Chile v. Beck

• Decision Date: 16 November 1982
• Docket Number: No. 80-35-A,80-35-A
• Citation: 452 A.2d 626
• Parties: Robert Adams CHILE v. Horace P. BECK, Jr., et al. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 626

452 A.2d 626

Robert Adams CHILE v. Horace P. BECK, Jr., et al.

No. 80-35-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Nov. 16, 1982.

Tillinghast, Collins & Graham, Providence, Louise Durfee, Robert W. Edwards, Christopher H. Little, for plaintiff.

Moore, Virgadamo & Lynch, Ltd., Jeremiah C. Lynch, Jr., Newport, Thomas T. Brady, Inc., Thomas T. Brady, Tiverton, for defendants.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

This controversy arises from the construction by a Superior Court justice of the May 29, 1969 will of Dorothy Bateman Beck (Dorothy), who at the time of her death in November 1972 owned the Bateman Farm, a parcel of land of almost sixty acres situated in the town of Tiverton on the westerly side of Punkateest Neck Road. The litigants are the plaintiff, Robert Adams Chile (Robert), the farm's faithful caretaker of forty years; and the defendants, Horace P. Beck, Jr. (Horace), Dorothy's son, and Bernard and Geraldine Taradash, who purchased the farm from Horace sometime after Robert and Horace became involved in this litigation.

At issue in the Superior Court, as it is here on appeal, is just what Dorothy intended when her attorney drafted a will that, by its twelfth clause, gave Bateman Farm to her son Horace "absolutely and in fee simple" but at the same time provided that if the farm was sold, Robert was to have the right to occupy Resurrection Piece, a guest house on the farm, "rent free for his life or for so long as he desires the same for his residence, together with a right of way from the back gate of the farm to said building. The conveyance of the farm shall be subject to this right of occupancy of Robert Adams Child." ¹

The trial justice, in rejecting Robert's claim that he had a life estate in the premises, relied upon the rule of construction found in Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. City of Woonsocket, 48 R.I. 345, 347, 137 A. 411, 412 (1927), which states that when a testator has made an "absolute estate in fee in land * * * a subsequent provision inconsistent with the absolute nature of that gift shall be regarded as a repugnant provision and treated as void in law." We acknowledge the repugnancy principle referred to in the City of Woonsocket case but are of the opinion that it is irrelevant to the case at bar.

Before proceeding to detail the rationale of our disagreement with the trial justice's conclusion, we shall look briefly at the pertinent evidence presented before the trial justice.

Robert had been employed by Dorothy as the caretaker of Bateman Farm since 1932. His responsibilities included taking care of a dairy herd that at times numbered as many as thirty-four cows and acting in such various capacities as plumber, carpenter, gardener, landscaper, and messenger. In return Robert received a salary that at one time reached as high as $220 a month plus housing (including utilities), food, and clothing. Throughout his employment and for some time after Dorothy's death, Robert lived in a house on the premises known as Farmer's Cottage.

Through the years Robert and Horace had been friends. Proof of this amicable relationship was a book written by Horace and given by its author to Robert with the following inscription: "To Bob, a friend of over forty years standing." This amicable relationship came under a strain once Horace retired from his academic duties at one of New England's prestigious colleges to assume the role of farmer. According to Horace, shortly after the change he realized that "a person who has a cow is a nursemaid, works morning and night, 365 days a year, to take care of them. I thought that was hard work * * * and I suggested something smaller." The "smaller" items were five sheep, but Robert preferred being a bovine babysitter to being a sheepherder.

As time marched on, the forty-year Bateman Farm friendship progressively unraveled. The situation deteriorated to the point that Horace's attorney informed Robert that his services were no longer required and that he was to leave the farm. Robert responded by instituting this suit.

The primary purpose of any will-construction suit is the discovery of the testator's or the testatrix's dispositive intent by reading the will in its entirety in the light of the circumstances attendant to the will's execution; and if the intent can be ascertained, it will be given effect as long as it is not contrary to law. Prince v. Roberts, R.I., 436 A.2d 1078 (1981); Strauss v. van Beuren, 119 R.I. 376, 378 A.2d 1057 (1977); Lux v. Lux, 109 R.I. 592, 288 A.2d 701 (1972). No one can quarrel with the rule of construction relied on by the trial justice, but this rule, like any other construction, must be subordinated, as here, to the testatrix's intent and must yield to that intent.

