Chicas v. Union Tank Car Co.
| Decision Date | 24 May 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:16-CV-201 |
| Parties | OSCAR CHICAS, ANA GONZALES, JOSE ALFARO, ERIC ALFARO, MARIA CHICAS, and MARIA ALFARO, Plaintiffs, v. UNION TANK CAR COMPANY and JEFF BERG, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Pending before the court is Defendant Union Tank Car Company's ("UTCC") Motion for Summary Judgment (#39) in which UTCC seeks summary judgment on all claims asserted against it. Having considered the pending motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that summary judgment is warranted.
UTCC owns a railcar repair facility in Cleveland, Texas. The facility includes railroad tracks used to facilitate the movement of railcars on site. At some point in 2013, UTCC contracted with Bayou City Rail ("Bayou") to perform maintenance and repair work on the railroad tracks at the Cleveland facility. Oscar Alfaro ("Alfaro"), an employee of Bayou, was the foreman in charge of the Bayou crew working on this project. On October 23, 2013, Alfaro was operating a backhoe, which was owned and maintained by Bayou. As Alfaro exited the backhoe, he threw a piece of metal scrap into the cab, striking a lever and activating the boom on the backhoe. The boom swung around and pinned Alfaro between the boom and the backhoe outrigger. Alfaro died as a result of this incident.1
On August 19, 2015, Plaintiffs, as wrongful death beneficiaries and on behalf of the Estate of Alfaro, filed suit against UTCC, asserting claims of gross negligence.2 Plaintiffs contend that UTCC "failed to own, control, supervise, maintain, and inspect the [backhoe], in a reasonable manner, thereby causing the fatal injuries to Oscar Alfaro." On February 17, 2017, UTCC designated Bayou as a responsible third party, asserting that, as Alfaro's employer, Bayou was responsible for training, instructing, and supervising him. Despite Plaintiffs' opposition, the court deemed such designation timely on March 29, 2017. Thereafter, on April 21, 2017, UTCC filed the instant motion alleging that Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden under § 95.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and, therefore, UTCC is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In response, Plaintiffs maintain that genuine disputes of material fact exist with regard to whether UTCC: (1) exercised control over Alfaro's work; (2) had knowledge of the danger or condition on its premises—i.e. the backhoe's malfunctioning; and (3) failed to warn of such danger or condition adequately.
As an initial matter, UTCC objects to several portions of Plaintiffs' summary judgment evidence on the basis of hearsay. Evidence offered for or against summary judgment is subject to the same standards and rules that govern the admissibility of evidence at trial. Reeves v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., 544 F. App'x 564, 569 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Donaghey v. Ocean Drilling & Expl. Co., 974 F.2d 646, 650 n.3 (5th Cir. 1992)); Okpala v. City of Houston, 397 F. App'x 50, 55 n.15 (5th Cir. 2010); Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 555 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir. 2009). "Evidence on summary judgment may be considered to the extent not based on hearsay or other information excludable at trial." Fowler v. Smith, 68 F.3d 124, 126 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 1992); Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987)); see Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir. 2005); Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 2001); Garcia v. Reeves Cty., 32 F.3d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1994).
Here, UTCC contends that three excerpts from Plaintiff Eric Alfaro's ("Eric") deposition are hearsay because they include discussions between Alfaro and David Lawrence ("Lawrence"), a UTCC employee. Specifically, Eric testified that Alfaro never knew what his work duties would be until he reported to Lawrence, who would instruct him on what his crew was to do for the day.3 These statements, arguably, are not submitted for the truth of the matter asserted but merely to reflect the control retained by UTCC over the way in which Alfaro and other Bayou employeescarried out their work on UTCC's premises. Therefore, they are not hearsay. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). In any event, any statements made by Lawrence that are offered for the truth of the matter asserted are nonetheless admissible. A statement made by an employee of the opposing party within the scope of that relationship qualifies as an admission of a party opponent and, therefore, is admissible to defeat summary judgment. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D); McMann v. Greystar Mgmt. Servs., LP, No. 1:12-CV-909, 2013 WL 6243847, at *4 n.1 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2013). Accordingly, UTCC's objections to the aforementioned portions of Eric's deposition are OVERRULED.
Additionally, UTCC objects to an interview given by Jeff Trevino ("Trevino"), a manager at Bayou, to OSHA after Alfaro's accident. Because this interview contains out-of-court statements offered for their truth, the court will disregard it. Consequently, UTCC's objection to Trevino's interview is SUSTAINED and the exhibit is STRUCK.
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); accord Hefren v. McDermott, Inc., 820 F.3d 767, 771 (5th Cir. 2016). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Davis v. Fort Bend Cty., 765 F.3d 480, 484(5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2804 (2015); Tech. Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 673 F.3d 399, 407 (5th Cir. 2012).
"A fact issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action." Hemphill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 805 F.3d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1715 (2016); Tiblier v. Dlabal, 743 F.3d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 2014); accord Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2012); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, 423 F.3d 446, 454 (5th Cir. 2005). "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Tiblier, 743 F.3d at 1007 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). "An issue is 'genuine' if it is real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham." Hudspeth v. City of Shreveport, 270 F. App'x 332, 334 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001)). Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Hefren, 820 F.3d at 771 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248); Tiblier, 743 F.3d at 1007; accord Haverda v. Hays Cty., 723 F.3d 586, 591 (5th Cir. 2013). The moving party, however, "need not negate the elements of the nonmovants' case." Pioneer Expl., L.L.C. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 767 F.3d 503, 511 (5th Cir. 2014); Bayle v. Allstate Ins. Co., 615 F.3d 350, 355 (5th Cir. 2010); Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)).
Once a proper motion has been made, the nonmoving parties may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must present affirmative evidence, setting forth specific facts, to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 n.3; see Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529 (2006) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)); DistribuidoraMari Jose, S.A. de C.V. v. Transmaritime, Inc., 738 F.3d 703, 706 (5th Cir. 2013). The court must "review the record 'taken as a whole.'" Black v. Pan Am. Labs., LLC, 646 F.3d 254, 273 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986))); see City of Alexandria v. Brown, 740 F.3d 339, 350 (5th Cir. 2014). All the evidence must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving parties, and the court will not weigh the evidence or evaluate its credibility. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150; Tiblier, 743 F.3d at 1007; see Hefren, 820 F.3d at 771. The evidence of the nonmovants is to be believed, with all justifiable inferences drawn and all reasonable doubts resolved in their favor. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255); Hemphill, 805 F.3d at 538; Pioneer Expl., L.L.C., 767 F.3d at 511.
Furthermore, unlike Texas law, federal law does not recognize "no evidence" motions for summary judgment. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). Although UTCC acknowledges this, it nonetheless maintains that it "is entitled to summary judgment under a no evidence standard" because Plaintiffs have "no evidence" to support any of the elements under their cause of action. The concept of a "no evidence" summary judgment, however, "neither accurately describes federal law nor has any particular import in the vernacular of federal summary judgment procedure." Royal Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Brownsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 404 F. Supp. 942, 948 (S.D. Tex. 2005). Rather, "federal law contemplates a shifting burden" in which the party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. Thus, to the extent UTCC seeks a "no evidence" summary judgment,that request is denied. Instead, the court will...
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