Chicago v. Chisholm
| Decision Date | 30 September 1875 |
| Citation | 79 Ill. 584,1875 WL 8693 |
| Parties | CHICAGO AND NORTHWESTERN RAILWAY CO.v.ROBERT B. CHISHOLM, JR. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. HENRY BOOTH, Judge, presiding.
Mr. B. C. COOK, for the appellant.
Mr. JOHN VAN ARMAN, and Mr. ALFRED H. GORDON, for the appellee.
This was an action of trespass on the case, brought by appellee against The Chicago and Northwestern Railway Company, to recover damages on account of a wrongful expulsion from one of the trains of the company, while traveling from Chicago to Elgin, on the company's road.
A trial of the cause before a jury resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of appellee, for $1000--to reverse which the railroad company has brought this appeal.
The grounds relied upon by appellant to reverse the judgment are, that the court erred in the exclusion of certain evidence offered by appellant; that appellee's fourth instruction was wrong; and that the damages are excessive.
On the 10th day of July, 1872, Robert B. Chisholm, Sr., the father of appellee, purchased of appellant a family commutation ticket, good for thirty rides on the company's road from Chicago to Elgin. The ticket stated, on its face, that it was good for thirty fares between Chicago and Elgin, on any trains stopping at those stations, subject to the conditions printed on the other side of the ticket, and that it would expire November 10, 1872. The conditions printed on the back of the ticket were as follows:
On the evening of August 30, 1872, appellee, who, at the time, resided with his father, Robert B. Chisholm, Sr., at Elgin, as a member of his family, although over twenty-one years old, entered one of the company's passenger trains at Chicago, for the purpose of going to Elgin. When the conductor called upon appellee for his fare, the ticket was offered in payment, but refused, solely on the ground appellee was not entitled to ride upon the ticket, as he was more than twenty-one years old. Appellee, refusing to pay fare in money, was forcibly expelled from the cars at a station on the road. Appellee received no personal injuries in being expelled from the cars, nor does it appear that he was harshly treated, or that any more force was used than was necessary to put him off the train.
It is clear, from the evidence, that, at the time of the occurrence, appellee was residing with his father, and was, and always had been, in fact, a member of his family.
A son or a daughter of a parent, residing with the parent, does not cease to be a member of the family when they respectively arrive at the age of twenty-one or eighteen, from that fact alone.
Webster defines a family thus: “The collective body of persons who live in one house, and under one head or manager.” “A household, including parents, children, servants, and, as the case may be, lodgers or boarders.” “Those who descend from one common progenitor--a tribe or race.”
There seems to be, therefore, no foundation for saying, that because a son arrives at an arbitrary age, called twenty-one, he, although still residing with his father, and receiving his support, and under his father's control, would not be regarded as a member of the family.
We apprehend there can be no doubt but appellee was entitled to ride upon the ticket, unless there was a rule or regulation of the company, at the time the ticket was purchased, which was known to the purchaser at the time he bought the ticket, under which appellee would be excluded from using the ticket as a member of his father's family.
While the ticket, upon its face, would be sufficiently comprehensive to include appellee as a member of his father's family, who had a right to ride upon the ticket, yet if, when it was purchased, the company had a rule in regard to that character of tickets which excluded appellee, and when appellee's father purchased the ticket he was informed of that fact, the rule or regulation would thus become a part of the contract under which the ticket was purchased, and hence would be obligatory upon the holder of the ticket, or any person who attempted to ride upon it. It is insisted by the counsel of appellant, that, on the trial, proof was offered to establish the fact that Chisholm was notified, when he purchased the ticket, that male children over twenty-one years were excluded from riding upon it, and the court refused to allow the evidence to go to the jury, and this is relied upon as error.
Had appellant offered to show that Chisholm was notified of the regulation at the time the ticket was bought, we are of opinion such evidence would be proper. But we do not understand that it was proposed to make that character of proof.
Appellant offered to prove, by one Hayes, that certain schedules were printed and furnished to the public with the thirty-ride tickets, which showed the rules and conditions under which the tickets were sold. This the court excluded, but, at the same time, offered to allow appellant to show that a schedule, showing the regulations, was furnished with the ticket in question when it was purchased.
The fact that certain schedules were furnished the public, could not affect the contract made between Chisholm and the railroad company; and to be obligatory upon him, as held by the court, the proof ought to show a schedule furnished by the company to the purchaser of the ticket. The appellant offered to show, by one Hathaway, that, at some time or other prior to the purchase of the ticket, he had informed Chisholm of the rules under which the thirty-ride tickets were issued. The court inquired how long prior to the sale of the ticket. The counsel could not fix the time, but remarked, several months.
The offered evidence was entirely too uncertain and indefinite to be allowed to go to the jury. We are inclined to hold, that, in order to make the rule obligatory upon Chisholm, it was the duty of the company, at the time the ticket was sold, to notify him of the rule. If, after being so notified, he purchased a ticket, the rule would become a part of the contract between him and the company. We, therefore, perceive no error of the court in the exclusion of the offered evidence.
The next question presented, involves the consideration of appellee's fourth instruction, which was as follows:
“If the jury shall, under the evidence, find the defendant guilty of the trespass charged against it, then, in...
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