Childs v. Goodland Econ. Lodging, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 106,583.,106,583. |
| Citation | 277 P.3d 1193 |
| Parties | Noel A. CHILDS, Appellant, v. GOODLAND ECONOMY LODGING, INC., d/b/a Super 8 MOTEL, A South Dakota Corporation, et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Sherman District Court; Scott Show Alter, Judge.
Dale E. Bennett and Rebecca P. Bennett, of Law Offices of Dale E. Bennett, of Westwood, for appellant.
John D. Gatz, of Colby, for appellees.
Before MALONE, P.J., PIERRON and BRUNS, JJ.
In the early morning hours of December 30, 2006, Noel A. Childs was injured when he slipped and fell on the exterior stairs at the Super 8 motel (Super 8) in Goodland. Childs, who is a truck driver, was staying at the Super 8 because I–70 was closed due to a severe winter storm that dumped nearly 17 inches of snow on Goodland. Childs subsequently brought a negligence action against the owners of the Super 8. After prolonged litigation, the district court ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Because we find that a business proprietor does not have a duty to remove precipitation from exterior surfaces during a winter storm—and for a reasonable time thereafter—we affirm the district court's decision.
On December 29, 2006, Childs was driving a truck for Mail Contractors of America west on I–70. Around 10 a.m., Childs was forced to stop in Goodland because I–70 was closed due to a winter storm. Childs checked in to the Super 8 and was given a room on the second floor.
It was snowing when Childs arrived in Goodland, and snow continued to fall for the next 18 hours. By the time it stopped falling around 3 a.m. on December 30, 2006, nearly 17 inches of snow had accumulated. Moreover, even after the snow stopped, the strong winds continued to blow—with gusts as high as 39 miles per hour.
During the day on December 29, 2006, Childs spent his time contacting his employer, walking to a nearby truck stop where he had parked his truck, talking to other drivers, shopping at Wal–Mart, and eating at fast food restaurants. Childs also moved his truck on several occasions so it would not be stuck when the storm ended. According to Childs, the last time he checked on his truck that evening, it was dark outside and snow was still falling.
After checking on his truck, Childs returned to his room at the Super 8 and fell asleep. Around 4 a.m., he woke up and realized he had left his truck running. So Childs decided to leave his motel room to go to the truck stop and shut off the truck's engine.
Childs first attempted to use an interior staircase to go downstairs. But when he got to the bottom of the stairs, the door to the outside would not open because of a snow drift. Childs then went back up the stairs and attempted to go down the outside staircase. When he took a step, he fell and landed at the bottom of the stairs.
After he fell, Childs thought he had sprained his ankle. He briefly spoke to the woman on duty in the front office and returned to his room on the second floor. Childs was able to go back to sleep but woke up again around 7 a.m. When he awoke, Childs realized that his ankle was not just sprained because it was severely swollen. Childs called the front office for help, and an ambulance was called.
Because of the drifting snow, it was necessary for the ambulance to follow a snowplow that cleared a path from the hospital to the Super 8. In fact, Childs testified that he saw the snowplow clearing the way for the ambulance from his motel room. Although the trip from the hospital to the motel usually took 3 minutes, it took 12 minutes because the snow was so bad on the streets.
On December 29, 2008, Childs filed a petition for damages against the owners of the Super 8. Ultimately, on July 1, 2011, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, Childs timely appealed.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In making this determination, the district court is required to resolve all facts and inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence in favor of the party against whom the ruling is sought. An adverse party opposing a motion for summary judgment must come forward with evidence to establish a dispute as to a material fact, and the facts subject to the dispute must be material to the conclusive issues in the case. Osterhaus v. Toth, 291 Kan. 759, 768, 249 P.3d 888 (2011).
Furthermore, summary judgment should be granted with caution in negligence cases. See Edwards v. Anderson Engineering, Inc., 284 Kan. 892, 904, 166 P.3d 1047 (2007). To prove a negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, an injury, and a causal connection between the duty breached and the injury suffered. Whether a duty exists is a question of law, and whether the duty has been breached is a question of fact. Reynolds v. Kansas Dept. of Transportation, 273 Kan. 261, Syl. ¶ 1, 43 P.3d 799 (2002). Summary judgment is proper in a negligence action if the only questions presented are questions of law. See Smith v. Kansas Gas Service Co., 285 Kan. 33, 39, 169 P.3d 1052 (2007).
The same rules apply on appeal of a district court's decision on a summary judgment motion. A summary judgment decision must be reversed if reasonable minds could differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence. See Osterhaus, 291 Kan. at 768. But if reasonable minds could not differ as to the conclusions drawn from the evidence, summary judgment was appropriate. See Bartal v. Brower, 268 Kan. 195, 203, 993 P.2d 629 (1999).
In granting summary judgment to Super 8, the district court applied the law and rationale from this court's decision in Agnew v. Dillons, Inc., 16 Kan.App.2d 298, 822 P.2d 1049 (1991). Specifically, the district court found that the owners of the motel “could not be reasonably expected to keep an exterior staircase clear of ice and snow during or immediately following a severe blizzard.”
In Agnew, the plaintiff was exiting a Dillons grocery store when he slipped on a mat near the store's entrance. At the time the plaintiff had entered the store, an ice storm was in progress, and ice was accumulating in front of the store. The district court granted a directed verdict in favor of Dillons on the issue of liability. In affirming that part of the district court's decision, this court held:
Furthermore, in Jones v. Hansen, 254 Kan. 499, Syl. ¶ 5, 867 P.2d 303 (1994), the Kansas Supreme Court found that the holding in Agnew is supported by sound public policy.
In the present case, Childs contends that summary judgment was not appropriate because there is a question of fact regarding whether the Super 8 breached its duty of ordinary care. But based on the Agnew decision—which the parties agree is applicable to this case—the Super 8 had no duty to remove the snow and ice from the stairs during the storm or for a reasonable time after the storm had ended.
Although it appears that a majority of the snow had fallen by 6 or 7 p.m. on December 29, 2006, weather records showed that snow was still falling until 3 a.m. on December 30, 2006. Moreover, by the time the snow ended, almost 17 inches had accumulated and strong winds—gusting over 30 miles per hour—continued to blow the snow that had already fallen. In fact, even 3 hours after Childs fell, the conditions continued to be so bad that a snowplow had to lead the ambulance from the hospital to the motel.
Based on the Agnew decision, we do not find that the Super 8 had a duty to clear the motel's outdoor surfaces of nearly 17 inches of blowing snow between 3 a.m. and 4 a.m. in the morning. Likewise, we do not find that the Super 8 had a duty to warn Childs that the exterior stairway would likely be slick. Certainly, “ ‘every pedestrian who ventures out at such time knows he [or she] is risking the chance of a fall and of a possible injury.’ “ Agnew, 16 Kan.App.2d at 304 (quoting Walker v. The Memorial Hospital, 187 Va. 5, 22, 45 S.E.2d 898 [1948] ).
Here, Childs knew that the winter storm had shut down I–70. Because he had gone outside several times during the time he was staying at the Super 8, Childs also knew that the snow was very deep and that the wind was blowing the snow into drifts. In addition, before attempting to use the exterior stairs in the early morning hours of December 30, 2006, Childs had attempted to use the interior stairs but found the door to the outside to be blocked by snow. Although there is conflicting evidence in the record regarding whether the Super 8 put up sawhorses to barricade the exterior stairway, we do not find that the motel had a duty to warn Childs of the severe conditions that he should have known he would be facing if he attempted to go down the exterior stairs at 4 a.m.
Childs also argues that he reasonably relied on the safety of the exterior stairs because the motel employees had attempted...
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