Chimel v. California

• Decision Date: 23 June 1969
• Docket Number: No. 770,770
• Citation: Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969)
• Parties: Ted Steven CHIMEL, Petitioner, v. State of CALIFORNIA
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

395 U.S. 752

89 S.Ct. 2034

23 L.Ed.2d 685

Ted Steven CHIMEL, Petitioner,

v State of CALIFORNIA.

No. 770.

Argued March 27, 1969.

Decided June 23, 1969.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 13, 1969.%tcSee 90 S.Ct. 36.%tc

Keith C. Monroe, Santa Ana, Cal., for petitioner.

Ronald M. George, Los Angeles, Cal., for respondent.

Mr. Justice STEWARTdelivered the opinion of the Court.

This case raises basic questions concerning the permissible scope under the Fourth Amendment of a search incident to a lawful arrest.

The relevant facts are essentially undisputed.Late in the afternoon of September 13, 1965, three police officers arrived at the Santa Ana, California, home of the petitioner with a warrant authorizing his arrest for the burglary of a coin shop.The officers knocked on the door, identified themselves to the petitioner's wife, and asked if they might come inside.She ushered them into the house, where they waited 10 or 15 minutes until the petitioner returned home from work.When the petitioner entered the house, one of the officers handed him the arrest warrant and asked for permission to 'look around.'The petitioner objected, but was advised that 'on the basis of the lawful arrest,' the officers would nonetheless conduct a search.No search warrant had been issued.

Accompanied by the petitioner's wife, the officers then looked through the entire three-bedroom house, including the attic, the garage, and a small workshop.In some rooms the search was relatively cursory.In the master bedroom and sewing room, however, the offc ers directed the petitioner's wife to open drawers and 'to physically move contents of the drawers from side to side so that (they) might view any items that would have come from (the) burglary.'After completing the search, they seized numerous items—primarily coins, but also several medals, tokens, and a few other objects.The entire search took between 45 minutes and an hour.

At the petitioner's subsequent state trial on two charges of burglary, the items taken from his house were admitted into evidence against him, over his objection that they had been unconstitutionally seized.He was convicted, and the judgments of conviction were affirmed by both the California Court of Appeal, 61 Cal.Rptr. 714, and the California Supreme Court, 68 Cal.2d 436, 67 Cal.Rptr. 421, 439 P.2d 333.Both courts accepted the petitioner's contention that the arrest warrant was invalid because the supporting affidavit was set out in conclusory terms,¹ but held that since the arresting officers had procured the warrant 'in good faith,' and since in any event they had had sufficient information to constitute probable cause for the petitioner's arrest, that arrest had been lawful.From this conclusion the appellate courts went on to hold that the search of the petitioner's home had been justified, despite the absence of a search warrant, on the ground that it had been incident to a valid arrest.We granted certiorari in order to consider the petitioner's substantial constitutional claims.393 U.S. 958, 89 S.Ct. 404, 21 L.Ed.2d 372.

Without deciding the question, we proceed on the hypothesis that the California courts were correct in holding that the arrest of the petitioner was valid under the Constitution.This brings us directly to the question whether the warrantless search of the petitioner's entire house can be constitutionally justified as incident to that arrest.The decisions of this Court bearing upon that question have been far from consistent, as even the most cursory review makes evident.

Approval of a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest seems first to have been articulated by the Court in 1914 as dictum in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652, in which the Court stated:

'What then is the present case?Before answering that inquiry specifically, it may be well by a process of exclusion to state what it is not.It is not an assertion of the right on the part of the Government, always recognized under English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime.'Id., at 392, 34 S.Ct., at 344.

That statement made no reference to any right to search the place where an arrest occurs, but was limited to a right to search the 'person.'Eleven years later the case of Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543, brought the following embellishment of the Weeks statement:

'When a man is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his person or in his control which it is unlawful for him to have and which may be used to prove the offense may be seized and held as evidence in the prosecution.'Id., at 158, 45 S.Ct., at 287.(Emphasis added.)

