Child v. Bemus

• Decision Date: 07 February 1891
• Parties: CHILD, Chief of Police v. BEMUS.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

21 A. 539

17 R.I. 230

CHILD, Chief of Police

v. BEMUS.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 7, 1891.

Exceptions from court of common pleas, Providence county.

Nicholas Van Slyck, City Sol., and Cyrus M. Van Slyck, Asst. City Sol., for plaintiff.

Charles E. Gorman, for defendant.

DURFEE, C. J. This is a complaint against the defendant for driving a hackney carriage without license, in violation of an ordinance of the city of Providence. On trial thereof in the court of common pleas, on appeal from the police court, it appeared that July, A. D. 1890, a license was granted to the defendant for one year, and that September 16, A. D. 1890, it was revoked by the mayor on recommendation of the superintendent of hacks, representing that the defendant had refused to remove his carriage at the Boston depot when told to do so by the officer there. It was revoked without notice or hearing. The evidence in support of the complaint showed that the defendant was driving for hire September 22, A. D. 1890. The defense was that the revocation was void. The jury, under rulings by the court sustaining its validity, found the defendant guilty. The cause is before us on exceptions to said rulings. Power is given to the city council of the city of Providence by the city charter "to make laws, ordinances, and regulations relative to hackney carriages, trucks, carts, and other vehicles, and licensing and regulating the same." Under this provision the city council passed an ordinance forbidding any person to drive a hackney carriage in the city without license from the mayor and board of aldermen under penalty of a fine of not less than two nor more than twenty dollars, making the licenses grant-able by the mayor and aldermen, in their discretion, and giving the mayor power to revoke any license so granted.

The defendant's first point is that the city council, in conferring power to revoke upon the mayor, exceeded their authority under the charter. The authority given by the charter is expressed in broad terms. It is to make laws, ordinances, and regulations relative to hackney carriages and licensing them. The language seems to us to be broad enough to authorize not only the granting of licenses, but also the granting of them subject to a power of revocation; and we see no reason why such power may not be vested by ordinance in the mayor. It is argued that the licensee has a vested right in his license beyond the city council's power to forfeit. Assuming that this would be so if the power to revoke were not reserved, it seems to us that when, as here, the license is granted under an ordinance that gives or reserves the power, it is to be regarded as subject to the power, and terminable by its exercise. The license is in the nature of a privilege to perform a public service or function for reward, which service or function, for the public good, and to secure its orderly and efficient performance, must be subjected to certain regulations. These regulations must be obeyed; and therefore the power to revoke the license is highly important,...