Chilcutt v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 07 October 2009
• Docket Number: No. 1:08cv116.,1:08cv116.
• Citation: 662 F.Supp.2d 967
• Parties: Carl D. CHILCUTT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

662 F.Supp.2d 967

Carl D. CHILCUTT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant.

No. 1:08cv116.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division.

October 7, 2009.

Charles T. McGinnis, III, Mark Wayne Napier, Freking & Betz, Cincinnati, OH, Jennifer E. McKibben, John C. Bohdan, Glaser & Ebbs, Ft. Wayne, IN, for Plaintiffs.

Heather MacGregor Hawkins, Joseph Benjamin Russell, Thompson, Hine LLP, Cincinnati, OH, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

S. ARTHUR SPIEGEL, Senior District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Ford Motor Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 35), Plaintiffs Carl D. Chilcutt and Pam Chilcutt's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 41), and Defendant's Memorandum in reply thereto (doc. 44). For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. 35).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Carl Chilcutt ("Chilcutt")is a truck driver employed by Team Transit Incorporated ("Team Transit") and Plaintiff Pam Chilcutt is his wife; both are Indiana citizens (docs. 1 and 41). Defendant Ford Motor Company ("Ford" or "Defendant"), a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan, hires Team Transit's truck drivers to empty dumpsters at the Ford Sharonville Transmission Plant ("the Plant") in Ohio and carry the contents of the dumpsters away (doc. 35).

On March 14, 2006, Chilcutt was instructed to drive a tractor-trailer carrying an empty dumpster to the Plant (doc. 41). Once there, Chilcutt was to deposit the empty dumpster at the Plant, load a full dumpster onto his trailer, and haul the full dumpster away (Id.). Upon arrival at the Plant, Chilcutt unloaded the empty dumpster and then positioned his truck near the full dumpster to prepare to load it onto his trailer (Id.). Before Chilcutt could load the dumpster, he needed to cover it with a tarp (Id.). In the process of covering the dumpster, Chilcutt slipped on an oily substance and fell into an uncovered sump pit (Id.). During his fall, Chilcutt injured his knee and required two subsequent knee surgeries (Id.).

The sump pit is a four-by-four feet hole that Ford uses to collect oil, coolant, grease, and other substances from two nearby dumpsters (doc. 35). The substances drain into the sump pit from valves situated at the bottom of the dumpsters (Id.). Chilcutt claims that he was submerged in fluid up to his chest upon falling into the pit (doc. 41).

The pit itself is black in color (doc. 35). It is located at the end of a thirty feet by five feet concrete island that is elevated by 8 inches (Id.). A large (one hundred feet by sixty feet) gray concrete pad surrounds the pit (Id.). According to Plaintiffs, the concrete pad was covered in oil and other substances draining from the nearby dumpsters, making the pad indistinguishable from the sump pit because they appeared to be essentially the same color (doc. 41). Plaintiffs claim that the presence of the pit is obscured by "numerous dumpsters" also located on the pad (Id.).

The sump pit is usually covered by a steel plate, four to five inches thick (doc. 35). The cover, when placed on top of the pit, is elevated 4 to 5 inches above the sump pit (doc. 44). However, in order to clean the sump pit, the cover must be removed (doc. 35). On the day of Chilcutt's accident, the sump pit was uncovered, and during the time of the accident it was not being cleaned (Id.). While the sump pit's cover was off that day, Chilcutt claims there was no warning of the missing cover, no attending employees, nor any guard railing placed along the uncovered pit (doc. 41).

Additionally, there is some factual confusion regarding the existence of a sign that was positioned near the sump pit at the time of Chilcutt's fall. Ford argues that a "6 feet tall bright sign" that described the presence of the sump pit nearby was located on the concrete island (doc. 35). However, Chilcutt claims that this sign did not exist prior to, nor at the time of, Chilcutt's accident, and claims that the sign was added to the concrete island after the incident occurred (doc. 41). Chilcutt also contends that the sign in question does not serve as a warning to the dangers of the sump pit, but only depicts its location (Id.).

During Chilcutt's work as a truck driver, he frequented the Plant three to four times a week over the course of a couple years (doc. 35). In that time, Chilcutt had also worked around the dumpsters and pit in question two to three times per week which, Defendant notes, means that he worked near the dumpsters and the pit an estimate of 200 to 300 times prior to the day of the incident (Id.). Additionally, Defendant avers that Chilcutt knew that the purpose of the sump pit was to collect oil and other runoff from the dumpsters and that the area around the pit was always oily and greasy (Id.). In their Complaint, Plaintiffs stated that to the best of Chilcutt's knowledge, the cover could only be removed for cleaning purposes (doc. 1). Chilcutt had never seen the pit uncovered prior to the day of his fall, and on each of his prior visits to the pit it had always been covered (doc. 41). On the day of the incident, Chilcutt did not notice the pit was uncovered until he was already falling backwards into it (Id.).

Basing this Court's jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship, Plaintiffs bring an Ohio-law negligence action against Ford, alleging that Chilcutt has suffered severe injuries as a direct and proximate result of Ford's negligence and that Pam Chilcutt has suffered both emotional distress and loss of consortium resulting from that negligence (doc. 1). Plaintiffs seek damages in excess of $75,000 (Id.). Defendant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment; Plaintiffs responded; and Defendant filed its reply. The matter is ripe for the Court's consideration.

II. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Although a grant of summary judgment is not a substitute for trial, it is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; see also, e.g., Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962); LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir.1993); Osborn v. Ashland County Bd. of Alcohol, Drug Addiction and Mental Health Servs., 979 F.2d 1131, 1133 (6th Cir.1992) (per curiam). In reviewing the instant motion, "this Court must determine whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Patton v. Bearden, 8 F.3d 343, 346 (6th Cir.1993), quoting in part Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The process of moving for and evaluating a motion for summary judgment and the respective burdens it imposes upon the movant and the non-movant are well settled. First, "a party seeking summary judgment ... bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact[.]" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also LaPointe, 8 F.3d at 378; Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 405 (6th Cir.1992); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989). The movant may do so by merely identifying that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case. See Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., L.P.A., 12 F.3d 1382, 1389 (6th Cir.1993).

Faced with such a motion, the non-movant, after completion of sufficient discovery, must submit evidence in support of any material element of a claim or defense at issue in the motion on which it would bear the burden of proof at trial, even if the moving party has not submitted evidence to negate the existence of that material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). As the "requirement [of the Rule] is that there be no genuine issue of material fact," an "alleged factual dispute between the parties" as to some ancillary matter "will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis added); see generally Booker v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., Inc., 879 F.2d 1304, 1310 (6th Cir.1989). Furthermore, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Gregory v. Hunt, 24 F.3d 781, 784 (6th Cir.1994). Accordingly, the non-movant must present "significant probative evidence" demonstrating that "there is [more than] some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts" to survive summary judgment and proceed to trial on the merits. Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 339-40 (6th Cir.1993); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405.

Although the non-movant need not cite specific page numbers of the record in support of its claims or defenses, "the designated portions of the record must be presented with enough specificity that the district court can readily identify the facts upon which the non-moving party relies." Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405, quoting Inter-Royal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). In contrast, mere conclusory allegations are patently insufficient to...