Chickasaw Nation v. Dep't of the Interior

• Decision Date: 16 April 2014
• Docket Number: No. CIV–05–1524–W,CIV–05–1524–W
• Citation: 120 F.Supp.3d 1190
• Parties: The Chickasaw Nation and The Choctaw Nation, Plaintiffs, v. The Department of the Interior et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma

120 F.Supp.3d 1190

The Chickasaw Nation and The Choctaw Nation, Plaintiffs,

v.The Department of the Interior et al., Defendants.

No. CIV–05–1524–W

United States District Court, W.D. Oklahoma.

Signed April 16, 2014

Bradley Earl Beckworth, John C. Hull, Nix Patterson & Roach LLP, Austin, TX, Charles Cary Patterson, Nix Patterson & Roach LLP, Texarkana, TX, Dallas L. Dale Strimple, Jason B. Aamodt, Aamodt Law Firm, Louis W. Bullock, Bullock Law Firm PLLC, Deanna L. Hartley, Tulsa, OK, Daniel S. Volchok, David W. Bowker, Seth P. Waxman, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, Michael Burrage, Randa Kay Reeves, Reggie N. Whitten, Whitten Burrage, Robert H. Henry, Oklahoma City, OK, Trey N. Duck, III, Nix Patterson & Roach LLP, Daingerfield, TX, Bob Rabon, Rabon Wolf & Rabon, Hugo, OK, Kerry L. Pedigo, Miller Keffer & Pedigo-Dallas, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Frank J. Singer, III, Jessica M. Held, Judith E. Coleman, Marissa A. Piropato, Matthew M. Marinelli, Anthony P. Hoang, Robert W. Rodrigues, Washington, DC, Robert Don Evans, Jr., U.S Attorney's Office, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendants.

ORDER

LEE R. WEST, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Since the Treaty of Hopewell was signed on January 3, 1786, by The Choctaw Nation ("Choctaw Nation") and on January 10, 1786, by The Chickasaw Nation ("Chickasaw Nation"), wherein the United States of America acknowledged that the Choctaw Nation and the Chickasaw Nation were "to be under [its] ... protection," 7 Stat. 21, Article 2; e.g., 7 Stat. 24, Article 2, "the United States has held in trust for the[se] Nations vast resources including, inter alia, land, minerals, and monetary funds." Doc. 91 at 8, ¶ 23. In the third amended complaint filed in this matter, plaintiffs Chickasaw Nation and Choctaw Nation (collectively "Nations") have alleged that despite this protective trust relationship and although "specifically charged with a duty to fully and completely account for its fidelity in the management of trust assets," id., the federal government has "never accounted to the Nations for its management of any of these lands, assets or funds[.]" Id. ¶ 24. It instead

illegally began the process of appointing the [Nations'] chief executives ... and subsequently ... illegally disbanded the Nations' legislatures, ... [thereby gaining] total control over the Nations, their governments, their property, their funds and their claims[,]

id. at 19, ¶ 50,

did not require ... its appointed chiefs and governors [to] maintain any records of their actions on behalf of the Nations[,]

id. at 21, ¶ 57, and as to any documents that did exist, "took [such] control," id. at 22, ¶ 57, of the same that by

the 1970s, there were few, if any, records memorializing the actions taken by these federally appointed executives on behalf of the Nations.

Id.

"[l]nvok[ing] their right ... as a beneficiary of th[is] ... trusteeship," id. at 1, ¶ 1, the Nations have brought this action "to resolve accounting and related equitable claims¹ ... [arising from] the [federal government's] ... management of the Nations' assets and funds." Id. In their prayer for relief, the Nations have requested both declaratory and injunctive relief, including an order that compels the defendants to provide "a full and complete accounting ... [of] all funds, assets, lands, investments, claims, and natural resources placed in[ ] ... trust ... for the [Nations'] benefit...." Id. at 43.

