Chicago v. Becker

• Decision Date: 31 January 1877
• Citation: 1877 WL 9417,84 Ill. 483
• Parties: CHICAGO AND ALTON RAILROAD COMPANYv.DAVID BECKER, Admr.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

84 Ill. 483

1877 WL 9417 (Ill.)

CHICAGO AND ALTON RAILROAD COMPANY

v.DAVID BECKER, Admr.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January Term, 1877.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Logan county; the Hon. LYMAN LACEY, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. WILLIAMS, BURR & CAPEN, for the appellant. Messrs. HOBLIT & FOLEY, and Messrs. BEASON & BLINN, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE CRAIG delivered the opinion of the Court:

This case was before us at the January term, 1875, when the judgment previously rendered in the circuit court was reversed, and the cause remanded, on the ground that erroneous instructions had been given to the jury for the plaintiff. The decision then announced is reported in 76 Ill. p. 25. After the cause was remanded another trial was had, resulting in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff, for $2000. It is not claimed that, in the last trial, there was error in the admission of evidence, or in the instructions given the jury; but the defendant insists upon a reversal of the judgment on the ground that the evidence is insufficient to warrant a recovery, and the damages are excessive.

The accident resulting in the death of Frederick Becker, occurred in Atlanta, a town on the Chicago and Alton Railroad. On the first trial it did not appear, from the evidence, that the train which ran over and killed the deceased was running at a rate of speed prohibited by law, but on the last trial the plaintiff read in evidence the ordinances of the town which prohibited trains from running in the incorporated limits of the town at a rate of speed exceeding four miles per hour. The defendant concedes, when the accident occurred, the train was running six miles per hour, and the witnesses of the plaintiff fix the rate of speed of the train at from twelve to eighteen miles per hour. Waiving the question whether the evidence of the plaintiff or defendant, upon this point, is entitled to the greater credit, in any event, the question is not controverted that the train was running through the town at a rate of speed prohibited by law. The town of Atlanta, as appears from the evidence, consisted of from fifteen hundred to two thousand inhabitants, with the defendant's track running nearly through its geographical center. The people of the town were constantly crossing and recrossing its track. Under such circumstances, no argument is needed to demonstrate the great danger to which property and life may be exposed, where a train, consisting of some twenty cars, as was the train in question, is run through a town of the size of Atlanta, at a high rate of speed. In Chicago and Alton Railroad Co. v. Gregory, 58 Ill. 226, it was expressly held to be great negligence on the part of a railroad company, to run its trains through a town at a rate of speed prohibited by law. That the train in question was so run is not denied. If, then, the rate of speed of the train caused or materially contributed to the injury, and the deceased, taking into consideration his age and all...