Chicago v. Mary H. Lewis.
| Decision Date | 31 May 1883 |
| Parties | CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILWAY CO.v.MARY H. LEWIS. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. N. M. LAWS, Judge, presiding. Opinion filed July 27, 1883.
Mr. H. W. WELLS and Mr. THOS. F. WITHROW, for appellant; that the release given was a valid contract, cited 2 Blackstone's Commentaries, 446; Sturges v. Crowningshield, 4 Wheat. 197; Buchanan v. Intl. Bank, 78 Ill. 500; Birch v. Hubbard, 48 Ill. 164; Wadsworth v. Thompson, 3 Gilm. 423; Corkins v. Collins, 16 Mich. 478; Court U. S. Art. I. § 10; Fitzgerald v. Staples, 88 Ill. 236; Weaver v. Fries, 85 Ill. 356.
When by ordinary degree of precaution, the party might have ascertained for himself the truth or falsity of the statements complained of, they do not amount to fraud: Sims v. Klein, Breese, 234, 302; Dunbar v. Bonesteel, 3 Scam. 32; Tuck v. Downing, 76 Ill. 71; White v. Watkins, 23 Ill. 480; Rogers v. Place, 29 Ind. 580; Seeright v. Fletcher, 6 Blackf. 381; May v. Johnson, 3 Porter (Ind.), 449; Am. Ins. Co. v. McWhorter, 78 Ind. 137; Clodfelter v. Hulett, 72 Ind. 139; Graffenstein v. Epstein, 23 Kan. 446; Dibble v. N. Y. & Erie R'y, 25 Barb. 184; Curley v. Harris, 11 Allen (Mass.), 112; Am. Ins. Co. v. Crawford, 7 Bradwell, 29; Eagle Packet Co. v. Defries, 94 Ill. 598; Starr v. Bennett, 5 Hill, 305; Fulton v. Hood, 34 Pa. St. 371; Saunders v. Hatterman, 2 Ired. (N. C.) 32.
The evidence of fraud should be clear, precise and indubitable, otherwise it should be withdrawn from the jury: Stine v. Sherk, 1 W. & S. 195; Irwin v. Shoemaker, 8 W. & S. 75; Dean v. Fuller, 4 Wright, 474; Penn. R. R. Co. v. Shay, 82 Pa. St. 199; Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, 382; Ross v. Sutherland, 81 Ill. 275; Milk v. Moore, 39 Ill. 584; Stout v. Oliver, 40 Ill. 245; Blow v. Gage, 44 Ill. 217; Marksbury v. Taylor, 10 Bush. 523; Moore v. Turbeville, 2 Bibb (Ky.), 602; East St. L. P. & P. Co. v. Hightower, 9 Bradwell, 297; McCormick v. Mulberry, 43 Ia. 561.
An instruction that plaintiff had a lawful right to avoid an otherwise valid contract on the ground of her own drunkenness, without returning the money received by her upon the contract, was erroneous: Anderson v. White, 27 Ill. 257; Nichols v. Michael, 23 N. Y. 264; Webber v. Flora, 16 Mich. 40; Thayer v. Turner, 8 Metc. 553; Foster v. Jared, 12 Ill. 457; Howe, etc. v. Rosine, 87 Ill. 105; Bachenau v. Horney, 11 Ill. 336.
Messrs. BARRERE & GRANT, for appellee; as to negligence, cited P. P. & J. R. R. Co. v. Reynolds, 88 Ill. 418.
The manner of obtaining the release and the effect to be given to it, is a question for the jury: C. R. I. & P. R'y Co. v. Doyle, 18 Kan. 58; Eagle Packet Co. v. Defries, 94 Ill. 599; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Welch, 52 Ill. 187.
As to when equity will take cognizance of cases in which a party is deceived as to material things: Match v. Hunt, 38 Mich. 1; Huxley v. Rice, 40 Mich. 73; Story's Equity Jurisprudence, 236; Jones v. Emery, 40 N. H. 348.
If an assent to a contract, promising more than the assenter intended, is obtained by fraud, the contract is not valid for so much as he intended, but is wholly void: 1 Parsons on Contracts, 475.
Presumptive evidence of fraud will sometimes outweigh positive testimony; Halstead Law of Ev. 79, 136, 141.
As to instructions: Mullen v. Old Colony R. R. Co. 127 Mass. 86.
This was a suit by appellee against appellant for damages arising from injuries received by her on account of the passing cars of appellant running off the track of its railroad near Prairie City between Des Moines and Keokuk in the State of Iowa, the appellee alleging negligence on the part of appellant in not keeping its railroad track in good repair by means of which the cars were thrown off and she injured.
The injury occurred in March, 1881. The appellant was an unmarried woman of the age of twenty-nine years and made her living by doing general housework, and resided at the time of the injury and still resides in Canton, Fulton county, Illinois. Her arm and shoulder were so badly injured that she had entirely lost the use of her arm and could do no more housework. The injury was permanent. The judgment was for $5,000, the amount of the verdict less $20 remitted. There is no complaint made that the evidence will not support the verdict on the question of negligence on the part of appellant or the amount of the verdict.
But appellant bases its defense upon a certain claimed settlement made on the morning after the injury at the hotel in Keokuk and a release of all causes of action signed by the appellee at the same time and the payment to her of $20 in full satisfaction. This release is as follows:
MARY H. LEWIS. (L. S.)
KEOKUK, March 1, 1881.
The appellee claims that the receipt, while signed by her, was procured to be signed by means of fraud and circumvention practiced on her by the agents of the appellant who procured her signature by means of representing to her and inducing her to believe that the instrument was simply a receipt for expenses and loss of time occasioned on account of her delay by reason of the accident, and that she signed the release under such belief.
It is claimed by appellants that the evidence is not sufficient to support her claim of fraud, but after a careful examination of the facts and evidence in the case we have come to the conclusion that the verdict of the jury was supported by the evidence, in other words, we do not feel at liberty to disturb the verdict on account of the want of evidence to support it. We do not deem it necessary to review the evidence in detail, and will not do so further than to see what bearing it had or may have had on some of appellee's instructions given by the court and complained of by appellant. The fourth and fifth of appellee's instructions are particularly complained of for the reason that there was, as appellant claims, no evidence to support them, and for the reason that the fourth authorized the appellee to be released if she believed from the representations and acts of appellant's agents that she was only signing a receipt of expenses, irrespective of whether there were any grounds for such belief, and irrespective as to whether she took reasonable precaution to protect herself from imposition, by reading the instrument. The instructions are as follows:
4. “The court instructs the jury that if they believe from all the evidence in the case that the release offered in evidence by the defendant was obtained from the plaintiff by representations or acts of the agents of the defendant, which induced in her mind the belief that it was only a receipt for money paid her at the time as compensation to her for lost time and expense incident to the delay, resulting from an accident to the train on which she was traveling, and not a discharge of the defendant from the claim which she had or might have against it on account of her said injuries, then it is not a bar to this suit, and the jury have a right to disregard it.”
5. “If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was induced by the agents of the defendant to sign the writing offered in evidence by the fraud and circumvention of said defendant's agents, then said writing is void as against said plaintiff.”
We do not think the objections are well taken. There was...
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