Chicago Screw Co. v. Weiss

• Decision Date: 16 June 1903
• Citation: 203 Ill. 536,68 N.E. 54
• Parties: CHICAGO SCREW CO. v. WEISS.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

203 Ill. 536

68 N.E. 54

CHICAGO SCREW CO.

v.WEISS. ^*

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 16, 1903.

Appeal from Appellate Court, First District.

Action by John Weiss, by next friend, against the Chicago Screw Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

F. J. Canty and J. C. M. Clow, for appellant.

Darrow & Thompson, for appellee.

BOGGS, J.

The appellant company by this appeal questions the correctness of the judgment entered in the Appellate Court for the First District (107 Ill. App. 39), affirming the judgment of the circuit court of Cook county awarding the appellee damages in the sum of $3,500 for personal injuries received by reason of the negligence of the appellant company. The alleged errors for which it is thought the Appellate Court should have reversed the judgment of the circuit court are (1) the refusal of the circuit court to direct a peremptory verdict in favor of the appellant company, and (2) giving to the jury instructions Nos. 1, 2, and 3 at the request of the appellee.

At the time of the injury the appellee, a youth then of the age of 17 years, was engaged, as an employé of the appellant company, in the work of operating a machine by which the heads of screws were shaped and finished. The screws were placed in a part of the machine called a ‘chuck,’ or holder, which chuck was so moved by an eccentric as to bring one side of the head of the screw in contact with a set of rapidly revolving wheels or knives, by which that portion of the head of the screw was shaped and finished. The chuck or holder was then moved backward by means of a lever or handle, and the screw turned so that the reverse side of the head thereof would be presented to the revolving wheels or knives to be shaped and finished. This handle or lever, in moving the chuck back, passed over the wheels or knives, and at a distance of 3 1/2 or 4 inches above them. It was the duty of the appellee to put the screws into the chuck or holder and to move the lever or handle forward and back. The machine worked automatically, and was set to finish 250 screws per hour. This made it necessary that the appellee should pull the lever or handle across the plate, over and above the wheels or knives, four times each minute. It was necessary that he should move the lever or handle with his left hand. While so engaged one of the fingers of his left hand came in contact with the wheels or knives, and the injury was inflicted for which the recovery of damages was awarded. Appellee began working on this machine on the afternoon of Monday, the 18th day of February, 1901, and had never worked on such a machine before. He worked that afternoon, and was injured at 8 o'clock on the morning of the next day. The testimony tended to show that one of several screws which fastened the lever or handle in place had fallen out, and two other of such screws had become loose, and that the appellee called the attention of the foreman to the fact that the lever was loose; that the foreman examined the lever, and told the appellee it was ‘all right,’ and to go on with his work; that by reason of the lever being thus out of repair it was caused to suddenly ‘stick’ or stop while appellee was moving it above the wheels or knives, causing his hand to slip from the handle or lever down on the revolving wheels or knives.

Discussion and argument are wholly unnecessary to demonstrate that the evidence tended to show that the appellant company was guilty of negligence, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. Nor did the court err in refusing to hold, as matter of law, that the appellee assumed the risk of injury. The appellee knew of the defective condition of the lever or handle. The defects interfered with the working of the lever, and the appellee notified the appellant's assistant foreman. This representative of the appellant company inspected the lever, and told the appelle that it was ‘all right,’ and to ‘go ahead with the work.’ The case was that both master and servant knew of the defect. If the servant did not also know that the defect subjected him to the danger of injury, he would not be deemed to have assumed the risk, unless in the exercise of ordinary judgment and discretion he should have comprehended the danger. Consolidated Coal Co. v. Haenni, 146 Ill. 614, 35 N. E. 162;Union Show Case Co. v. Blindauer, 175 Ill. 325, 51 N. E. 709. The youth and inexperience of the appellee, the effect upon his mind of the assurance of the foreman, whom he had the right to regard as possessed of superior knowledge and judgment, that the machine was ‘all right,’ and the direction of the foreman given to him to ‘go ahead’ with the work, were elements to be considered in determining whether he ought to be charged with knowledge of the danger arising or likely to arise from the defective machinery. It was a question of fact, to be determined by the jury, whether the appellee had such understanding and appreciation of the peril to which the defect in the fastening of the lever exposed him as to defeat his right of recovery, on the ground he had assumed the risk of continuing to work with the machine. Whether a servant had assumed the danger which he encountered is ordinarily a question of fact, and only becomes a question of law when but one conclusion can be drawn from the evidence by all reasonable minds. Browne v. Siegel, Cooper & Co., 191 Ill. 226, 60 N. E. 815.

Instruction No. 1 given for the appellee declared, in the abstract, the...