On May 4, 2010, the Court divided the litigation into phases. The instant phase, Phase I, concerns the Nations' "trust accounting and trust management claims that pre-date 1946," Doc. 100 at 1, ¶ (1)(b), and the matter now comes before the Court on the Motion for Dismissal or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment² filed pursuant to Rules 12 and 56, F.R.Civ.P., by the defendants, as named in the third amended complaint: United States of America, Department of Interior ("DOI"), Kenneth Salazar, then-Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary"), Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA"), Larry Echohawk, then-Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, Office of the Special Trustee for American Indians, Donna M. Erwin, Principal Deputy Special Trustee for American Indians, Office of Trust Fund Management, Dianne Moran, Acting Director of Trust Fund Management, Bureau of Land Management, Bob Abbey, then-Director of the Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement ("BOEMRE"),³ Michael Bromwich, BOEMRE Director, Department of the Treasury and Timothy F. Geithner, then Secretary of the Treasury.

The defendants' jurisdictional challenges are governed by Rule 12(b)(1), F.R.Civ.P.⁴ A motion filed under this rule is considered " "a "speaking motion" and can include references to evidence extraneous to the [third amended] complaint' without converting [the motion] ... to a motion [governed by Rule 56, supra ]." Breakthrough Management Group. Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino and Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 1188 (10th Cir.2011) (quoting Wheeler v. Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 259 n. 5 (10th Cir.1987) )(other citation omitted). The Court may therefore exercise "wide discretion ... [and] allow affidavits[ and] documents ... to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under [Rule] 12(b)(1) [, supra ]." Wheeler, 825 F.2d at 259 n. 5.

The defendants have also cited Rule 12(c), F.R.Civ.P. A motion for judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant to this rule is analyzed under the same standard applicable to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for relief filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), F.R.Civ.P. E.g., Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1160 (10th Cir.2000). Under Rule 12(b)(6), supra, and thus, under Rule 12(c), supra, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the plaintiffs' amended pleading as true and construe those allegations, and any reasonable inferences that might be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the Nations. To survive a request for dismissal under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c), supra, the third amended "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ).⁵

As to those matters that are governed by Rule 56, supra, also cited by the defendants, summary judgment must be granted "if the ... [defendants, as the moving parties,] show[ ] that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that they are] ... entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(a), supra. At this stage of the litigation, the Court does "not ... weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter...." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Rather, the Court must only decide "whether there is a genuine issue for trial ... [and] there is no [triable] issue ... unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving part[ies] for a jury to return a verdict for th[ose] part[ies]. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249–50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). The Court's inquiry must be whether the evidence, when viewed "through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden," id. at 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505, "presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505.⁶

"In making this determination, ... [the Court must] ‘examine the record and all reasonable inferences that might be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the [Nations, as the] non-moving part[ies].’ " Pinkerton v. Colorado Department of Transportation, 563 F.3d 1052, 1058 (10th Cir.2009) (quoting T–Mobile Central, LLC v. Unified Government of Wyandotte County, 546 F.3d 1299, 1306 (10th Cir.2008) (citations omitted)). That is to say, in addition to the undisputed facts, the Court must accept the Nations' version of the facts but only to the extent the disputed facts are supported by the record and are not based upon mere conclusory allegations. In addressing the issues raised by the parties, the Court, to the extent applicable, has followed the outline set forth in the parties' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, as revised and supplemented. See Docs. 169, 170, 173, 174.

The Chickasaw Nation first adopted a written constitution that outlined its government organization in 1846. That document was thereafter amended on several occasions. In 1867, a new constitution was adopted that remained in effect until 1983 ("1867 Constitution"). See Doc. at 91 at 10, ¶ 28; Doc. 119–6.

Under the 1867 Constitution, "[t]he powers of the [g]overnment ... [were] divided into three distinct departments." Id. at 5, Article III, Section 1. The judicial department was comprised of a supreme court, district courts, and if necessary, county courts. See id. at 14, Article VI, Section 1. "The Supreme Executive power ... [was] vested in a Chief Magistrate, who [would be called] ... ‘The Governor of the Chickasaw Nation,’ " id. at 10, Article V, Section 1, and who had the "power to enforce the laws...." Id. at 11, Article V, Section 6.

The third department created by the 1867 Constitution had two branches, a house of representatives and a senate. E.g., id. at 7, Article IV, Section 1. The house of representatives and the senate formed "the [l]egislature of the Chickasaw Nation," id., which, the Nations have alleged, was empowered inter alia "to order the commencement of legal and equitable claims when necessary to protect the [Chickasaw] Nation's[ ] rights, privileges or interests." Doc. 91 at 10, ¶ 29. Such power, according to the Nations, included authorizing prior to 1911 "the hiring of attorneys to prosecute claims ... to protect the assets of...