Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Company v. Payne
Decision Date | 26 January 1920 |
Docket Number | 134 |
Citation | 217 S.W. 810,141 Ark. 617 |
Parties | CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY v. PAYNE |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Third Division; G. W. Hendricks Judge; affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
Thos S. Buzbee and Geo. B. Pugh, for appellant.
1. The evidence was not sufficient to justify the court in submitting to the jury the question as to whether or not the hernia was caused by the accident in which plaintiff was struck by a maul. The only witness was Doctor Reed, and his testimony is not definite enough to justify the jury in saying the hernia resulted from the accident. 123 Ark. 124.
2. The release was binding and prevented a recovery. 102 Ark. 616; 115 Id. 123; 119 Id. 95; 117 Id 524.
3. No negligence was proved warranting a recovery. It requires no skill, experience or judgment to do such an act as putting a handle in a maul, and it was not incumbent on the master to have someone to examine the maul every few minutes to see whether the handle was on tight or not. The plaintiff could readily ascertain the safety of the maul as a tool by examination and the master was not an insurer as to ordinary tools in everyday use. 66 S.E. 134; 199 S.W. 1074; 57 Ark. 503; 108 Id. 377; 130 Id. 486.
4. The court erred in its instructions.
5. The verdict is excessive. 147 N.W. 279, and cases spra.
Fred A. Isgrig and Fred A. Snodgress, for appellee.
1. The evidence is sufficient to show that the hernia was caused by being struck by the maul.
2. The instructions as to the release follow our law. 93 Ark. 589; 193 S.W. 791.
3. Negligence was proved, and the verdict is not excessive. 170 N.W. 279; 8 R. C. L. 673; 78 S.W. 744; 5 Current Law 931; 85 S.W. 669; Id. 785; 78 P. 866; 9 N.E. 453; 27 Id. 607; 38 Id. 358; 13 Cyc. 123; 58 S.W. 923; 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 458; 15 Id. 779.
The appellee instituted this action against the appellant for damages for personal injuries.
The appellee, a carpenter and cabinet maker, was in the employ of the appellant at its shops in North Little Rock. He was engaged in safety appliance work and was in charge of such work. He had an assistant, usually called a knocker or helper. Safety appliance work requires the climbing up on cars, the fixing of grab irons, running boards, and things of that kind. Appellee was engaged in putting steel plates as a partial equipment on one of appellant's cars, and while so engaged he was severely injured.
Appellee describes the circumstances of the occurrence as follows:
Witness Dewey Dees testified on behalf of the appellant as follows:
Another one of appellant's witnesses testified in part as follows:
The appellee in his complaint alleged that the appellant had furnished the appellee with the maul which had been negligently and carelessly repaired and that he, appellee, did not know and could not have known that the maul was in the condition described until after his injury.
Appellant in its answer denied all the material allegations of the complaint and alleged as affirmative defenses that the appellee assumed the risk and that appellant had settled with the appellee and had obtained a general release from appellee for all damages, if any, which he had sustained by reason of the injury.
The above are substantially the facts upon which the appellee predicated his cause of action and upon which he recovered judgment against the appellant in the sum of $ 5,000. From which is this appeal.
The court at the request of the appellant instructed the jury "that when the plaintiff undertook to work for the defendant he assumed the risk of any and all injuries ordinarily incident to the work and that might result, without negligence of the defendant, from the character of work he was doing."
The issues of negligence and of assumed risk were submitted to the jury under proper instructions and there was substantial evidence to sustain the verdict.
The testimony on behalf of the appellee tended to prove that the mauls were made with a small side and a large side; that the handle should be put on from the small side and wedged over the wide side; that when so put on the handle is flared so that it will not slip off, but that in the present case the handle was put on from the large side and wedged on to the small side which caused it to slip off the handle.
It was the duty...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Roberts v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 8030
...Mr. Weber's testimony reveals that he did not instruct appellant on the use of the device. In Chicago, R.I. & P. Railway Company v. Payne, 141 Ark. 617, 217 S.W. 810 (1920), the court held in an FELA case that, 'The servant is bound to exercise ordinary care for his own protection in the us......
-
Southern R. Co. v. Cowan
... ... R. L. Cowan against the Southern Railway Company. Judgment ... for plaintiff, defendant's ... Swaim v ... Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 187 Iowa 466, 174 N.W. 384. The ... In ... Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Payne, 141 Ark. 617, 217 ... S.W. 810, it was held ... ...
-
Southern Ry. Co v. Cowan
...rule requiring the exercise of reasonable care to furnish reasonably safe tools extends to simple tools. In Chicago, etc, Ry. Co. v. Payne, 141 Ark. 617, 217 S.W. 810, it was held that a case was made for the jury where the servant was injured by a defective iron maul, where the defect coul......
-
Farmers' Bank & Trust Co. v. Boshears
...No estoppel is shown by the evidence. On appeal the evidence should be given its strongest probative force in favor of appellee. 141 Ark. 617-24; 135 466- 70. The doctrine of estoppel and account stated is an artificial one, growing out of the law merchant. It is highly penal and should be ......