Childers v. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co.

• Citation: 881 F.2d 1259
• Decision Date: 07 September 1989
• Docket Number: No. 87-1727,87-1727
• Parties: 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3217, 112 Lab.Cas. P 11,370, 4 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 1069 Peggy CHILDERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC TELEPHONE COMPANY, A New York Corporation; David Charles Seal; Ray N. Brown, M.D.; Robert E. Gerring, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (4th Circuit)

Page 1259

881 F.2d 1259

131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3217, 112 Lab.Cas. P 11,370,

4 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 1069

Peggy CHILDERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CHESAPEAKE AND POTOMAC TELEPHONE COMPANY, A New York

Corporation; David Charles Seal; Ray N. Brown,

M.D.; Robert E. Gerring, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 87-1727.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Nov. 1, 1988.

Decided July 28, 1989.

Rehearing and Rehearing In Banc Denied Sept. 7, 1989.

William Ober, Baltimore, Md. (Daniel Cohen, Office of Daniel Cohen, on brief), for plaintiff-appellant.

Leonard Edwin Cohen (Mary E. Pivec, Frank, Bernstein, Conaway & Goldman, Baltimore, Md., on brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before PHILLIPS and WILKINSON, Circuit Judges, and BOYLE, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

After being discharged by the Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company, Peggy Childers filed this action in Maryland state court against C & P and three of C & P's employees, alleging wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress. She claimed that her discharge was in retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims and violated Maryland's public policy against handicap discrimination. Defendants removed the action to federal district court, claiming that Childers' state-law claims were preempted by Sec. 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185. The district court found that Childers' state claims were preempted by Sec. 301 and therefore properly removed. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of C & P and the individual defendants, holding that Childers failed to satisfy the prerequisites of a Sec. 301 cause of action, 670 F.Supp. 624.

We affirm, but for different reasons than those stated by the district court. We hold that a federal court has jurisdiction in a removed Sec. 301 action to address the merits of alleged state-law claims during the course of determining its own jurisdiction, and, that it lies within the discretion of a federal court to dismiss meritless state-law claims during the course of its preemption inquiry. See Washington v. Union Carbide Corp., 870 F.2d 957, 959-62 (4th Cir.1989). Here the invalidity of Childers' state claims is apparent and entitled defendants to summary judgment. We decline, therefore, to address appellees' preemption claims.

I.

Peggy Childers began working with C & P in 1973 as a telephone installer. She was a member of the Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, and its Local 2100. The terms and conditions of her employment with C & P were governed by a collective bargaining agreement between C & P and the union, which prohibited termination of employees without "just cause" and vested C & P employees with numerous rights and benefits, including the right to grieve and arbitrate employment disputes.

On September 3, 1981, Childers injured her finger while installing a telephone for C & P. She filed a workers' compensation claim and was awarded temporary total disability benefits through October 8, 1981. Because of her disability, C & P removed Childers from phone installation and promoted her to the position of central office technician. In June of 1983, Childers filed a workers' compensation claim for permanent partial disability benefits for her hand injury.

Also in June of 1983, Childers began psychiatric treatment for depression which she alleged resulted from her hand injury and C & P's reaction to it. On July, 11, 1983, Childers notified C & P that the conditions of her employment were intolerable and that she could no longer work for the company. Her last day of work with C & P was July 25, 1983. On October 3, 1983, she filed a workers' compensation claim for temporary total disability benefits based on an alleged work-related psychiatric disability.

C & P approved a medical disability leave for Childers pending a psychiatric determination of her ability to work. Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement she was paid medical benefits during this leave of absence. On November 30, 1983, C & P's psychiatrist concluded that Childers did not exhibit a work-related psychiatric disability. C & P's medical director therefore determined that Childers was able to return to work and would not receive medical disability benefits after December 8, 1983. Childers was notified of the company's decision but refused to return to work. On December 22, 1983, C & P notified Childers that she would be removed from the payroll if she failed to return to work by January 3, 1984. C & P terminated her employment on January 4, 1984 when she refused to return to the company.

On February 10, 1984, Childers requested the union to file a grievance on her behalf. The union refused to pursue the grievance because it was not filed within the time limit established by the collective bargaining agreement. The National Labor Relations Board also declined to intervene.

On January 5, 1987, Childers filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against C & P and its employees, David Charles Seal, Ray N. Brown, and Robert E. Gerring, alleging wrongful discharge on the basis of handicap discrimination, retaliatory discharge for filing workers' compensation claims, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. C & P and the individual defendants removed the action to federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1441(b) and 1331, claiming that Childers' state-law claims were completely preempted by Sec. 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA). Childers moved to remand the case to state court, asserting that her complaint was based solely on Maryland law and was therefore not removable to federal court.

On September 30, 1987, the district court denied Childers' motion to remand and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment. The district court found that Childers' state-law claims were preempted by Sec. 301 and therefore properly removed to federal court. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of C & P and the individual defendants because Childers failed to exhaust her contractual remedies and her Sec. 301 action was barred by the federal statute of limitations.

Childers appeals.

II.

We shall review in parts A and B the basic principles of federal jurisdiction in Sec. 301 preemption cases and explain in part C how our analysis differs from that in the dissenting opinion.

A.

The presence of federal question jurisdiction is generally determined by the "well-pleaded complaint" rule. Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13, 57 S.Ct. 96, 97-98, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908). Federal jurisdiction exists, in other words, "only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2429, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987).

In most instances, the plaintiff is the master of the complaint and may avoid federal jurisdiction by relying exclusively on state law. The doctrine of "complete preemption," however, serves as an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22-24, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2852-54, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). If a federal cause of action completely preempts a state-law claim, "any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily 'arises under' federal law," id. at 24, 103 S.Ct. at 2854, and is removable to federal court. The Supreme Court has held that the preemptive effect of a federal statute may be so "extraordinary" that it "converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well-pleaded complaint rule." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1547, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987). The complete preemption exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule "is applied primarily in cases raising claims preempted by Sec. 301 of the LMRA." Caterpillar, 107 S.Ct. at 2430. If appellant's claims are preempted by Sec. 301 of the LMRA, removal was appropriate in this case.

B.

We turn next to the nature of the preemption inquiry itself. Section 301(a) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a), provides that:

Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties....

In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451, 77 S.Ct. 912, 915, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957), the Supreme Court held that Sec. 301 not only provides federal jurisdiction over controversies involving collective bargaining agreements but also authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.

The principle of Sec. 301 preemption of state-law claims was more fully developed in later decisions. The Court concluded in Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 82 S.Ct. 571, 7 L.Ed.2d 593 (1962), that Congress enacted Sec. 301 with the intent that federal labor law doctrines would uniformly prevail over inconsistent state law. See also Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). However, in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1882-83, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988), the Court held that a state claim was not preempted by Sec. 301, despite the fact that resolution of the state claim might involve the same factual inquiry under the collective bargaining agreement. According to the Court, the application of state law is preempted by Sec. 301 "only if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement." Id., 108 S.Ct. at 1885.

The preemptive effect of Sec. 301 thus depends upon the...