Chin Fong v. Samuel Backus

• Decision Date: 17 April 1916
• Docket Number: No. 664,664
• Citation: 241 U.S. 1,36 S.Ct. 490,60 L.Ed. 859
• Parties: CHIN FONG, Appt., v. SAMUEL W. BACKUS, Commissioner of Immigration for the Port of San Francisco
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

241 U.S. 1

36 S.Ct. 490

60 L.Ed. 859

CHIN FONG, Appt.,

v SAMUEL W. BACKUS, Commissioner of Immigration for the Port of San Francisco.

No. 664.

Argued April 5 and 6, 1916.

Decided April 17, 1916.

Messrs. Jackson H. Ralston and William E. Richardson for appellant.

Assistant Attorney General Wallace for appellee.

Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:

Appeal from a judgment dismissing a petition for habeas corpus and remanding petitioner to the custody of the Commissioner of Immigration for the Port of San Francisco, in whose custody he was, pending petitioner's deportation.

A summary of the petition made by the district court is as follows:

'Petitioner Chin Fong, who had been a resident of the United States for a number of years, departed for China in November, 1912; that before he left he applied for a pre-investigation as to his status as a merchant, and a certificate was denied him on the ground that his original entry into this country was surreptitious; that notwithstanding this denial the petitioner left the country, and is now endeavoring to beenter as a returning Chinese merchant; that he presents the affidavits of a member of the New York firm to which he claims to belong and of two reputable Americans supporting his claim; that notwithstanding these facts he has been denied admission and ordered deported on the same ground that his pre-investigation certificate was denied, that is to say, because his original entry was surreptitious; that in so deciding the immigration department has exceeded its authority, as that question can only be determined under the exclusion laws by a justice, judge, or commissioner.'

A demurrer was interposed to the petition, which was sustained, the court saying: 'Had the petitioner been content to remain in this country, he could have been deported only after a hearing before a justice, judge, or commissioner. But as he left the country voluntarily, and even after a preinvestigation certificate was denied him, the question of his right to re-entry lies peculiarly with the immigration department, and as they have found that he is not entitled to re-enter, such finding cannot be disturbed. A different rule prevails, and a different tribunal determines, in the case of a Chinese applying to enter, from that of one already in this country whom it is sought to deport, under the exclusion laws.'

The decision of the court is contested and it is asserted (1) that the petition was sufficient to entitle petitioner to a discharge; (2) that the Commissioner of Immigration and Secretary of Labor could not require a greater and different degree of proof than that specified in § 2 of the act of Congress of May 5, 1892, entitled, 'An Act to Prohibit the Coming of Chinese Persons into the United States' [27 Stat. at L. 25, chap. 60, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 4315]; (3) that petitioner furnished the degree of proof required by the law; (4) that the rights guaranteed petitioner under the treaty between the United States and China concerning immigration, November 17, 1880 [22 Stat. at L. 826], were unduly and unlawfully infringed; and (5) that the decision of the Commissioner was against the law and was an abuse of discretion.

The appeal is direct from the district court, and can only be sustained against the motion of the United States to dismiss for want of jurisdiction in this court if there is a substantial question under the Constitution of the United States or a treaty made under their authority, § 238 of the Judicial Code [36 Stat. at L. 1157, chap. 231, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 1215] permitting an appeal from a district court when a constitutional question is involved and in any case 'in which . . . the validity or construction of any treaty made under its [United States] authority is drawn in question.'

It will be observed that appellant based his right to land solely on the ground that he had been a merchant in the United States before his departure to China, and that, therefore, it was not competent for the immigration officers to inquire or determine whether his...