Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc. v. Prince George's County

• Decision Date: 09 July 1973
• Docket Number: CHILLUM-ADELPHI,No. 324,324
• Citation: 269 Md. 486,307 A.2d 481
• Parties: VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, INC., et al. v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, Maryland.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 486

269 Md. 486

307 A.2d 481

CHILLUM-ADELPHI VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, INC., et al. v. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, Maryland.

No. 324.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

July 9, 1973.

William L. Kaplan, Hyattsville (Feissner, Kaplan, Smith, Joseph & Greenwald, Hyattsville, on brief), for appellants.

Nelson M. Oneglia, Associate Co. Atty., Upper Marlboro (Joseph S. Casula, County Atty., Upper Marlboro, on brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and BARNES, McWILLIAMS, SINGLEY, SMITH, DIGGES and LEVINE, JJ.

BARNES, Judge.

Four suits for declaratory decrees were filed in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, in equity. They were consolidated for hearing in the lower court and are before us on appeal and cross-appeal from a final order passed by the chancellor (McCullough, J.) on November 3, 1972. The declaratory relief sought concerned the legality, construction and effect of various provisions of the Code of Public Local Laws of Prince George's County, Resolutions of the Board of County Commissioners for Prince George's County and provisions of the Prince George's County Charter as they related to the Volunteer Fire Departments in the county and some of their officials and members. Three of the suits were filed against the Board of County Commissioners for Prince George's County prior to February 8, 1971, the effective date of the Prince George's County Charter, i. e., Equity No. D-3996 by Ronald E. Randolph on October 2, 1969; Equity No. D-4153 by James F. Dorsey on December 30, 1969; and Equity No. D-4244 by Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer Fire Department, Inc. et al. on February 18, 1970. The fourth suit, Equity No. D-6439, was filed against Prince George's County (the County) by Allentown Volunteer Fire Department, Inc. et al. on October 19, 1971. Various other Volunteer Fire Departments in Prince George's County were allowed to intervene in Equity No. D-4244 and on April 29, 1970, all of the remaining 37 Volunteer Fire Departments in Prince George's County were joined as additional parties defendants in Equity D-4244 upon the motion of the defendant, Board of County Commissioners for Prince George's County. After a pre-trial conference on December 3, 1971, the parties formulated some 22 issues of law for a declaration by the chancellor and these were incorporated in a pre-trial order.

Hearings were held on December 20 and 21, 1971, and on February 10 and March 3, 1972. The chancellor thereafter on April 14, 1972, issued his opinion and other making certain declarations, but indicating that, in regard to other issues, additional testimony was necessary. Further hearings were held on June 1, June 26 and September 21, 1972, after which the chancellor issued his final opinion and order of November 3, 1972, making his order of April 14, 1972, final.

The chancellor declared that the legal and beneficial interest in the assets of the Volunteer Fire Departments is in the respective volunteer fire companies and that these assets are not held by those companies upon any express, implied or charitable trust for the County. The chancellor, in reaching this decision, relied upon our decision in Mayor & Aldermen of City of Annapolis v. West Annapolis Fire and Improvement Company, 264 Md. 729, 288 A.2d 151 (1972). We agree generally with the chancellor's conclusion in this regard.

The chancellor, however, was further of the opinion, and so declared, that the proper construction of Chapter 628 of the Laws of Maryland, 1963-Section 32-17 of the Code of Public Local Laws of Prince George's County-applied only to volunteer fire companies organized under the Laws of Prince George's County subsequent to the effective date of Chapter 628, i. e., June 1, 1963. He concluded that the assets of the volunteer fire companies incorporated prior to that date (all of such companies before the lower court) were not affected by the provisions of that statute.

Section 32-17 provides:

'Sec. 32-17. Nonprofit fire companies and rescue squads.

'(a) Instrumentalities of county. All existing nonprofit incorporated volunteer fire companies and/or rescue squads operating in Prince George's County are hereby declared to be an instrumentality of Prince George's County and/or the municipality in which they operate for the protection of life and property from the hazards of fires, explosions and related perils.

'(b) Income to be public. No income of such existing nonprofit incorporated volunteer fire companies and/or rescue squads shall inure to any private person.

'(c) Assets. The beneficial interest in any assets, real or personal, held by such existing nonprofit incorporated volunteer fire companies and/or rescue squads shall be vested in Prince George's County or the municipality wherein such volunteer fire companies and/or rescue squads are located and operating, which said county or municipality shall be vested with full legal ownership of all such assets upon the retirement of all indebtedness of such volunteer fire companies and/or rescue squads.

'(d) Dissolution. In the event of dissolution or liquidation of such incorporated fire companies and/or rescue squads, title to all assets, real or personal, held by it, shall revert to and vest in Prince George's County or the municipality in which the fire companies or rescue squads are located.

'(e) Application. The provisions of this section shall apply to all volunteer fire companies and/or rescue squads hereinafter organized under the laws of Prince George's County.'

The volunteer fire companies successfully contended before the chancellor that the entire application of the statute was limited by subsection (e) to volunteer fire companies and rescue squads 'hereinafter organized' so that the provisions of subsection (c) in regard to assets did not apply to the plaintiffs-all organized prior to June 1, 1963. The County, however, contended that the words of subsection (a), (b) and (c) themselves, 'All existing nonprofit incorporated volunteer fire companies' and 'held by such existing nonprofit incorporated volunteer fire companies' (emphasis supplied), clearly indicated that it was intended that subsections (a), (b) and (c) applied to those volunteer fire companies incorporated and 'existing' prior to June 1, 1963. The County argued that subsection (e) was intended to indicate that the rovisions of the statute were applicable to volunteer fire companies and rescue squads organized after that date, without any intention to limit or modify the provisions of subsections (a), (b) and (c) in regard to 'existing' volunteer fire companies and rescue squads. By limiting the application of the statute to volunteer fire companies and rescue squads organized after the effective date of the statute, it was unnecessary for the chancellor to decide the constitutional issues inevitably arising if the statute was construed in the manner urged by the County. Does Section 32-17 represent an attempt to take the property of the existing incorporated volunteer fire companies for public use without the payment of just compensation as forbidden by Article III, Section 40 of the Maryland Constitution, or a denial of due process of law as provided for in Article 23 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution and in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution?

Alas, we are of the opinion that it was the legislative intent of Section 32-17 to apply subsections (a), (b), (c) and (d) to the volunteer fire companies and rescue squads existing when the Act became effective so that the constitutional issues are raised and must be decided in the present case. Our review of the...