Childs v. Motor City Casino Hotel
| Decision Date | 27 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 09-13108 & 10-13458 |
| Parties | GLENN CHILDS, Plaintiff, v. MOTOR CITY CASINO HOTEL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Honorable David M. Lawson
The matter is before the Court on objections to the report and recommendation filed by Magistrate Judge Michael J. Hluchaniuk recommending that the defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, construed in part as a motion for summary judgment, be granted. The plaintiff commenced this action by filing a pro se complaint alleging employment discrimination on the basis of gender. In a second amended complaint, that was followed by an addendum, he expanded his federal claims to include age discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. He also added some state law claims. The plaintiff was employed as a security officer with the defendant since 1999, and he alleges that he was "constructively discharged" in August 2008. The Court entered an order referring the case to the magistrate judge to conduct all pretrial matters. Thereafter, the defendant filed its motion for judgment on the pleadings or alternatively for summary judgment. Judge Hluchaniuk filed his report on October 5, 2010. The plaintiff timely filed an objection and the matter is before the Court for de novo review. The Court finds that the magistrate judge's conclusions are correct. Therefore, the Court will overrule the objections, adopt the reportand recommendation, grant the defendant's motion to for summary judgment, dismiss the federal claims with prejudice, and dismiss the state law claims without prejudice.
The plaintiff also filed a second case against this defendant, given case number 10-13458, in which he alleged that the defendant cancelled his health care benefits in violation of the Equal Pay Act. The two cases were consolidated, and the defendant filed another motion for judgment on the pleadings to address the new complaint. The defendant filed an answer to the motion. The Court has reviewed the motion papers and finds that the relevant law and facts have been set forth and that oral argument will not aid in the disposition of the motion. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the motion be decided on the papers submitted. See E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(f)(2). The Court concludes that the second complaint does not state a proper claim and likewise must be dismissed.
The plaintiff was hired by Motor City Casino in August 1999 as a security manager. During his tenure there, the plaintiff worked as a uniform and plain clothes security officer. One of his main points of contention arose from a transfer from plain clothes back to uniform status in August 2008, causing the plaintiff to complain to management. He was suspended for two days in September 2008 ostensibly for attendance policy violations and resigned later that month.
The plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on December 22, 2008 in which he alleged he had been discriminated against based on his gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of1964 and retaliated against for complaining of the Title VII violations. The EEOC dismissed the charge and issued a right-to-sue letter on May 6, 2009.
On August 6, 2009, the plaintiff filed his pro se complaint in this Court alleging discrimination based on gender and constructive discharge. The magistrate judge granted the plaintiff s two requests to amend the complaint. In his first amended complaint, the plaintiff added a claim for breach of contract to his sex discrimination and retaliation claims. In the plaintiff's second amended complaint and a later filing entitled "Errata Correction 2nd Amended Complaint," the plaintiff for the first time alleged age discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). He also included a claim for defamation.
The defendant answered the latest complaint and moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the plaintiff should not be permitted to proceed with his claims under the ADEA because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this lawsuit. The defendant argued that the plaintiff has failed to state a prima facie claim of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because the plaintiffs pleadings are insufficient as a matter of law to state a plausible claim for sex discrimination under federal law. Finally, on the retaliation claim, the defendant contended that the plaintiff failed to plead plausible allegations that he engaged in protected activity as a matter of law or that he suffered adverse employment action as a result.
The magistrate judge applied the summary judgment standard to the motion because the defendant referred to matters outside the pleadings. He found that the plaintiff failed to mention age discrimination in his EEOC filings, and therefore the failure to exhaust administrative remedies precluded the pursuit in this Court of his ADEA discrimination claim and any retaliation claim based on a violation of the ADEA. The sex discrimination claim was deficient, he said, because the plaintiffs papers did not include any allegations that similarly-situated women were treated differently in the workplace or gender-based discriminatory remarks. Certainly, the plaintiffcomplained about his treatment at the hands of his employer, but he did not connect that treatment to any sex discrimination. The magistrate judge concluded that the retaliation claims failed because the complaints did not allege that the plaintiff opposed conduct that violated Title VII, made a charge of discrimination, or assisted in an investigation. Nor did the plaintiffs allegations that he was verbally abused in retaliation for not allowing an employee to leave with casino property suggest that the plaintiff engaged in protected activity. Moreover, filing the EEOC charge could not have constituted protected activity because it was filed after the plaintiff voluntarily resigned. Finally, the magistrate judge recommended that because the federal claims should be dismissed, the Court should not continue to entertain the state law claims.
The plaintiff filed timely objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, but the objections do not address the substance of the report. Instead, the plaintiff alleges that procedural irregularities and misconduct of the magistrate judge and the defense lawyer require rejection of the report and recommendation. The plaintiff contends that certain unspecified court papers lack a proper electronic signature and there is no court seal on the report. Next, the plaintiff alleges that the recitation of the procedural history is inaccurate. He contends that his original complaint stated a proper claim for constructive discharge, and he was manipulated into filing amendments by defense counsel and the magistrate judge during teleconferences with the court. The plaintiff also accuses the magistrate judge of raising legal arguments and citing authority that the defendant never brought forth. He believes that the motion to dismiss was unfair to a pro se litigant and was filed so that defense counsel could multiply litigation costs. Finally, he accuses the magistrate judge and defense counsel of unethical conduct.
Objections to a report and recommendation are reviewed de novo. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Sixth Circuit has stated that "[o]verly general objections do not satisfy the objection requirement." Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006). "The objections must be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious." Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995). "'[O]bjections disput[ing] the correctness of the magistrate's recommendation but fail[ing] to specify the findings... believed [to be] in error' are too general." Spencer, 449 F.3d at 725 (quoting Miller, 50 F.3d at 380).
"[T]he failure to file specific objections to a magistrate's report constitutes a waiver of those objections," Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912 (6th Cir. 2004), and releases the Court from its duty to independently review the motion, see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149 (1985) (); Smith v. Detroit Fed'n of Teachers Local 231, 829 F.2d 1370, 1373 (6th Cir. 1987). As mentioned above, the plaintiffs objections do not address the substance of the magistrate's report or take issue with its legal pronouncements.
A pro se litigant's complaint is to be construed liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and is held to "less stringent standards" than a complaint drafted by counsel, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nonetheless, "[t]he leniency granted to pro se [litigants]... is not boundless, "Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004), and such complaints still must plead facts sufficient to show a redressable legal wrong has been committed, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Dekoven v. Bell, 140 F. Supp. 2d 748, 755 (E.D. Mich. 2001). To plead a case under the currentregime, a plaintiff "must plead 'enough factual matter' that, when taken as true, 'state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570 (2007). "Plausibility requires showing more than the 'sheer possibility' of relief but less than a 'probab[le]' entitlement to relief." Fabian v. Fulmer Helmets, Inc., 628 F.3d 278, 280 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ---U.S. —, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)).
The magistrate judge identified valid reasons why the plaintiff cannot proceed on his complaints. None of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial