Childress v. Walker

Decision Date21 May 2015
Docket NumberNo. 14–1204.,14–1204.
Citation787 F.3d 433
PartiesCraig A. CHILDRESS, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Roger E. WALKER, Jr., et al., Defendants–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Scott Jared Fisher, Attorney, Eric Youngbin Choi, Attorney, Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP, Chicago, IL, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Before RIPPLE, KANNE, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

Craig Childress brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against numerous administrators and individuals affiliated with the Big Muddy River Correctional Center (“BMRCC”) in Ina, Illinois. He alleged that those individuals had violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, he claimed that, upon completion of a prison-sponsored reentry program, the program instructor delivered a computer disk containing Mr. Childress's resume to the property officer, who in turn placed it in Mr. Childress's property box.

Mr. Childress later was discharged on mandatory supervised release (“MSR”); one of the terms of his release was that he could not possess any computer-related material. Following his release, a routine inspection of his living quarters revealed the envelope containing the computer disk, and his release was revoked.

After serving his extended sentence, Mr. Childress, acting pro se, filed this action. The district court, on initial review under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, dismissed the suit. On reconsideration, the court determined that Mr. Childress was not a prisoner within the meaning of the PLRA but that his action nevertheless should be dismissed on in forma pauperis review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

The district court's dismissal of Mr. Childress's complaint was premature. His complaint set forth sufficient facts to proceed against at least one of the defendants. Moreover, he should have been granted the opportunity to amend his complaint to cure any deficiencies in the remainder of his claims. Finally, the district court failed to consider adequately Mr. Childress's request to recruit counsel. For these reasons, we reverse the court's judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

IBACKGROUND1
A.

While Mr. Childress was serving a sentence at BMRCC for attempted aggravated sexual assault, he participated in a Lifestyle Redirection Program. The three-week program is intended to assist inmates with reentry into the community and with finding employment. Defendant Danalyn Wilson is the program instructor. It is the “policy, practice, and procedure” of the program to provide each participant with a hardcopy of the participant's resume and cover letter and to forward a computer disk with those materials to the BMRCC property room.2 This practice is known to BMRCC administrative staff. Consistent with this practice, when Mr. Childress completed the program on August 10, 2010, a computer disk containing his cover letter and resume was sent to the property room to be placed with his other belongings.

Mr. Childress was released from custody on August 19, 2010. One of the conditions of his release was that he not “possess[ ] ... computer related items.”3 Upon his release, Mr. Childress was provided with his personal property, including an envelope that contained the computer disk from the Lifestyle Redirection Program. The sealed envelope did not bear any markings that indicated or suggested that it contained a computer disk.

Fifteen days later, on September 3, 2010, agents of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) conducted an inspection of Mr. Childress's immediate living area. During that inspection, they discovered the still unopened envelope containing the computer disk from the Lifestyle Redirection Program. Mr. Childress was taken into custody for violating the conditions of his release. He initially was housed at the Statesville Correctional Center but, on November 16, 2010, was transferred back to BMRCC. When Mr. Childress arrived at BMRCC, he was greeted by the Assistant Warden of Programs, Ty Bates, who told Mr. Childress that there had been two other incidents in which inmates had been taken back into custody after follow-up inspections uncovered computer disks associated with prison programs. The following month, Mr. Childress's MSR was revoked following a hearing.

B.

After Mr. Childress served his criminal sentence, he was detained at the Treatment and Detention Facility in Rushville, Illinois, an institution administered by the Illinois Department of Human Services to house individuals held pursuant to Illinois's Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILCS 207/1–99. On December 3, 2012, while at Rushville, Mr. Childress filed the present action, alleging that the prison administration's practice of placing computer disks in inmates' property subjected him to an unnecessary risk of re-incarceration in violation of the Eighth Amendment and of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He named as defendants several IDOC directors, wardens of BMRCC, and other individuals affiliated with the Lifestyle Redirection Program.4 Mr. Childress also filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and a motion to appoint counsel. One week later, Mr. Childress filed a second motion for appointment of counsel.

On February 20, 2013, the district court dismissed Mr. Childress's complaint for failure to state a claim and denied all pending motions (including the motions to appoint counsel) as moot. The district court explained that it was required under the PLRA “to conduct a prompt threshold review” of the merits of Mr. Childress's claim.5 In undertaking this analysis, it was unable to conclude that any defendant knew that the placement of the computer disk in Mr. Childress's property would violate the conditions of his release. “At most,” the court continued, Plaintiff's allegations indicate that the placement of the computer disk in his property could have been a negligent act. A defendant can never be held liable under § 1983 for negligence.”6 Additionally, Mr. Childress “had exclusive control over his property items and could have easily found the computer disk. Indeed, it appears from the complaint that he knew he would be given the disk upon completion of the Life Style program, since he states that this was the regular practice.”7 Furthermore, even if Ms. Wilson had violated Mr. Childress's rights by giving him the computer disk, the court explained that

this would not translate into liability on the part of the wardens, IDOC Directors, or other Defendants in supervisory positions. The doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable to § 1983 actions; to be held individually liable, a defendant must be “personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.”8

The district court therefore dismissed Mr. Childress's complaint with prejudice, indicated that the dismissal would count as a “strike[ ] under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), and ordered the clerk to close the case and enter judgment in favor of the defendants.9 It denied the remaining motions as moot.

Mr. Childress then filed a motion seeking to alter, set aside, and vacate the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). He argued that he was not a prisoner for purposes of the PLRA, and that, therefore, the district court should not have subjected his complaint to PLRA pre-screening. Mr. Childress also maintained that there were errors in the district court's substantive analysis and requested that he be permitted to amend his complaint.

The district court granted in part and denied in part Mr. Childress's motion. The court agreed that Mr. Childress was not a prisoner for purposes of the PLRA. Nevertheless, because Mr. Childress had sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis, his complaint was subject to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which requires the court to dismiss any in forma pauperis action that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The court therefore reexamined the pleadings and found “no error in its conclusion that the factual allegations did not indicate that any Defendant's conduct rose to the level of unconstitutional deliberate indifference.”10

Mr. Childress filed a timely notice of appeal.

IIDISCUSSION

On appeal, with the assistance of counsel, Mr. Childress submits that the district court committed several errors. He first maintains that his complaint did state a claim, and, therefore, it should not have been dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Even if his complaint were deficient in some manner, Mr. Childress contends that the district court should have granted him leave to amend. Finally, Mr. Childress argues that the district court committed legal error in failing to consider his motion to appoint counsel.

A.

We turn first to the allegations of his complaint. Mr. Childress submits that he stated a claim for violations of his substantive and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment as well as for violations of the Eighth Amendment.

Mr. Childress's primary argument on appeal is that the defendants' actions violated his substantive due process rights. The Supreme Court has stated, however, that plaintiffs should resort to the substantive guarantees of the Due Process Clause for relief only when there is not “a particular Amendment [that] provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Armstrong v. Squadrito, 152 F.3d 564, 569 (7th Cir.1998) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 842, 118 S.Ct. 1708 ). The Eighth Amendment is the primary source of constitutional protection for incarcerated individuals. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664–68, 97 S.Ct. 1401, ...

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