Chicago & E.R. Co. v. Blake

• Decision Date: 22 January 1886
• Citation: 4 N.E. 488,116 Ill. 163
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: CHICAGO & E. R. CO. v. BLAKE.

116 Ill. 163

4 N.E. 488

CHICAGO & E. R. CO.

v.BLAKE.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed January 22, 1886.

Appeal from Cook.

E. Walker

, for appellant.

R. Hervey, for appellee.

MULKEY, C. J.

This proceeding was commenced in the county court of Cook county by the Chicago & Evanston Railroad Company, to condemn for railroad purposes a strip of land 50 feet wide, off of the east side of lot 6, block 95, Elston's addition to city of Chicago. The lot of which the 50 feet condemned was a part is bounded by the adjoining lot on the north; Chicago avenue on the south; Larrabee street on the east; and by the Chicago river on the west. The following diagram shows the situation of the property:

Image 1 (3.79" X 3") Available for Offline Print

Barnum Blake, the appellee, is owner of the entire lot. The jury, after hearing the testimony of many witnesses on both sides, and having made a personal examination of the premises,awarded as compensation the sum of $39,000, upon which award the court entered judgment, and the petitioner appealed to this court.

With respect to the claim that the damages are excessive, we see no cause for reversing the judgment on that ground. The witnesses, as generally happens in this class of cases, widely differed both as to the value of the land taken and the extent of the damage to the remaining portion of the lot. Very nearly all of them, on both sides, were real-estate agents and dealers in real property, living and doing business in the city, and most, if not all, swore they were acquainted with the value of property in that locality. Had the jury disregarded their own examination of the property, and accepted without qualification the opinions and theory of the witnesses for the respondent, the compensation and damages awarded would have been increased by thousands of dollars. On the other hand, had they simply accepted the theory and opinions of the petitioner's witnesses, the amount found by them would have been greatly diminished. So it is clear the jury must have exercised their own judgment in the matter. In such a diversity of opinion and conflict of testimony we are aware of no rule or principle that would authorize us to interpose on the ground the evidence does not support the verdict, especially as it may reasonably be supposed their verdict is based, at least to some extent, upon their own examination of the property. The point is made that the court erred in permitting respondent's witnesses to testify at all, for the alleged reason they did not, in a preliminary examination before the court, furnish satisfactory evidence of their knowledge of the market value of property in that locality as based on actual sales. This point is clearly not well taken. Even admitting the court, in an extreme case, would have the right to exclude a witness on the ground of incompetence where he had had no opportunities at all to obtain such information as would enable him to form an intelligent opinion on the question of value, about which we express no opinion, there was clearly no ground for the application of such a rule in this case. So far as this case is concerned, whatever there is in the objection goes to the value of the testimony rather than to its competency. It is the uniform practice of the courts to admit such evidence, and it is stated in Lawson's work on opinion and expert evidence that there is but one state in the Union where such evidence is not received. It would certainly be a startling announcement to go out to the profession that this court had reversed a judgment in a condemnation case in Chicago because the trial court had permitted a number of resident real-estate dealers to give their opinions as to the value of the land taken, without requiring them to first satisfy the court that their opinions on the subject were based upon their knowledge of actual sales in that locality. While such knowledge is always desirable, it is by no means a test of a witness' competency. Nor is it, in many cases, the chief element in determining the weight or value of witness' testimony when given. The uses and capabilities of a particular property, the prices at which like property in the neighborhood is held or offered, knowledge or...