant's road. This local tariff was duly published in Scranton. In accordance with it, the rate from Scranton to Chicago on corn was 18 cents per 100 pounds. All shippers shipping simply to Chicago paid that rate. The plaintiff, among others, made sundry shipments, and was charged and paid such sum. There was, so far as appears, absolute uniformity of rate as to all such local shipments. At the same time the tariff on corn shipped through from Blair, Neb., to New York city was 38 1/2 cents; to Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, sums slightly above and below this figure. This through rate was made up in this way: By agreement between the defendant and eastern companies, corn was shipped through to New York from Turner and Rochelle, two small stations on the defendant's road, one 30 and the other 70 miles west of Chicago, for 27 1/2 cents, 3 1/2 cents of which went to defendant, and the balance to the eastern companies; and by agreement between the defendant and the Fremont, Elkhorn & Missouri Valley Railroad Company, the rate from Blair to Turner and Rochelle, on corn shipped to New York, Boston, Philadelphia, or Baltimore, was 11 cents. In other words, by these agreements of the several companies a through rate was fixed on corn shipped from Blair to New York and other eastern cities; and of that through rate the defendant company received, for carrying the whole line of its road, less than the local tariff of 18 cents, charged from Scranton to Chicago. This joint tariff was not published at Scranton, and no knowledge of it was given to or possessed by the plaintiff until February 24th; and until that time he made no application for shipment beyond Chicago. Thereafter he shipped to Boston, and received the benefit of the through tariff.

W. C. Goudy and N.M. Hubbard, for plaintiff in error.

C. C. Nourse and C. L. Nourse, for defendants in error.

Before BREWER, Circuit Justice, and CALDWELL and SANBORN, Circuit Judges.

BREWER Circuit Justice, (after stating the facts.)

This case must be determined exclusively by the provisions of the interstate commerce law, as it was originally passed and before any amendment. No question was submitted to the jury, and no evidence was offered, as to whether 18 cents was or was not in fact a reasonable rate for carrying corn from Scranton to Chicago. The theory of the plaintiff's case was that the defendant company had violated the fourth section of the act, by charging more for a short than for a long haul; and, of course, if it had, it is liable to the plaintiff.

We do not care to enter into any extended discussion of the interstate commerce act. It was the first effort of the general government to regulate the great transportation business of the country. That business, though of a quasi public nature, and therefore subject to governmental regulation, has, as a matter of fact, been carried on by private capital through corporations. The fact that it was a quasi public business always prevented the owners of capital invested in it from charging, like owners of other property, any price they saw fit for its use. A reasonable compensation was all that they could exact, and he who felt aggrieved by a charge could always invoke the aid of the courts to protect himself against it. With him, however, lay the burden of proving the fact that the charge was unreasonable; a burden which all experience shows was onerous, and therefore seldom undertaken; the party aggrieved preferring to submit to the overcharge, rather than go to the expense and time of contesting it. Hence the efforts by state and nation to establish limits of charges, and means of evidence of easy and accurate ascertainment. While it is the duty of the courts to see that the provisions established by congress are not frittered away on technical or trifling grounds, yet it is also equally their duty to see that such a legislation is not carried beyond its clear scope, and that the owners of private capital invested in the business of transportation be not deprived of their liberty of contract and right of control any further than the lawmaking power has intended that they should be.

With these preliminary observations, we remark:

First. That congress has not attempted to require that the tariffs on all roads be uniform; nor has it attempted to place a limit in figures beyond which no company may go in its charges. The laws of business and of competition have, as yet, been deemed sufficient restraints in that direction. The Rock Island is, between Chicago and the Missouri river, a parallel and competing road with the defendant company; yet there is nothing in the commerce act which compels either company to charge for through or local transportation the same as its competitor. Either company may reduce its rates as far as it pleases below what is reasonable and a fair compensation for the service without violating the act; and such reduction compels no change by its competitor or any other company. This is obvious from a mere reading of the act.

Secondly. That, where two companies owning...