Chicago v. Mary H. Lewis.

• Citation: 109 Ill. 120,1884 WL 9779
• Parties: CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANYv.MARY H. LEWIS.
• Decision Date: 23 January 1884
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

109 Ill. 120

1884 WL 9779 (Ill.)

CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY

v.MARY H. LEWIS.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed at Ottawa Jan. 23, 1884.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the Second District;--heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. NINIAN M. LAWS, Judge, presiding.

Mr. THOMAS F. WITHROW, and Mr. H. W. WELLS, for the appellant:

The court was asked to instruct the jury that there was no sufficient evidence of fraud in obtaining the release, and to find for the defendant. Before a cause is submitted to a jury the court must determine, as a matter of law, whether or not there is evidence from which the jury can reasonably infer that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case. Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 448; Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Id. 637; Pleasants v. Faut, 22 Id. 122; Parks v. Ross, 11 How. 373; Fawling v. United States, 4 Cranch, 221; Schuchardt v. Allens, 1 Wall. 369; Oscanyan v. Arms Co. 103 U. S. 206; Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 Ill. 14; Pennsylvania Co. v. Conlan, 101 Id. 105.

An instruction which tells the jury if a certain fact exists, virtually tells them that there is evidence from which they can find that fact, and if there is no such evidence, the instruction is erroneous. Illinois and St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Miller, 71 Ill. 464.

Any degree of influence of liquors or opiates does not avoid a contract. Bates v. Ball, 72 Ill. 111; 1 Story's Eq. Jur. secs. 231, 233; Mansfield v. Watson, 31 Iowa, 212.

It is error to submit a question of fraud to a jury upon slight parol evidence, to overturn a written instrument. The evidence of fraud must be clear, precise and indubitable, otherwise it should be withdrawn from the jury. Stine v. Sherk, 4 W. & S. 195; Irwin v. Shoemaker, 8 Id. 75; Dean v. Fuller, 4 Wright, 474.

As to the fraudulent representations and practices to avoid a written contract, see Bell v. Ryerson & Barlow, 11 Iowa, 237; McCormack v. Mulbury, 43 Id. 561; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Welch, 52 Ill. 183; Shultz v. Chicago and Northwestern R. R. Co. 44 Wis. 638; Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Doyle, 18 Kan. 58; Rogers v. Place, 29 Ind. 280; May v. Johnson, 3 Port. 449; Dutton v. Clupper, 78 Ind. 137; Nebeker v. Cutsinger, 72 Id. 139; American Ins. Co. v. McWherter, 53 Id. 276; Clodfelter v. Hulett, 48 Id. 437.

Messrs. BARRERE & GRANT, for the appellee:

The jury having found the fact that the appellee was incapable of making a contract, and overreached, this court is bound by that finding. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Doyle, 18 Kan. 58.

The release having been obtained fraudulently, under the belief it was only a receipt for the money paid, is not binding. Eagle Packet Co. v. Defries, 94 Ill. 599; Illinois Central R. R. Co. v. Welch, 52 Id. 187; Schultz v. Chicago and Northwestern R. R. Co. 44 Wis. 645; Anderson v. Field, 6 Bradw. 307.

The doctrine is, that the acts and contracts of persons who are of weak understanding, and who are liable to imposition, will be held void in equity if the nature of the act or contract justifies the conclusion that the party has not exercised a deliberate judgment, but has been imposed upon, circumvented, or overcome by cunning artifices. Story's Eq. Jur. 236; 4 Barb. 376; 1 Mumf. 557; 32 Ind. 126.

If a party designedly concealed a material fact which it was his duty to disclose, and upon which the other party had the right to rely, and did rely, for the purpose of misleading and deceiving the other party to his injury, he is guilty of positive fraud. Jones v. Emery, 40 N. H. 348. See, also, Sims v. Cline, Breese, 234.

If an assent to a contract is obtained by fraud, it will be wholly void. 1 Parsons on Contracts, 475, 476.

