Chicago v. Clampit

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SHELDON
• Citation: Chicago v. Clampit, 63 Ill. 95, 1872 WL 8115 (Ill. 1872)
• Decision Date: 31 January 1872
• Parties: CHICAGO AND ALTON R. R. CO.v.WILLIAM H. CLAMPIT.

63 Ill. 95

1872 WL 8115 (Ill.)

CHICAGO AND ALTON R. R. CO.

v.WILLIAM H. CLAMPIT.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

January Term, 1872.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Morgan county; the Hon. CHARLES D. HODGES, Judge, presiding.

This was an action on the case, brought by the appellee against the appellant to recover for a loss by fire communicated by the engine of the appellant. Appellee occupied, as a tenant, a barn near the railroad track. This barn was burned, and appellee claimed to have lost personal property in it to the value of $355. A recovery was claimed on the ground of negligence on the part of appellant whereby the sparks from its engine escaped and set the barn on fire.

T. B. Lowe, on the part of defendant below, having denied that, in a conversation with Mrs. Snyder, he stated that his engine threw out more sparks than usual, and that it was out of repair, appellee called Mrs. Snyder for the purpose of impeaching his testimony, and asked her to state the conversation between her and this witness. Among other things, she said: “I told him that it looked like he was going to burn us all up.” On objection to this, the court remarked: “She can state anything she said to him about this matter, and his reply to her.” She answered: “He said it threw out, he thought, more sparks than usual. I told him there must be something the matter with it. My woodpile taking fire is what made me ask him about it.” No motion seems to have been made to exclude the last part of her answer.

The other facts deemed material are stated by the Court.

Mr. H. E. DUMMER, for the appellant.

Messrs. GOHEEN & SHINN, and Messrs. MORRISON & WHITLOCK, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE SHELDON delivered the opinion of the Court:

The main ground of error assigned on this record is, that the verdict is not sustained by the evidence.

The evidence must be regarded as sufficient to justify the jury in finding that the fire in question was set by a locomotive engine of the appellant.

The fact that the fire was so communicated, under the act of 1869, “shall be taken as full prima facie evidence to charge with negligence the corporation or person or persons who shall, at the time of such injury by fire, be in the use and occupation of such railroad either as owners, lessees or mortgagees, and also those who shall at such time have the care and management of such engine.” Session Laws, 1869, p. 312.

To rebut the presumption of negligence, the defendant below, on the trial, contented itself with the introduction of proof that, at the time of the fire, the engine was provided with the best mechanical contrivances to prevent the escape of sparks, and that they were in good order. There is no evidence whatever, in the record, as to the management of the engine.

In the C. & A. R. R. Co. v. Quaintance, 58 Ill. 389, this court held that, to rebut the prima facie case made by proof of the fact of the communication of fire by the engine, it was not enough for the company to show that the engine was equipped with the proper...