Chicago Park Dist. v. Canfield

• Decision Date: 15 February 1939
• Docket Number: No. 24814.,24814.
• Citation: Chicago Park Dist. v. Canfield, 370 Ill. 447, 19 N.E.2d 376 (Ill. 1939)
• Parties: CHICAGO PARK DIST. v. CANFIELD.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

370 Ill. 447

19 N.E.2d 376

CHICAGO PARK DIST.

v.CANFIELD.

No. 24814.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 15, 1939.

Action by the Chicago Park District against Arthur Canfield, Jr., for violation of an ordinance prohibiting the driving in the park system of a vehicle upon which was displayed commercial advertising.From a judgment dismissing the charge, Chicago Park District appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

Affirmed.Appeal from Municipal Court of Chicago; John J. Gutkvecht, judge.

John O. Rees, of Chicago (Philip A. Lozowick and J. Lester Mee, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

William T. Pridmore, of Chicago (Seymour Lewis, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

STONE, Justice.

Appellee was charged in the municipal court of Chicago with violation of section 87 of chapter 8 of the general ordinance of the Chicago Park District prohibiting the driving, in the park system, of a vehicle upon which was displayed commercial advertising.He filed a motion to dismiss the proceeding, which was denied.On hearing, the court dismissed the charge against him on the ground that section 87 of chapter 8 of the general ordinance is invalid.The Chicago Park District has appealed directly to this court, the usual statutory certificate as to the question of the validity of the ordinance having been entered by the trial court.

The cause was heard on stipulation as to facts.Certain additional evidence was offered by appellant on its motion for new trial.The facts as stipulated are that appellee was, on January 29, 1938, operating a Ford business coupe as an employee of the A. J. Canfield Company, an Illinois corporation; that this corporation owns and operates twenty-five such automobiles, each of which is colored deep green with a bright-red top.On both doors and rear panel of each is painted the insignia ‘Canfield Beverages.’This insignia is two feet three inches in length and one foot four inches in height.It is superimposed on a splash or sunburst of light green and golden yellow.It is stipulated that the insignia is identifiable within a radius of 150 to 200 feet and visible for a distance of approximately 800 to 900 feet.Appellee was arrested as he was driving north along the Outer Drive, a public boulevard, also known as Lief Eriksen Drive, which boulevard lies within the confines of Burnham Park, a unit in the system of parks, controlled and maintained by appellant, and constitutes a link in a system of boulevards or parkways which connect all the parks within the Chicago park system.

It is stipulated that the parks of the Chicago Park District were created and are maintained for the purpose of contributing to the health, welfare, recreation, culture and enjoyment of the general public.They consist of attractive squares, plazas, lagoons, fountains, playgrounds, stadia, museums and monuments.Section 87 of chapter 8 of the general ordinance of the park district is as follows: ‘Section 87.Display of Advertising from a vehicle: (a) No person shall drive any vehicle in the Park System upon which there is displayed any commercial placard or advertisement of any kind.’

On motion for a new trial, appellant called its traffic engineer.He stated as his opinion that since the enactment of section 87 of the general ordinance prohibiting the use of the parks and boulevards by vehicles carrying advertising, there has been a decrease in deaths due to traffic accidents.It was his opinion that advertising signs on automobiles distract attention from drivers, slow up traffic and increase traffic hazards, and that the safety and convenience of the public is properly served by the type of regulation adopted by the park board.He stated, on cross-examination, that about sixty-five per cent of all the traffic within the city of Chicago passes over the boulevards within the park system.While his testimony does not seem clear on the point, we gather from it that he intended to state that deaths from automobile accidents on the streets under the jurisdiction of the city of Chicago, since the adoption of this ordinance, have not shown as much of a proportionate decrease as those on the boulevards of the park system.The trial court held that section 87 of chapter 8 of the general ordinance of the Chicago Park District is not within the police powers of the district delegated to it by the legislature, and is unconstitutional and void.

The issues argued here, concerning the validity of this ordinance, are: (1) Whether the ordinance comes within the powers delegated to the Chicago Park District by the General Assembly; (2) whether it constitutes a reasonable or is an arbitrary exercise of powers delegated to the Chicago Park District; and (3) whether the display on appellee's car constitutes an advertisement within the meaning of the ordinance.

