Childs' Estate v. Hoagland

• Decision Date: 17 March 1943
• Docket Number: 35.
• Citation: Childs' Estate v. Hoagland, 181 Md. 550, 30 A.2d 766 (Md. 1943)
• Parties: CHILDS' ESTATE v. HOAGLAND et al.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

30 A.2d 766

181 Md. 550

CHILDS' ESTATE v. HOAGLAND et al.

No. 35.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 17, 1943

Appeal from Orphans' Court, Montgomery County; Carey E. Quinn Lewis F. Hobbs and Washington Waters, Judges.

Proceeding in the matter of the estate of Helen P. Childs, deceased. A petition was filed by the executor against Joseph C. Hoagland and others for a determination as to what property was to be distributed under the several paragraphs of the residuary clause of deceased's will. From decree entered, an appeal was taken.

Affirmed.

Nicholas J. Chase, of Washington, D. C. (Albert L. Cox and William E. Leahy, both of Washington, D. C., on the brief) for appellant.

F. Bernard Welsh, of Rockville (Clark H. Hebner, of New York City, on the brief), for appellees.

Before SLOAN, C.J., and DELAPLAINE, COLLINS, MARBURY, GRASON, and MELVIN, JJ.

MARBURY Judge.

This case involves the construction of the residuary clauses of the will and codicil of Helen P. Childs of Montgomery County, Maryland. It arose through the filing of a petition by the executor in the Orphans' Court of Montgomery County, in which he stated that question had arisen as to what property was to be distributed under the several paragraphs of the residuary clause, and that it would depend upon the determination of this question who would get the property mentioned in these paragraphs. Appropriate parties were made, and appeared at a hearing before the Orphans' Court, at which documentary evidence was offered, and an agreed stipulation of facts was filed. The Orphans' Court then passed the order determining what passed and to whom under the residuary clauses. From that order this appeal is taken.

The Orphans' Courts of this State have the power, under the provisions of Sections 243 and 245 of Article 93 of the Code, to determine who are legatees under a will, and what is given to such legatees. The determination of such questions necessarily involves a construction of the will. That was determined as early as Pole v. Simmons, 45 Md. 246, and that decision has been followed by a number of others, including Gallagher v. Martin, 102 Md. 115, 62 A. 247; In re Hagerstown Trust Company, 119 Md. 224, 86 A. 982; Redwood v. Howison, 129 Md. 577, 99 A. 863; Boland v. Ash, 145 Md. 465, 125 A. 801; Collins v. Cambridge Hospital, 158 Md. 112, 148 A. 114; Longerbeam v. Iser, 159 Md. 244, 150 A. 793. The case before us comes within the principles laid down in these decisions. The Orphans' Court of Montgomery County had jurisdiction to determine the question raised in the executor's petition.

This question is the determination of what passed under Item XVII(a) of the testatrix' will as modified by Item I of her codicil. When that question is determined, the question of who is to get her residuary estate follows automatically. The reason for this is that she divided her residuary estate into two parts, Item (a) being concerned with the part which she received from a specific source, and Items (b) and (c) bequeathing the balance. Different legatees received the bequests in the three subdivisions. If certain property is found to pass under subsection (a), it will go to those named in that subsection. If, on the other hand, it is determined that it does not so pass, then it will go to those named in subsections (b) and (c).

The testatrix by Item XVII, devised and bequeathed all the rest, residue and remainder of her property and estate, real and personal, of whatever kind and wheresoever situate of which she dies seized and possessed, or was entitled at the time of her death, in the following way:

'(a) Any property, real or personal, to which I may be entitled at the time of my death, from the estate of my great-grandfather, Haynes L. Porter in equal shares, unto those who may survive me of my cousins, Nellie A. Porter, Grace Porter, Rosa P. Hoagland and Alice P. Templeton, all hereinbefore mentioned, the issue, however, surviving at my death of any of them who may pre-decease me, to take, per stirpes, the same part, share or interest which the deceased ancestor would have taken if surviving me;'

The remainder of her residuary property is devised two-thirds by subsection (b) to her cousins Caroline Childs and Lowrie Childs, and one-third by subsection (c) to two other cousins, Grace Weston and Helen M. Perkins. There are some provisions and contingencies mentioned in these subsections, but it is not necessary to consider them, nor is it necessary to relate how other parties have become substituted in the case in place of some mentioned in the will by reason of death, inheritance, etc. The stipulation of facts shows that the parties mentioned in subsection (a) are descendants of the testatrix' grandfather, Haynes L. Porter, (erroneously called great grandfather in the will). They are referred to by counsel as the Porter cousins, a designation which is properly descriptive, and which we will adopt for the purposes of this opinion. Likewise, those entitled under subsections (b) and (c) are cousins of the testatrix on her father's side, he being Thomas S. Childs. They are no relation to Haynes L. Porter, and will be referred to as the Childs cousins.