In City of Woonsocket, 48 R.I. at 346, 137 A. at 412, the testator, in giving his sister the residuary estate, had executed a will that contained the following term of art: "[T]o her, her heirs and assigns forever." Even though there appeared to be some language qualifying the gift, there was additional language that read: "It is my will * * * that my sister * * * is not to be restricted in any manner whatever from using and disposing of any part or all of my estate." Thus, the language under scrutiny in the City of Woonsocket case demonstrated a clear intent to make an absolute gift of the residuary estate.

However, this is not the case in regard to Dorothy's will. When her will is read in its entirety, it is obvious that Dorothy intended that Robert would have a roof over his head, to wit, Resurrection Piece, in the event that her son should decide to sell Bateman Farm. There is no indication that she had any intention of abandoning her caretaker when she executed the will; in fact, the trial justice specifically found that Dorothy "intended to provide living quarters for [the] plaintiff after her death." Again, when the will is read in its entirety, Dorothy's concern for Robert's continued well-being and her appreciation for his forty years of fidelity become even more manifest. She gave Robert a $30,000 legacy, all the furniture and furnishings from Farmer's Cottage (his abode at that time on the farm), a large tractor, and a variety of tools and equipment. In addition, she left explicit instructions in her will (which were repeated in a 1970 codicil) that her executors during the period when the estate was being administered were to pay Robert "so much money as they deem adequate for his proper subsistence and living expenses."

In Dyal v. Brunt, 155 Kan. 141, 146, 123 P.2d 307, 310 (1942), the Kansas Supreme Court expressly disapproved the use of the canon relied on by the trial justice in rejecting Robert's claim and pointed out that unwavering adherence to the rule that a devise of a fee may not be impaired by a subsequent contradictory provision has been supplanted by consideration of such matters as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the will, an examination of all the parts of the testamentary instrument, and a discernment of intent from such sources. A year later in Washington Trust Co. v. Arnold, 69 R.I. 121, 124, 31 A.2d 420, 421 (1943), this court, in construing a controversy somewhat similar to that now before us, emphasized the necessity of determining intent from an examination of the "whole will," stating that "where the testator has used certain technical words of limitation in describing a devise and bequest, such words will be given their ordinary meaning and effect as at common law, unless a contrary intent is clearly manifested by the testator elsewhere in the will." In other words, once a fee is given to a person in a will, the fee will not thereafter be taken away or diminished unless the terms clearly demonstrate an intent to limit the prior devise.

Taking our cue from what was said in the Arnold case, we cannot view the phrase "absolutely and in fee simple" in a vacuum. We are bound to give the language of the will such an interpretation as will carry out Dorothy's intent. In our opinion, any endorsement of the narrow view taken by the trial justice would nullify Dorothy's obvious beneficence to Robert, a result clearly at odds with her manifest intent. It is clear from an examination of the record that not only did Dorothy wish her son to have the ultimate exclusive control of the farm but she also wished her caretaker to be able to live there as he had for forty years. She intended Robert's interest to be limited to his right to have a shelter and comfort in the converted sheep shed known as Resurrection Piece, a place where he could hang his hat as long as he chose if and when the farm was sold. The farm would belong to Dorothy's son, but her caretaker would not be forgotten. Consequently, we are of the opinion that Robert received a right by Dorothy's will to occupy Resurrection Piece once the farm had been sold and that the devise to him is valid and enforceable.

In reaching this conclusion, we are not unmindful of Horace's argument that Robert's "executory interest * * * is violative of the rules at common law and, therefore, is null and void." He describes Robert's executory interest as "a future interest created in one other than the grantor which is not a remainder" but "vests upon the happening of a condition or event and in derogation of a vested freehold estate." Presbyterian Church of Carlyle v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 18 Ill.App.3d 713, 719, 310 N.E.2d 412, 417-18 (1974). Horace, after citing G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 34-4-11, which in its pertinent portion specifically authorizes the disposition by conveyance or will of any "executory * * * interest * * * in any tenements or hereditaments of any tenure," claims that Robert's interest is neither a hereditament, because it cannot be the subject of inheritance, nor a tenement, because it is not "an estate in land." Horace describes Robert's interest as a "bare personal right to residential use."

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