Still, that assertion too was far from a claim that the 'place' where one is arrested may be searched so long as the arrest is valid.Without explanation, however, the principle emerged in expanded form a few months later in Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145—although still by way of dictum:

'The right without a search warrant contemporaneously to search persons lawfully arrested while committing crime and to search the place whr e the arrest is made in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means by which it was committed, as well as weapons and other things to effect an escape from custody, is not to be doubted.SeeCarroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543;Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652.'269 U.S., at 30, 46 S.Ct., at 5.

And in Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231, two years later, the dictum of Agnello appeared to be the foundation of the Court's decision.In that case federal agents had secured a search warrant authorizing the seizure of liquor and certain articles used in its manufacture.When they arrived at the primises to be searched, they saw 'that the place was used for retailing and drinking intoxicating liquors.'Id., at 194, 48 S.Ct., at 75.They proceeded to arrest the person in charge and to execute the warrant.In searching a closet for the items listed in the warrant they came across an incriminating ledger, concededly not covered by the warrant, which they also seized.The Court upheld the seizure of the ledger by holding that since the agents had made a lawful arrest, '(t)hey had a right without a warrant contemporaneously to search the place in order to find and seize the things used to carry on the criminal enterprise.'Id., at 199, 48 S.Ct., at 77.

That the Marron opinion did not mean all that it seemed to say became evident, however, a few years later in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374, andUnited States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 S.Ct. 420, 76 L.Ed. 877.In each of those casesthe opinion of the Court was written by Mr. Justice Butler, the author of the opinion in Marron.In Go-Bart, agents had searched the office of persons whom they had lawfully arrested,² and had taken several papers from a desk, a safe, and other parts of the office.The Court noted that no crime had been committed in the agents' presence, and that although the agent in charge 'had an abundance of information and time to swear out a valid (search) warrant, he failed to do so.'282 U.S., at 358, 51 S.Ct., at 158.In holding the search and seizure unlawful, the Court stated:

'Plainly the case before us is essentially different from Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231.There, officers executing a valid search warrant for intoxicating liquors found and arrested one Birdsall who in pursuance of a conspiracy was actually engaged in running a saloon.As an incident to the arrest they seized a ledger in a closet where the liquor or some of it was kept and some bills beside the cash register.These things were visible and accessible and in the offender's immediate custody.There was no threat of force or general search or rummaging of the place.'282 U.S., at 358, 51 S.Ct., at 158.

This limited characterization of Marron was reiterated in Lefkowitz, a case in which the Court held unlawful a search of desk drawers and a cabinet despite the fact that the search had accompanied a lawful arrest.285 U.S., at 465, 52 S.Ct., at 423.

The limiting views expressed in Go-Bart and Lefkowitz were thrown to the winds, however, in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 67 S.Ct. 1098, 91 L.Ed. 1399, decided in 1947.In that case, officers had obtained a warrant for Harris' arrest on the basis of his alleged involvement with the cashing and interstate transportation of a forged check.He was arrested in the living room of his four-room apartment, and in an attempt to recover two canceled checks thought to have been used in effecting the forgery, the officers undertook a thorough search of the entire apartment.Inside a desk drawer they found a sealed envelope marked 'George Harris, personal papers.'The envelope, which was then torn open, was found to contain altered Selective Service documents, and those documet § were used to secure Harris' conviction for violating the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.The Court rejected Harris' Fourth Amendment claim, sustaining the search as 'incident to arrest.'Id., at 151, 67 S.Ct., at 1101.

Only a year after Harris, however, the pendulum swung again.In Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 68 S.Ct. 1229, 92 L.Ed. 1663, agents raided the site of an illicit distillery, saw one of several conspirators operating the still, and arrested him, contemporaneously 'seiz(ing) the illicit distillery.'Id., at 702, 68 S.Ct. at 1231.The Court held that the arrest and others made subsequently had been valid, but that the unexplained failure of the agents to procure a search warrant—in spite of the fact that they had had more than enough time before...