Chichakli v. Park Lane Townhomes Homeowners Ass'n

Decision Date08 February 2022
Docket Number3:21-cv-01795-C-BT
PartiesRICHARD A. CHICHAKLI, Plaintiff, v. PARK LANE TOWNHOMES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION and THE PRINCIPAL MANAGEMENT GROUP OF NORTH TEXAS - ASSOCIA, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REBECCA RUTHERFORD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Before the Court is Defendants Park Lane Townhomes Homeowners Association (the HOA) and The Principal Management Group of North Texas-Associa's (Associa's) joint Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Richard Chichakli's pro se Complaint. MTD (ECF No. 9). For the reasons explained in these Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation the Court should GRANT Defendants' Motion, DISMISS Chichakli's federal claims for failure to state a claim and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state-law claims.

Background

This lawsuit arises out of a dispute, or series of disputes between Chichakli and the HOA that governs the Park Lane Townhomes condominium project in Dallas, Texas (the “project”), and its management company, Associa. See generally Compl. (ECF No. 3); see also generally Pl.'s Exs. (ECF No. 3-1).

Chichakli alleges that he purchased a condominium in the project on December 4, 2020. Almost immediately thereafter, he started having problems with the HOA and Associa. For example, Chichakli alleges Defendants failed to provide him with keys for several weeks to the laundry room, mailroom, and other common areas, thus depriving him of full access to the project. Compl. ¶ 14. Defendants also allegedly failed to promptly process his application for a parking permit, and his car was towed because he did not have a permit. Id. ¶¶ 29-30, 32-33, 60.

On December 22, 2020, Chichakli threatened to sue Defendants for the charges he incurred when his car was towed. Id. ¶¶ 32-33; Pl.'s Exs. 25. Defendants allegedly required Chichakli to communicate with the HOA's lawyer and charged the lawyer's “cost of defense against [Chichakli's] unit as a special individual assessment.” Id.

In January 2021, Chichakli inspected some HOA records and learned the HOA allegedly borrowed funds in 2016 to pay for repairs that should have been covered by insurance proceeds. Id. at 9-10; see Compl. ¶¶ 20-21, 34, 36, 50-51. Defendants also allegedly selected workers to make the repairs without going through the competitive bid process outlined in the HOA rules. Id. ¶¶ 67, 69-70. Chichakli further claims the improperly selected workers are related to Defendants. Id.

After reviewing his HOA account-balance statement in June 2021, Chichakli told Defendants they failed to record all of his payments, incorrectly applied a late fee, and charged him incorrectly in general. Id. ¶¶ 38-39; Pl.'s Exs. 33-34. Counsel for Defendants responded and offered to correct the ledger if Chichakli would provide proof of payment. Id. at 38. After reviewing Chichakli's evidence, counsel advised him that the monthly assessments were paid in full but there was a small balance that included a late fee, a handling fee, and a legal fee. Id. at 44.

On August 1, 2021, Defendants sent Chichakli an email advising him that they had not received an April 2021 special assessment and to remind him that monthly assessments were increasing 18% on August 1. Id. at 45. Chichakli alleges Defendants never notified him of the special assessment and the monthly assessment increases. Id.

Based on these facts, Chichakli filed this lawsuit on August 3, 2021. By his Complaint, Chichakli asserts claims against Defendants for (1) violations of his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 19 of the Texas Constitution; (2) violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); (3) violations of “federal postal law;” and (4) violations of his rights under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). Compl. ¶ 1; see Id. ¶¶ 54-79. Chichakli also vaguely refers to other causes of action, including conspiracy, id. ¶ 1; violations of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, id. ¶¶ 1, 7, 53; the Texas Property Code, id. ¶ 53, 76-77; and the Texas Uniform Condominium Act, id. He alludes to being part of a “class” of HOA members. Id. ¶¶ 49, 64, 68. He also mentions tax fraud, insurance fraud, and falsification of records. Id. ¶¶ 1, 63, 65.

Defendants timely filed their motion to dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. MTD (ECF No. 9); Br. (ECF No. 19). Succinctly stated, Defendants argue Chichakli's constitutional claims fail because they are not government actors; his statutory claims fail because the statutes on which he relies do not provide for a private right of action; and Chichakli failed to allege sufficient facts to support his other claims for relief. Chichakli filed a Response, and Defendants filed a Reply. Resp. (ECF No. 12); Reply (ECF No. 13). The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for determination.

Legal Standards

When deciding a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court “accepts all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, therefore, a plaintiff's complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “To be plausible, the complaint's [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.' In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

This pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, ” but it does demand more than an unadorned accusation devoid of factual support. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). [A] formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). “While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Where the facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has stopped short of showing that the plaintiff is plausibly entitled to relief. Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may not look beyond the pleadings. Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). However, the pleadings, for the purpose of determining a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, include documents attached to the pleadings and to the motion to dismiss so long as they “are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to [his] claim.” Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)). “Dismissal is proper only if there is either: (1) the lack of a cognizable legal theory, or (2) the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” S&W Enters., LLC v. SouthTrust Bank, N.A., 2001 WL 238095, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2001) (Lindsay, J.) (quoting Stewart Glass & Mirror, Inc. v. U.S.A. Glass, Inc., 940 F.Supp. 1026, 1030 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988)).

Although the courts construe pro se litigants' pleadings liberally, pro se parties are not exempt from complying with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.[1] U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Richardson, 2018 WL 5722680, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 30, 2018) (Rutherford, J.) (citing Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981) (“The right of self-representation does not exempt a party from compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law . . . . Rather, such a litigant acquiesces in and subjects himself to the established rules of practice and procedure.”) (citations omitted)).

Analysis

In his Compliant, Chichakli asserts four enumerated claims against Defendants: (1) Defendants deprived him of access to the project's common areas thus violating the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Section 19 of the Texas Constitution; (2) Defendants engaged in fraud and stole HOA funds in violation of RICO; (3) Defendants withheld and “blockaded” his mail by depriving him access to the project's mailroom in violation of “federal postal law;” and (4) Defendants retaliated against him for bringing this lawsuit in violation of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the TCPA. Compl. ¶ 1; see Id. ¶¶ 54-79.

The Court addresses his federal claims first and pretermits consideration of his state law claims because all the federal claims should be dismissed. The Court does not consider any claims Chichakli raises for the first time in his Reply.

a. Chichakli fails to state a claim against Defendants for a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.

Among its protections, the Fifth Amendment protects citizens from deprivation of property by the federal government: “No person shall be . . .deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “The Fifth...

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