Chicago, St. P. & K.C. Ry. Co. v. Pierce

• Citation: 64 F. 293
• Decision Date: 27 November 1894
• Docket Number: 192.
• Parties: CHICAGO, St. P. & K.C. RY. CO. v. PIERCE.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

64 F. 293

CHICAGO, St. P. & K.C. RY. CO. v. PIERCE.

No. 192.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

November 27, 1894

Henry A. Gardner and William McFadon, for plaintiff in error.

Ernest Dale Owens and Seth F. Crews, for defendant in error.

Before WOODS and JENKINS, Circuit Judges, and BUNN, District Judge.

BUNN District Judge.

This action was brought to recover damages for a personal injury sustained by the defendant in error, plaintiff below, on the 15th day of September, 1857, at Hudson, Iowa, while riding in one of the sleeping cars of the plaintiff in error. The injury was caused by reason of another train of cars running into the read end of the train in which the plaintiff was riding at the time. Eight days after the accident, on September 23, 1887, at Chicago, the plaintiff settled for the injury with the company for the sum of $1,600 cash paid, and executed in due form, under seal, a release of all damages growing out of the injury. Subsequently, on August 11, 1888 the plaintiff brought suit against the company in the United States circuit court for the Northern district of Illinois to recover for the same injury, but caused the same to be dismissed on September 1st following. One year afterwards, on September 1, 1889, the plaintiff, by her attorney, made a tender to the company of the $1,600 received by her, with 6 per cent. interest, which tender was refused, and on September 3, 1889, the present suit was begun. The plaintiff declared upon the injury named as though no settlement or release had ever been made. The company pleaded in defense the release, and the plaintiff, by way of replication, set up that at the time of the execution of the release she was suffering from great agony of body and mind to such an extent that she was wholly deprived of her reasoning powers and in a condition which rendered her unfit and incapable of contracting; and that while in such condition the defendant by its agent, took an unfair advantage of and overreached her, and thus obtained the execution of the release by duress and fraud. Issue was joined upon this plea, and a trial had of the issues thus made, and a verdict therein rendered in favor of the plaintiff on the 4th day of May, 1894, for the sum of $15,000. It is not necessary to state the evidence introduced upon the trial. It was somewhat conflicting upon the main issue, the plaintiff's testimony tending to show that at the time she executed the release she was not in a condition to understand what she was doing, while, on the contrary, the defendant's evidence tended to show that she was fully competent to contract, and that after the release was executed, without offering to disaffirm the contract, she continued to spend the money she had received from the company, with full knowledge and understanding of the facts respecting the settlement.

There are 36 assignments of error, but according to the view we have taken of the case it will not be necessary to notice them all. The 19th, 20th, 21st, and 30th assignments refer to the question of the affirmance and disaffirmance of the settlement. The money was paid and the release executed on the 23d day of September 1887. On September 1, 1889,-- nearly two years afterwards,-- the plaintiff tendered back the money received, with interest, after bringing a suit and then discontinuing the same one year previously. The evidence showed that the money paid her by the company had all been expended for her benefit by herself and her brothers within seven or eight months after being paid to her. The evidence of the defendant tended also to show that, whatever her condition may have been at the time of the settlement, she was greatly improved, and her recovery was such as to render her quite competent to understand and appreciate the situation, within 10 days or two weeks afterwards. There was no claim that the plaintiff was insane or non compos. The disability, if any existed, to make contracts, was temporary; and it is quite evident that when that disability was removed, if it was removed, it would be incumbent upon her at once to disaffirm the contract of settlement, if she wished to elect to do so, and bring suit to recover for the injury. And if she once affirmed the contract, by knowingly and voluntarily spending the money she had received, she could not afterwards elect to disaffirm it.

On the trial defendant's counsel asked the court to charge the jury as follows:

'The court instructs the jury that even if they believe from the evidence that the release in evidence was not binding on the plaintiff, because

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