Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corporation

Decision Date16 May 1988
Docket NumberNo. 87-505,87-505
Citation108 S.Ct. 1684,100 L.Ed.2d 127,486 U.S. 140
PartiesCHICK KAM CHOO, et al., Petitioners, v. EXXON CORPORATION et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

After Leong Chong, a Singapore resident, was accidentally killed in that country while performing repair work on a ship owned by one of the respondents, a subsidiary of the other respondent, his widow, petitioner Chick Kam Choo (hereafter petitioner), also a Singapore resident, brought suit in Federal District Court alleging various causes of action, including claims under the general federal maritime law and the Texas Wrongful Death Statute. In 1980, the court granted respondents summary judgment on the maritime law claim, concluding that applicable choice-of-law principles required that Singapore law, and not the maritime law of the United States, should apply. The court also dismissed the rest of the case on federal forum non conveniens grounds, provided that respondents submit to the Singapore courts' jurisdiction. Petitioner then filed suit in the Texas state courts under the Texas statutes and Singapore law, but the Federal District Court enjoined petitioner from prosecuting any claims relating to her husband's death in the state courts. The Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting petitioner's contention that the injunction violated the Anti-Injunction Act (Act), which generally bars federal courts from enjoining state court proceedings. The court ruled that the injunction fell within the Act's "relitigation" exception, which permits a federal court to issue an injunction "to protect or effectuate its judgments."

Held: Because the District Court's injunction barring the state court proceedings is broader than is necessary "to protect or effectuate" that court's 1980 judgment dismissing petitioner's lawsuit from federal court, this case must be remanded for the entry of a more narrowly tailored order. Pp. 145-151.

(a) An essential prerequisite for applying the Act's relitigation exception is that the claims or issues which the federal injunction insulates from state court litigation actually have been decided by the federal court. This prerequisite is strict and narrow, requiring an assessment of the precise state of the record and what the earlier federal order actually said; it does not permit a post hoc judgment as to what the order was intended to say. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234. Pp. 146 148.

(b) Thus, since the 1980 judgment did not resolve the merits of petitioner's Singapore law claim, the injunction exceeded the Act's restrictions insofar as it barred the state courts from considering that claim. The 1980 judgment simply resolved that petitioner's claims should be dismissed under the federal forum non conveniens doctrine, and did not determine whether the state courts are an appropriate forum for the Singapore law claim. The Texas courts would apply a significantly different forum non conveniens analysis than the federal courts, and might well consider themselves an appropriate forum, in light of an "open courts" provision in the State Constitution. The argument that an independent state forum non conveniens determination is pre-empted under the "reverse-Erie " principle of federal maritime law, see, e.g., Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 222-223, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2494-2495, 91 L.Ed.2d 174, cannot help respondents, since that pre-emption question was not actually litigated and decided by the District Court. When a state proceeding presents a federal issue, even a pre-emption issue, the proper course under the Act is to allow the state court to resolve the issue. P. 148—150.

(c) Since petitioner's state law claim was necessarily adjudicated in the original federal action by the District Court's choice-of-law ruling that Singapore law controls petitioner's suit, the injunction, insofar as it barred the state courts from considering the state law claim, is within the scope of the relitigation exception and is permissible under the Act. Pp. 150-151.

(d) The fact that an injunction may issue under the Act does not mean that it must issue. On remand the District Court should decide whether it is appropriate to enter an injunction. P. 151.

817 F.2d 307, reversed and remanded.

O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 151.

Benton Musslewhite, Houston, Tex., for petitioners.

James Patrick Cooney, Houston, Tex., for respondents.

Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the propriety of an injunction entered by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The injunction prohibited specified parties from litigating a certain matter in the Texas state courts. We must determine whether this injunction is permissible under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, which generally bars federal courts from granting injunctions to stay proceedings in state courts.

I

In 1977 Leong Chong, a resident of the Republic of Singapore, was accidentally killed in that country while performing repair work on a ship owned by respondent Esso Tankers, Inc., a subsidiary of respondent Exxon Corporation. Petitioner Chick Kam Choo, also a resident of Singapore, is Chong's widow. In 1978 she brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, presenting claims under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. § 761 et seq., the general maritime law of the United States, App. 4, and the Texas Wrongful Death Statute, Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. §§ 71.001-71.031 (1986).

Respondents moved for summary judgment on the Jones Act and DOHSA claims, arguing that Chong was not a seaman, which rendered the Jones Act inapplicable, and that Chong had not died on the "high seas" but while the ship was in port, which rendered the DOHSA inapplicable. App. 9-10. Respondents also moved for summary judgment on the claim involving the general maritime law of the United

Choo's attorneys, Benton Musslewhite and Joseph C. Blanks, having been specifically enjoined by the District Court, are also petitioners before this Court. For convenience, however, we shall use the term "petitioner" to refer only to Choo. States, arguing that due to the lack of substantial contacts with the United States, the maritime law of Singapore, not that of the United States, governed. Id., at 10 (citing Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 73 S.Ct. 921, 97 L.Ed. 1254 (1953); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959)). In addition to seeking summary judgment, respondents moved for dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, arguing that under the criteria identified in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947), the District Court was not a convenient forum.

In 1980, the District Court, adopting the memorandum and recommendations of a Magistrate, granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on the Jones Act and DOHSA claims. The court agreed with respondents that those statutes were inapplicable. App. 29-31, 34. With respect to the general maritime law claim, the District Court applied factors identified in Lauritzen and Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 90 S.Ct. 1731, 26 L.Ed.2d 252 (1970), to the choice-of-law question and concluded that the "statutory and maritime law of the United States should not be applied." App. 32. This conclusion led the court to grant summary judgment on petitioner's general maritime law claim, as well as to consider whether dismissal of the rest of the case was warranted under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. After reviewing the various factors set out in Gilbert, the court concluded that dismissal was appropriate and accordingly granted respondents' motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds, provided respondents submit to the jurisdiction of the Singapore courts. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 699 F.2d 693, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826, 104 S.Ct. 98, 78 L.Ed.2d 103 (1983).

Rather than commence litigation in Singapore, however, petitioner filed suit in the Texas state courts. Although the state complaint initially included all the claims in the federal complaint, as well as a claim based on Singapore law, petitioner later voluntarily dismissed the federal claims. This left only the Texas state law claim and the Singapore law claim. See Brief for Petitioners 4, n. 4. Respondents briefly succeeded in removing the case to the District Court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ultimately held that complete diversity did not exist and the case was returned to the District Court with instructions to remand it to state court. 764 F.2d 1148 (1985).

Respondents then initiated a new action in federal court requesting an injunction to prevent petitioner and her attorneys, Benton Musslewhite and Joseph C. Blanks, "from seeking to relitigate in any state forum the issues finally decided" in the federal court's 1980 dismissal. App. 93. Petitioner moved to dismiss, arguing that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, prohibited the issuance of such an injunction. App. 96-98. Respondents, in turn, moved for summary judgment and a final injunction. Id., at 104-108. The District Court granted respondents' motion and permanently enjoined petitioner and her attorneys "from prosecuting or commencing any causes of action or claims against [respondents] in the courts of the State of Texas or any other state . . . arising out of or related to the alleged wrongful death of Leong Chong." Id., at 119.

Petitioner appealed, reiterating her contention that the injunction violated the Anti-Injunction Act. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected this...

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