Mr. JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

It can not consistently be contended in this court, as was done in the lower courts, the evidence is not sufficient to sustain the verdict as to the alleged negligence of defendant in respect to the accident that caused the injury to plaintiff, nor that the evidence was not sufficient to warrant the jury in disregarding the alleged release of damages offered in evidence by defendant, as having been obtained through improper practices. These are questions of fact about which the evidence is conflicting, and as to which the jury found the issues against the position taken by defendant. The affirmance of the judgment of the Appellate Court implies a finding of the facts in the same way, and no further inquiry will be had in respect to them. In cases like the one at bar this court is required to re-examine cases brought to it by appeal or on writ of error, as to questions of law only, and the statute is peremptory, no assignment of error shall be allowed which will call in question the determination of the inferior or Appellate Court upon controverted questions of fact.

Before passing to the consideration of the questions of law thought to arise on the record, it might be well first to ascertain the issues made by the pleadings that were submitted to the jury. The declaration charges defendant with negligence in regard to keeping its road-bed or track in a suitable and safe condition, as the cause of the accident that resulted in injury to plaintiff. The issues formed were, first, upon the plea of not guilty; and second, upon a special plea averring full payment and satisfaction, and discharge of all causes of action. Under these issues it was the duty of the jury to find, from the evidence, first, whether defendant had been guilty of negligence in regard to its track; and second, whether the release in evidence was so fairly obtained as to bar a recovery. On these issues the cause was tried in the circuit court. If it shall appear the evidence touching these questions of fact was conflicting, and no error of law occurred at the trial, it is plain the judgment must be affirmed, whether this court, on an original consideration of the evidence, would come to the same conclusion as did the trial and Appellate courts, or not.

It is conceded the trial court should not give an instruction to the jury where there is no evidence on which to base it,--or, what is the same thing, where there is no evidence which tends to support the hypothetical case assumed by the instruction. It is for the reason it directs the attention of the jury to elements of liability that do not exist under the evidence, and it is manifest error to do so. This is the settled law, and has been so often declared by repeated decisions of this court it is not necessary to cite authorities in its support.

It may be also stated, it is the practice in this court to examine the entire evidence, with a view to ascertain whether or not instructions were properly given or refused by the trial court, and this duty is never omitted where the discussion makes it necessary to do so. That has been done in this case, with the utmost care.

As respects the negligence of defendant in regard to the condition of its track, which produced the accident, it is so much a question of fact no argument is made in this court on that branch of the case. It is as to the defence attempted to be made under the special plea, upon which a most elaborate argument has been made in this court. It is not denied plaintiff signed the paper in evidence, purporting to release defendant from all causes of action, for the consideration stated. Of course, if it was fairly obtained by the agents of defendant, and understandingly executed by plaintiff, it would constitute an effectual bar to the action. In respect to the alleged release, the manner in which it was obtained, and the condition of plaintiff, mentally and physically, at the time she signed it, the record contains a great deal of testimony, and much of it is irreconcilably conflicting. The accident to the train on which plaintiff was a passenger occurred about eight o'clock in the evening before the day on which the alleged release was signed. It was most probably signed between one and two o'clock in the afternoon of the next day after the accident. The injury to plaintiff was very severe, and the sequel will show it will be permanent. Her shoulder blade was fractured, and the muscles in that part of her body were very much injured. Since then she has not had the use of her left arm. Evidently the shock to her nervous system was very great. She suffered intense pain as soon as the sense of feeling returned after the accident. It appears she was placed in a car that had not left the track, and continued on her journey, and reached Keokuk at about eight o'clock the next morning after the accident, and was then taken to a hotel. She lived in this State, and was anxious to get home. During the night after the accident, whisky and morphine were administered to her on the cars, but in what quantities the proof does not show with any certainty. It may be fairly assumed, from the evidence, the doses given were of the size usually administered to adult persons. On account of sickness, induced by pain, plaintiff slept none during the night, notwithstanding the opiates she had taken. She was still suffering great pain when she reached the hotel at Keokuk. Shortly after arriving at the hotel she was visited by a division superintendent of defendant's road. It is probable, from the evidence, he visited her twice that forenoon. Perhaps the last visit was near twelve o'clock. It was at the last visit it is said he negotiated a settlement with her, in pursuance of which the alleged release was afterwards obtained. The replication to the plea of accord and satisfaction puts in issue the fairness of obtaining from plaintiff the release insisted upon so confidently as a bar to the action. On this branch of the case the court was asked by defendant to instruct the jury “there is no sufficient evidence in this case to warrant inference of fraud, and the court instructs the jury to find a verdict for ...