Appellant urges that the legislature has delegated plenary powers to it to regulate the use of parks and boulevards, including the power ‘to exclude all objectionable travel and traffic therefrom.’Section 7 of the act creating the Chicago Park District, approved July 10, 1933(Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, chap. 105, § 333.7), vests in the Chicago Park District the powers incident to park organizations of that character, and provides that the powers then vested in various districts within the Chicago area should be thereafter exercised by the Chicago Park District.The district is given power to acquire, lay out, establish, construct and maintain parks, driveways and boulevards in such districts and to control, manage and govern them and the use thereof.The commissioners of the district are, by that section, given power to ‘establish by ordinance all needful rules and regulations for the government and protection of parks, boulevards, and driveways and other property under its jurisdiction; may exclude all objectionable travel and traffic and may make and enforce reasonable traffic and other regulations; and provide penalties not exceeding two hundred dollars for any one offense for the violation of such rules and regulations.’

In Chicago Park District v. Lattipee, 364 Ill. 182, 4 N.E.2d 86, that section was construed as giving to the Chicago Park District the same powers as are given to cities and villages within the State, which may be empowered to preserve their boulevards and parkways as pleasure driveways, to designate the type of motor vehicle which may be operated over certain streets, or, in fact, suspend traffic entirely if the situation surrounding the thoroughfare warrants it.The issue in that case was whether an ordinance prohibiting the operator of public vehicles soliciting passengers in the park system was a valid ordinance.The case is not decisive of the issue here.

Power to regulate traffic, or to exclude it, is vested in the State, and may, by its General Assembly, be delegated as a part of its police power, where its exercise bears some relation to public health and safety and which makes for public welfare.The rule recognized in this State is that all uses of property or courses of conduct which are injurious to the health, comfort, safety, morals and welfare of society, may be prohibited under the sovereign power of the State, though the exercise of such power results in inconvenience or loss to individuals.The exercise of such power, however, must find basis in the doctrine of overruling necessity, or bear some substantial relation to the public good.State Bank & Trust Co. v. Village of Wilmette, 358 Ill. 311, 193 N.E. 131, 96 A.L.R. 1327;Forbes v. Hubbard, 348 Ill. 166, 180 N.E. 767;People v. Kane, 288 Ill. 235, 123 N.E. 265;Town of Cortland v. Larson, 273 Ill. 602, 113 N.E. 51, L.R.A.1917A, 314, Ann.Cas.1916E, 775;Haskell v. Howard, 269 Ill. 550, 109 N.E. 992, L.R.A.1916B, 893.Laws which impose a penalty upon an individual, or interfere with his personal liberty, cannot be sustained unless they find basis in public health, comfort, safety or welfare.An arbitrary invasion of the personal rights of an individual citizen under the guise of police regulation is not countenanced.While the General Assembly may first determine when the necessity exists for the exercise of this power, such determination is not final or conclusive.What are the subjects of its exercise is a judicial question.Ruhstrat v. People, 185 Ill. 133, 57 N.E. 41,49 L.R.A. 181, 76 Am.St.Rep. 30;Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 95, 40 N.E. 454,29 L.R.A. 79, 46 Am.St.Rep. 315.

The issue here presented falls under two principal heads: May appellant exclude vehicular advertising from the parks, and, may such advertising be excluded from the boulevards connecting the public parks, which boulevards are under the jurisdiction of the Chicago Park District?Much of appellee's argument is devoted to the latter phase of this question.He insists that sixty-five per cent of the travel of the city goes over these connecting boulevards, and that it is not a proper regulation to keep automobiles, bearing advertising signs or placards, from traveling over them.While this question is one of grave doubt because of the fact that these connecting boulevards are, after all, public highways, and do not bear exactly the same relation to the park purposes as the boulevards lying within the public parks, it is stipulated, in this case, that appellee was arrested on a boulevard within the confines of Burnham Park.So, however interesting that question may be, and however serious the doubt as to its solution, it does not afford a basis for profitable discussion here, since it has no application to appellant.It has long been the rule that this court will not determine the constitutionality of the provisions of an act which does not affect the parties to the cause under consideration, or where the party urging the invalidity of such provision is not in any way aggrieved by its operation.People v. Diekmann, 285 Ill. 97, 120 N.E. 490;People v. Huff, 249 Ill. 164, 94 N.E. 61.As appellee's arrest took place...