Chillemi v. Town of Southampton

Decision Date04 May 2013
Docket NumberNo. 12–CV–3370 (ADS)(ETB).,12–CV–3370 (ADS)(ETB).
PartiesCraig J. CHILLEMI, Plaintiff, v. The TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON, Eric Sickles, James Kiernan, and Thomas Tully, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Ruskin Moscou Faltischek PC, by Thomas Anthony Telesca, Esq., Of Counsel, Uniondale, NY, for Plaintiff.

Devitt Spellman Barrett, LLP, by Jeltje DeJong, Esq., Kelly E. Wright, Esq., Of Counsel, Smithtown, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

SPATT, District Judge.

The Plaintiff Craig J. Chillemi (“Chillemi” or the Plaintiff) brought the instant action against the Defendants for violations of his constitutional rights to freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures, freedom from compelled self-incrimination, and the right to equal protection, all stemming from an alleged false arrest on July 8, 2009, and his alleged subsequent false imprisonment. He asserts causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), including a Section 1983 false arrest claim. Presently before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by the Defendants. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff started dating a woman named Tara Tully in or around December 2006. Tara is the daughter of the Defendant Thomas Tully (Detective Tully), who was employed by the Southampton Town Police Department (“STPD”) as a detective about the time of the events in question. Detective Tully was also a member of the now-disbanded Street Crimes Unit.

On or about August 5, 2007, the Plaintiff was arrested by the STPD's Street Crimes Unit. Chillemi was staying at a house that he neither owned nor rented, along with five other persons, including Tara Tully. The house was raided by the Street Crimes Unit, which included the Defendant Lieutenant James Kiernan and Defendant Officer Eric Sickles as members. During the raid, it is alleged that Officer Sickles taunted the Plaintiff about his relationship with Tara Tully and allegedly propositioned her for a date. Tara Tully was removed from the scene by Lieutenant Kiernan and was not charged. However, the Plaintiff, along with the other persons at the scene, were arrested and charged. Chillemi pled guilty to the sale of a controlled substance and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree. On or about March 28, 2008, he was sentenced to four years in prison.

The Complaint states that in or about April 2009, the Plaintiff was paroled and entered a work release program through the Lincoln Correctional Facility in New York City. In his memorandum in opposition to the Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Plaintiff now claims that he was not paroled but “furloughed” from prison to enter the work release program. In any event, the Plaintiff participated in this program from April 2009 through July 2009, while continuing to date Tara Tully. According to the Complaint, this relationship incensed her father Detective Tully as well as Office Sickles, who was romantically interested in Tara Tully. Thus, the Complaint states that upon information and belief, the Defendants conspired to end the relationship under pretense and color of law.

On July 8, 2009, the Plaintiff was riding in the passenger seat of a rental car being driven by Tara Tully. They both arrived at a friend's home and while the Plaintiff was standing in the driveway, Officer Sickles arrived at the residence in an unmarked police car. Office Sickles then ticketed the Plaintiff for aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle because the Plaintiff was not permitted to drive while on work release. The General Traffic Complaint sworn to by Officer Sickles stated that the Plaintiff was driving, but the Plaintiff claims that in fact Tara Tully was driving. The Complaint states that this ticket was merely a pretext to illegally search the Plaintiff.

Chillemi alleges that while Officer Sickles was handcuffing him, Officer Sickles produced a small bag of cocaine without going into any of the Plaintiff's pockets. However, Office Sickles later claimed that he found the cocaine in Chillemi's right-side pants pocket.

Consequently, Officer Sickles arrested the Plaintiff for the unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the third degree and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree. However, the Plaintiff maintains that he was neither operating a vehicle on July 8, 2009, nor in possession of any illicit drugs at the time of his arrest. Chillemi contends in the Complaint that the charges were fabricated by Officer Sickles in concert with Lieutenant Kiernan and Detective Tully in an attempt to end the relationship between Tara Tully and Chillemi. It is alleged that Kiernan and Detective Tully were involved in this conspiracy in that Kiernan administered the oath for the General Traffic Complaint and Misdemeanor Information signed by Officer Sickles on July 8, 2009, even though both he and Detective Tully knew the statements made were knowingly false. In this regard, the Complaint alleges that Kiernan was aware of Sickles' unconstitutional actions and consciously chose to ignore them, effectively ratifying these illicit actions. Further, he alleges that Detective Tully knowingly acquiesced to the Plaintiff's unlawful arrest with deliberate indifference to the constitutional deprivations in his supervisory role with the STPD.

Despite the above allegations, on or about October 29, 2009, the Plaintiff agreed to a plea bargain with regard to the charges stemming from the July 2009 arrest. The charge of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree was reduced to a violation of unlawful possession of marijuana—neither a felony nor a misdemeanor. The charge of aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle was reduced to facilitating aggravated unlicensed operation—a traffic infraction. The Plaintiff was not sentenced to any jail time and a fine of $910.00 was imposed. According to the Plaintiff, he only entered into this plea bargain because of the understanding that it would not interfere with his participation in the work release program at the Lincoln Correctional Facility.

However, on or about November 2, 2009, a hearing was conducted by a review board at the Lincoln Correctional Facility. The review board recommended the Plaintiff's removal from the work release program based upon his convictions. Thus, Chillemi was removed from the work release program despite his claimed satisfactory performance and the willingness of his employer—Ketty-Linda Cleaning Corp. d/b/a Malone Restoration—to allow him to return to work if he were reinstated in the work release program. According to the Complaint, at the time of the Plaintiff's July 2009 arrest, the Defendants knew that the charges against him would result in a violation of the Plaintiff's parole (or furlough), leading to the Plaintiff's incarceration.

The Plaintiff was finally released from prison on or about December 31, 2010. He claims that it was a direct result of the deprivation of his constitutional rights on July 8, 2009, that he was falsely imprisoned for the approximate three and a half months while awaiting the disposition of the July 8, 2009 charges and then an additional fourteen months in a New York State penitentiary.

The Street Crimes Unit of the STPD was disbanded in the summer of 2011. In May 2012, Lieutenant Kiernan was suspended without pay as a result of numerous disciplinary charges. In addition, Officer Sickles was sent to a drug rehabilitation center at an unspecified time.

On or about July 9, 2012, the Plaintiff commenced this action, asserting causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). On or about August 30, 2012, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim.

II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard

Under the now well-established Twombly standard, a complaint should be dismissed only if it does not contain enough allegations of fact to state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The Second Circuit has explained that, after Twombly, the Court's inquiry under Rule 12(b)(6) is guided by two principles. Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66 (2d Cir.2009) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)).

“First, although ‘a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint,’ that ‘tenet’ ‘is inapplicable to legal conclusions,’ and [t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.’ Id. at 72 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). ‘Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss' and [d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’ Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950). Thus, [w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and ... determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.

In considering a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true the factual allegations set forth in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in the Plaintiff's favor. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118, 110 S.Ct. 975, 979, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990); In re NYSE Specialists Secs. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 91 (2d Cir.2007). Only if this Court is satisfied that “the complaint cannot state any set of facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief will it grant dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Hertz Corp. v. City of N.Y., 1 F.3d 121, 125 (2d Cir.1993). The issue on a motion to dismiss is “not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer...

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