Childs v. Bank of Missouri

• Decision Date: 31 October 1852
• Citation: 17 Mo. 213
• Parties: CHILDS, Plaintiff in Error, v. THE BANK OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI, Defendant in Error.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

17 Mo. 213

CHILDS, Plaintiff in Error,

v.THE BANK OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI, Defendant in Error.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1852.

1. Neither an action for malicious prosecution, for slander, nor for false imprisonment, can be maintained against a corporation.

2. Although, under the new code, a plaintiff may unite in his petition as many causes of action as he may have, yet each cause must be distinctly and separately stated.

Error to St. Louis Court of Common Pleas.

Childs brought an action under the new code, alleging that the defendant had falsely accused, and caused him to be accused of embezzlement, and upon this charge had unjustly and maliciously, and without probable cause, caused him to be arrested and imprisoned; that under color of a search warrant, the defendant had obtained possession of certain valuable papers and evidences of debt belonging to the plaintiff; that the defendant had caused the dwelling house of plaintiff to be beset by armed men by day and by night, thus restraining the plaintiff and his family of their liberty, and interrupting their intercourse with their friends; and that the defendant had falsely and maliciously caused the plaintiff to be indicted and prosecuted; for all which grievances, the plaintiff claimed damages to the amount of fifty thousand dollars.

A demurrer to this petition was sustained, and the cause is brought to this court by writ of error.

Edward Bates, for plaintiff in error. The bank, as a corporation, was legally capable of doing all the wrongs charged in the petition; but if capable of doing any one of them, it was erroneous to sustain the demurrer. Our statute law puts corporations and private persons on the same footing. R. C. 1845, ch. 101, § 10. Our statute of set-off is not restrained to natural persons. City of St. Louis v. Rogers, 7 Mo. R. 19. The federal courts consider corporations as the mere aggregate of the individual members, and take or refuse jurisdiction accordingly. Hope Insurance Co. v. Boardman, 5 Cranch, 57. Bank v. Deveaux, ib. 61. Bank U. S. v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904. Kirkpatrick v. White, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 595. A money corporation may commit a trespass, and it is sufficent to charge the corporation as a trespasser, that its president ordered the sheriff to execute a writ. Ford v. Perpetual Insurance Co., 11 Mo. Rep. 295. In the nature of things, corporations are as capable of doing wrongful acts, as private persons are, and justice requires that they should be held responsible for them in the same way; and this is the settled doctrine of the common law. Yarborough v. Bank of England, 16 East, 6. Parsons v. Loyd, 3 Wilson's Rep. Goodloe v. Cincinnati, 4 Ohio, 513. 4 S. & R. 6. Angell & Ames on Corporations, (3 ed.) 385, § 7, and especially p. 391.

Miron Leslie, for defendant in error. It is physically and legally impossible that a corporation, as such, can maliciously prosecute, or wilfully slander any one. Kyd on Corporations. Bacon's Ab. 4 Serg. & R. 6. 16 East, 6. 20 Maine Rep.

RYLAND, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

1. The difficulty under which we have labored in this case was to classify the action. It is brought under the new code. If it were an action of slander, we should at once say that it could not be maintained. The bank is a corporation-- it cannot utter words--it has no tongue--no hands to commit an assault and battery with--no mind, heart or soul to be put into motion by malice; therefore, if it was an action for an assault and battery, or for a malicious prosecution, or for slander, we should at once say, that such could not be maintained. Yet the doctrine is well settled that corporations are now liable for torts, in some cases, in the same manner as persons individually are. The bank of England has been sued in trover and the action sustained. Many corporations have been sued for the misfeasance or malfeasance or negligence of their servants or agents. Yet I have not been able to find where a public or private corporation was sued, either for slander, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment or for assault and battery, and the action held maintainable. In the nature of things, manifest injustice might follow from allowing such actions. In such corporations, the majority of the incorporators rule and manage the affairs, appoint agents, officers and servants, and direct their conduct.

Suppose the majority of directors of a bank should, by a vote, order one of its servants to strike a man, or to have a man accused of larceny, and have him arrested and imprisoned; these acts were ordered to be done by a majority, against the votes and wishes of the minority. Now let the corporation be held liable to be sued as such, and the innocent must suffer with the guilty, the non-offending with those directing and ordering the injury. This cannot be. In 20 Maine Rep. 43, State v. Great Works Milling and Manufacturing Co., it is said by Chief Justice Weston, “a corporation is created by law for certain beneficial purposes. They can neither commit a crime or misdemeanor by any positive or affirmative act, or incite others to do so as a corporation. It is a doctrine in conformity with the demands of justice and a proper distinction between the innocent and the guilty, that when a crime or misdemeanor is committed under color of corporate authority, the individuals acting in the business and not the...