Chicago Park Dist. v. Lattipee

• Decision Date: 13 October 1936
• Docket Number: Nos. 23377,23426.,s. 23377
• Citation: Chicago Park Dist. v. Lattipee, 364 Ill. 182, 4 N.E.2d 86 (Ill. 1936)
• Parties: CHICAGO PARK DIST. v. LATTIPEE. GODDARD et al. v. CHICAGO PARK DIST. et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

364 Ill. 182

4 N.E.2d 86

CHICAGO PARK DIST.

v.LATTIPEE.

GODDARD et al.

v.CHICAGO PARK DIST. et al.

Nos. 23377, 23426.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 10, 1936.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 13, 1936.

No. 23377:

Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; Frank M. Padden, Judge.

No. 23426:

Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Francis B. Allegretti, Judge.

Judgment of conviction and order dismissing the suit both affirmed.

Wilbur Lattipee was convicted of soliciting passengers for hire in the park system of the Chicago Park District, and he appeals, and on the appeal the cause was consolidated with a suit by Clarence Goddard and others against the Chicago Park District and others, wherein an appeal was taken by plaintiffs after dismissal of the suit.

Judgment of conviction and order dismissing the suit bothAT1 Ellis & Westbrooks, Joseph E. Clayton, Jr., and Edward M. Byrd, all of Chicago (Richard E. Westbrooks, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Ellis & Westbrooks, Joseph E. Clayton, Jr., and Edward M. Byrd, all of Chicago (Richard E. Westbrooks, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

James M. Slattery, of Chicago (Philip A. Lozowick, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

JONES, Justice.

In cause 23377 Wilbur Lattipee was convicted in the municipal court of Chicago for violating section 7b of chapter 10 of an ordinance of the Chicago park district, which provides that no person shall solicit passengers for hire in the park system. A direct appeal was allowed because the validity of the ordinance is involved.

In cause 23426 Clarence Goddard et al. filed a complaint in chancery for an injunction in the superior court of Cook county to restrain the enforcement of the abovementioned ordinance provision and also section 55a of chapter 8 of said ordinance, which provides that it shall be unlawful for the operator of any public vehicle to solicit passengers in the park system. A temporary injunction was granted. The cause was set down for final hearing, and on motion of the defendant the cause was dismissed and an appeal to this court was perfected. The causes were consolidated in this court upon motion of appellants.

The contentions of appellants which are common to both cases are that the Chicago park districk was without power to enact said ordinance; that the ordinance is invalid because the word ‘solicit’ is not sufficiently defined so that persons may know what is prohibited; that the Chicago park district is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the city of Chicago, and therefore the municipal court of Chicago has no jurisdiction over prosecutions for the violation of a park district ordinance, and that the enforcement of said ordinance as attempted by the district has been discriminatory and in violation of section 22 of article 4 and section 2 of article 2 of the Constitution of Illinois and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Section 7 of the act creating the Chicago park district (Smith-Hurd Ann.St. c. 105, § 333.7, Ill.Rev.Stat.1935, c. 105, par. 574), vested in its commissioners the power to establish by ordinance all needful rules and regulations for the government and protection of parks, boulevards, and driveways, as well as the power to exclude all objectionable travel and traffic; to make and enforce reasonable traffic and other regulations; and to provide penalties for the violations of such rules and regulations. The vesting of power by the Legislature in a municipality to regulate traffic so as to safeguard both life and property is everywhere recognized as being within the province of the Legislature. The power here given to the Chicago park district is no different from that granted to cities and villages within this state. Moreover, it is within the legislative domain to empower municipalities to preserve their boulevards and parkways as pleasure driveways. The annoyance and dangers incident to certain kinds of traffic are so well known that they involve the public welfare, and the state may empower municipalities to designate what type of motor vehicles may be operated over certain streets. In fact, vehicular traffic may be entirely suspended if the situation surrounding the thoroughfare warrants it. While, generally, a person has a right to the use of a street, that right may be circumscribed by reasonable regulations, and no one has an inherent right to use a street as a place of business where he may operate a taxicab or a motorbus for hire. The presence of taxicabs in congested streets of large cities increases the possibility of accidents and, consequently, of personal injuries. Weksler v. Collins, 317 Ill. 132, 147 N.E. 797. We held in People ex rel. v. Thompson, 341 Ill. 166, 173 N.E. 137, that, where one seeks a special or extraordinary use of the streets or public highways for his private gain, as by the operation of an omnibus, truck motorbus, or the like, the state may regulate such use of the vehicle thereon or may even prohibit it. The power to regulate and prohibit in such cases is beyond question, and that power was expressly conferred upon the park district as to its thoroughfares by the statute above referred to.

Appellants insist that the word ‘solicit,’ as used in the ordinance, should be therein defined, and that the acts which would constitute soliciting should be set forth with such certainty that the average man, exercising due care, will know whether or not he will incur a penalty for his actions. The error in appellants' contention arises from the assumption that the term ‘solicit’ is not sufficiently definitive. This court has already had occasion to consider the term in People v. Murray, 307 Ill. 349, 138 N.E. 649. It was there held that the word ‘solicit’ not only means to importune, entreat, and implore, but that solicitation is not necessarily by word of mouth or writing. It may be by action which can be construed into a request, and that it requires no particular degree of importunity, entreaty, imploration, or supplication. In that case Murray was indicted upon a charge that he solicited an employee in the classified civil service of Chicago to make a contribution of money for political purposes. No open request was made for the contribution, but the circumstances shown were held to be equivalent to a solicitation. A conviction of the defendant was sustained.

The case of People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 190 N.E. 301, 92 A.L.R. 1223, relied on by appellants, is not in point. It was there held that a statute which provided that persons who are reputed to be habitual violators of criminal laws shall be declared to be vagabonds, was invalid because the word ‘reputed’ had a definite signification; that it meant ‘opinion, estimation or judgment,’ and that criminality cannot be made dependent upon the opinion of individuals.

In Boshuizen v. Thompson & Taylor Co., 360 Ill. 160, 195 N.E. 625, we held section 1 of the Occupational Diseases Act (Smith-Hurd Ann.St. c. 48, § 73) void because it did not...