Chicago Terminal Transfer R. Co. v. Greer

• Decision Date: 23 October 1906
• Citation: 79 N.E. 46,223 Ill. 104
• Parties: CHICAGO TERMINAL TRANSFER R. CO. v. GREER.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

223 Ill. 104

79 N.E. 46

CHICAGO TERMINAL TRANSFER R. CO.

v.GREER.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 23, 1906.

Error to City Court of Chicago Heights; Homer Abbott, Judge.

Action between Adeline Greer and the Chicago Terminal Transfer Railroad Company. From a judgment in favor of the former, the latter brings error. Affirmed.Jesse B. Barton, for plaintiff in error.

Lindhout & Lindhout, for defendant in error.

VICKERS, J.

This writ of error challenges the constitutionality of the act of the General Assembly adopted March 26, 1874, entitled, ‘An act in relation to courts of record’ (1 Starr. & C. Ann. St. 1896, p. 1200), and also the constitutionality of section 21 of the original act as amended by the act of May 10, 1901 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, p. 631). Section 21 of the act provides: ‘A city court consisting of one or more judges, not exceeding five, and not exceeding one judge for every fifty thousand inhabitants, may be organized and established under this act in any city which contains at least three thousand inhabitants, whenever the common or city council shall adopt an ordinance or resolution to submit the question, whether such court shall be established, consisting of one or more judges, not exceeding five, as may be specified in such ordinance or resolution, to the qualified voters of such city; and two-thirds of the votes cast at such election shall be in favor of the establishment of such court.’

It is contended that the act delegates to city councils the power (1) to ascertain whether the city contains at least 3,000 inhabitants; (2) to determine as to the advisability or necessity of the establishment of a city court in the municipality; (3) to determine how many judges shall be in the city court, and that the powers so attempted to be delegated are legislative in character and must be exercised only by the Legislature. The population of a city may be ascertained by the exercise of ministerial acts alone; hence that objection is groundless. This court is committed to the view that the provision in an enactment that the final operation thereof may be made to depend upon some contingency, as the vote of electors of a given territory within which the law is to operate, or some like contingency, is not the delegation of legislative functions to electors or to corporate officials of the territory or municipality. Home Ins. Co. v. Swigert, 104 Ill. 653.The courts of sister states have declared the same doctrine. State v. Sullivan, 67 Minn. 379, 69 N. W. 1094;Moers v. Reading, 21 Pa. 202.

The contention that this doctrine has application only when the enactments are local in their operation and directly affect the people only to whom they are referred for approval or rejection, if conceded, would not render the enactments under consideration unconstitutional, for the reason the direct operation of the subject of the act is restricted to the inhabitants of the city or those voluntarily within its territorial limits. The act is not local or special legislation because the cities in which city courts are created are restricted to those having not less than 3,000 inhabitants. The classification of municipalities, for purposes of legislation, on the basis of population was considered and approved in Cummings v. City of Chicago, 144 Ill. 563, 33 N. E. 854, and the subject was there fully discussed and the discussion need not be here repeated. The necessity for additional courts may arise because of the number of inhabitants in a city, and thus the classification be justified. When the classification on the basis of population has reasonable relation to the purposes and objects of the legislation, the act is not within the constitutional prohibition against local or special laws. People ex rel. v. Knopf, 183 Ill. 410, 56 N. E. 155;L'Hote v. Village of Milford, 212 Ill. 418, 72 N. E. 399,103 Am. St. Rep. 234.

The argument that city courts, under the act now being considered, are created by the officials and voters of the municipality is not sound. It is the act of the Legislature that creates the city court-not the act of the city council or the vote of the electors. The action of the city council, and the election held in pursuance thereof, are but the contingencies upon which the enactment comes into operation in any given city. Section 29 of article 6 of the Constitution, which provides that all laws relating to courts shall be of general...