The testatrix by Item I of her codicil modified sub-Item (a) of Item XVII of her will by directing that such sub-Item should not include certain accumulations of income. Item I reads as follows:

'Item I: I hereby modify sub-item (a) of Item XVII of my last will and testament aforesaid, by providing that the property and estate covered thereby, and to which I may be entitled at the time of my death, from the estate of my grandfather, Haynes L. Porter, shall not include such of my interest in the said estate as may represent undistributed accumulations of net income or any income therefrom due me at the time of my death, but such sub-item (a) shall include any interest of mine in the said estate, excluding the aforesaid income, which I may have the power to dispose of by testamentary disposition.' It so happens that the estate of the testatrix is entitled to certain shares of a trust fund coming to her directly from her grandfather, Haynes L. Porter, and certain other shares of the same fund coming to her out of the Porter property, but reaching her indirectly through the estates of her grandmother and her two sisters. The Porter cousins claim that they are entitled to all of this property, originating from the Haynes L. Porter estate, whether it came to the testatrix directly or indirectly. The Childs cousins claim that only the property coming to the testatrix directly from the Haynes L. Porter estate passes to the Porter cousins under subsection (a), and that the property which the testatrix received indirectly through other estate passes to them, the Childs cousins, under subsections (b) and (c). The Orphans' Court decided in favor of the Porter cousins and so decreed. This appeal is taken by the Childs cousins.

Haynes L. Porter died February 10th, 1873, a resident of Hartford Connecticut, and testate. He left the residue of his estate in trust for the benefit of his wife, Lucinda B. Porter, during her life. Upon her death, one-half was to be given to his son absolutely, and the other one-half was to be held by the trustees to pay over the interest and income to his three grandchildren, the children of his deceased daughter, Mary E. P. Childs, and to the survivors or survivors of them and their heirs. These grandchildren were Mary Lowrie Childs, who died October 13th, 1930; Fannie Graham Childs, who died February 18th, 1932; and Helen P. Childs, the testatrix who died October 3rd, 1938. Haynes L. Porter therefore was the grandfather of Helen P. Childs, as correctly stated in the codicil of her will, and not the great grandfather, as stated in subsection (a) of Item XVII of her will. The Brooklyn Trust Company had become substituted trustee of the trusts under the Haynes L. Porter will. At a Surrogate's Court for the County of Kings, State of New York, on December 17th, 1941, there was filed a decree as a result of a petition of the trustee for construction of the Porter will. Such construction became necessary after the death of Helen P. Childs, the last surviving grandchild. The Surrogate determined that Haynes L. Porter died intestate in respect to the corpus of the trust left to the grandchildren. He decreed that the estate of Helen P. Childs should receive a one-ninth undivided interest, the estate of Mary Lowrie Childs a one-ninth undivided interest, the estate of Fannie Graham Childs a one-ninth undivided interest, and the estate of Lucinda B. Porter a one-third undivided interest. It appears from the stipulation that Mary Lowrie Childs left her estate to her sisters, Fannie Graham and Helen P., and the survivor. Fannie Graham Childs left her estate to her sisters Mary Lowrie and Helen P. Childs equally. Helen P. Childs was also an heir of her grandmother, Lucinda B. Porter, who died intestate July 18th, 1874. Her estate therefore became entitled to a one-eighteenth share of the Haynes L. Porter corpus through her grandmother's estate. This was also the case with the estates of Mary Lowrie Childs and Fannie Graham Childs. The result of this situation, is that the Helen P. Childs estate will receive one-ninth of the Haynes L. Porter corpus directly from the Haynes L. Porter estate, and, indirectly, will receive one-eighteenth through the Lucinda B. Porter estate, one-eighteenth under the will of Mary Lowrie Childs, one-thirty-sixth under the will of Mary Lowrie Childs from her part of the Lucinda B. Porter estate, one-eighteenth under the will of Fannie Graham Childs, one thirty-sixth under the will of Fannie Graham Childs coming to the latter through Mary Lowrie Childs and Lucinda B. Porter, and...