Chicago Ry Co v. Bolle

• Decision Date: 23 November 1931
• Docket Number: No. 60,60
• Citation: Chicago Ry Co v. Bolle, 284 U.S. 74, 52 S.Ct. 59, 76 L.Ed. 173 (1931)
• Parties: CHICAGO & N. W. RY. CO. v. BOLLE
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

284 U.S. 74

52 S.Ct. 59

76 L.Ed. 173

CHICAGO & N. W. RY. CO.

v BOLLE.

No. 60.

Argued Oct. 28, 1931.

Decided Nov. 23, 1931.

Messrs. Samuel H. Cady, Ray N. Van Doren, and Nelson J. Wilcox, all of Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.

Mr. Joseph D. Ryan, of Chicago, Ill., for respondent.

Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the court.

Petitioner is a common carrier by railroad engaged in the interstate and intrastate transportation of passengers and freight. Respondent was employed by petitioner to fire a stationary engine which was utilized to generate steam for the purpose of heating the passenger depot, baggageroom, and other structures and rooms used for general railroad purposes at Waukegan, Ill. The steam was also used to heat suburban passenger coaches while standing in the yards. Some of these coaches, taken off of interstate trains moving out of Chicago, were heated when necessary before being taken up by other interstate trains to be carried back. A way car and bunk cars, converted into stationary structures and occupied by some of the employees engaged in the track maintenance and bridge and building departments, were likewise heated; and sometimes steam was used to prevent freezing of a turntable used for turning engines employed both in interstate and intrastate traffic.

On the occasion in question, the stationary engine was temporarily out of order, and, in accordance with the usual practice, respondent had been making use of a locomotive engine as a substitute. While thus employed, he was directed to accompany this locomotive engine to a place about four miles distant to obtain a supply of coal. For that purpose, the engine was attached to and moved with three other locomotive engines then being prepared for use in interstate transportation. While coal was being taken upon one of the locomotives, respondent was seriously injured, through what is alleged to have been the negligence of petitioner.

The sole object of the movement of the substitute engine was to procure a supply of coal for the purpose of generating steam. Its movement was in no way related to the contemplated employment of the other three locomotives in interstate transportation; and its use differed in no way from the use of the stationary engine when that was available.

There is evidence that respondent, at other times, had been engaged in supplying other engines with coal and water, firing live engines, and turning a turntable; but his employment at the time of the injury was confined to firing the stationary or locomotive engine for the sole purpose of producing steam. The character of the work which he did at other times, therefore, becomes immaterial. Shanks v. Delaware, Lack. & West. R. Co., 239 U. S. 556, 558, 36 S. Ct. 188, 60 L. Ed. 436, L. R. A. 1916C, 797; Chicago, Burlington & Q. R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U. S. 177, 179, 36 S. Ct. 517, 60 L. Ed. 941.

The action was brought under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (c. 149, 35 Stat. 65, as amended in 1910, title 45, c. 2, U. S. C. (45 USCA §§ 51-59)) to recover damages for the injury. There have been three trials of the case. In the first, the verdict and judgment was for the respondent, which upon appeal was reversed by the intermediate Appellate Court, upon the ground that the evidence failed to show that respondent was engaged in interstate commerce when injured. 235 Ill. App. 380. This judgment of the Appellate Court was reversed by the Supreme Court. 324 Ill. 479, 155 N. E. 287. After remand, there was another trial resulting in a directed verdict and judgment for petitioner; and this judgment the Appellate Court, following the decision of the Supreme Court of the state, reversed. 251 Ill. App. 623. Upon the third trial, judgment upon a verdict was entered in favor of the respondent. This the Appellate Court affirmed, 258 Ill. App. 545, and the Supreme Court refused certiorari to review the cause.

The Appellate Court, in holding upon the first appeal that respondent was not engaged in interstate commerce, applied the rule laid down in the Shanks Case, supra; and, in so doing, was clearly right.

The railroad company which was sued in the Shanks Case maintained a large machine shop for repairing locomotives used in both interstate and intrastate traffic. While employed in this shop, Shanks was injured through the negligence of the company. Usually he was employed in repair work, but on the occasion of the injury he was engaged solely in taking down, and putting into a new location, an overhead countershaft through which power was communicated to some of the machinery used in the repair work. The Employers' Liability Act, § 1 (45 USCA § 51) provides that 'every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States * * * shall be liable in damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such commerce,' if the injury be due to the negligence of the carrier, etc. This court, at page 558 of 239 U. S., 36 S. Ct. 188, 189, after quoting the words of the act, laid down the following test for determining whether the employee, in any given case, comes within them: 'Having in mind the nature and usual course of the business to which the act relates and the evident purpose of Congress in adopting the act, we think it speaks of interstate commerce, not in a technical legal sense, but in...