Childs v. Radzevich, 8455.
| Citation | 139 F.2d 374 |
| Decision Date | 06 December 1943 |
| Docket Number | No. 8455.,8455. |
| Parties | CHILDS et al. v. RADZEVICH. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia) |
Mr. Emmett Leo Sheehan, of Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Richard W. Galiher, of Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellants.
Mr. J. Wilmer Latimer, of Washington, D. C., with whom Messrs, Walter C. Clephane and Gilbert L. Hall, both of Washington, D. C., appeared on the brief, for appellee.
Before GRONER, Chief Justice, and MILLER and ARNOLD, Associate Justices.
This is an action begun by appellants in the District Court to recover damages for personal injuries sustained while riding as guest passengers in appellee's automobile. The accident happened on Virginia State Route 644, some eight or ten miles from Alexandria. The trial judge, on plaintiffs' evidence, directed a verdict for defendant. The appeal followed.
What is popularly known as the guest-automobile statute is in effect in Virginia. It provides that no person transported as a guest by the owner of a motor vehicle shall be entitled to recover damages for injuries resulting from its operation, "unless such death or injury was caused or resulted from the gross negligence or willful and wanton disregard of the safety of the person * * * being so transported on the part of such owner * * *."1
The undisputed evidence shows that the three appellants were riding as guest passengers in appellee's automobile, and were injured when the automobile went out of control and ran with great force into a telegraph pole on the side of the road. The car was being driven by appellee on State Road 644, and he and his guests had only a little while before concluded a visit at the home of appellee's relative. The time was about ten o'clock in the evening. It was raining and very dark. As the automobile approached the intersection of Route 644 with Route 617, where there is a slight curve, the driver accelerated his speed to approximately fifty miles an hour, failed to heed a "Stop" sign protecting the intersection, and drove at the same high speed from the dirt-gravel road on which he had been travelling onto the macadamized portion of the road which begins at the intersection, and which was slippery as a result of the rainfall. As the automobile reached the paved section of the road it went out of control, skidding from one side to the other for a distance of more than three hundred feet, where it struck a telegraph pole some twelve to fourteen inches in diameter, broke it off and careened to the opposite side of the road where it stopped.
The single question in the case is whether, in the proper consideration of this evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it, enough was shown which, if credited by the jury, would in law justify a verdict under the provisions of the Virginia statute. The question is close, but we think there can be no doubt that driving an automobile fifty miles an hour in the rain on a very dark night, across a slightly curving intersection, from a dirt road to a paved one, in disregard of a "Stop" sign, is negligence. But under the Virginia statute that in itself is not sufficient to justify a verdict for plaintiffs; it must go farther and reach the degree of "gross." Here, if that test be applied to the spoken evidence of the witnesses, it may well be doubted whether it sufficiently measured up, for none of the occupants of the car testified that the owner-driver did any other act than increase his speed to cross the intersection. The night was dark and they could only guess the extent of acceleration. But in this class of cases, as we have found, it sometimes happens that the physical facts shown speak more effectively than the words of witnesses. Here it is admitted that though the car got out of control at the entrance to the intersection, it was then travelling at such speed that three hundred or more feet further its momentum was sufficient to cause it to cut down a twelve to fourteen inch pole, without stopping its progress. Viewed in this light, we are unable to say that fair-minded men might not...
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