Chin v. Daimlerchrysler Corp.
| Decision Date | 15 May 2007 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 95-5569(JCL). |
| Parties | David CHIN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
Allyn Zissel Lite, Bruce D. Greenberg, Lite, Depalma, Greenberg and Rivas, LCC, Newark, NJ, Paul J. Linker, Gruhin & Gruhin, Esqs., Nutley, NJ, Brian Hufford, Pomerantz Haudek Block Grossman & Gross, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.
Thomas R. Curtin, Graham, Curtin & Sheridan, PC, Morristown, NJ, for Defendant.
On November 8, 2006, the Court ruled that the 25 California-citizen Plaintiff's in this action are entitled to attorneys' fees under California Code of Civil Procedure § 1021.5 from Defendant DaimlerChrysler Corporation ("Chrysler"). See Chin v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., No. 95-5569, slip op. at 7, 43-44 (D.N.J. Nov. 8, 2006). The factual and procedural history of the case is detailed in that opinion, and will not be recounted here. See id. at 1-7.
Now before the Court is Plaintiffs' application for fees under section 1021.5. Plaintiffs, represented by the law firms of Lite DePalma Greenberg & Rivas, LLC ("Lite DePalma"), Pomerantz Haudek Block Grossman & Gross, LLP ("Pomerantz"), the Law Offices of James V. Bashian PC ("Bashian"), and Gruhin & Gruhin, PA ("Gruhin"), seek $11,465,020.26 in fees and expenses. Plaintiff's arrive at that number as follows:
Requested Attorneys' Fees
Firm Hours Billed Ave. Hourly Rate Lodestar
Pomerantz 4008.6 $541.17 $ 2,169,351.00
Lite DePalma 2037.3 $455.87 $ 928,755.00
Bashian 194.5 $438.68 $ 85,325.00
Gruhin 112.0 $375.00 $ 42,000.00
Totals: 6,352.4 $507.74 $ 3,225,431.00
Proposed Multiplier: × 3.5
Total Attorney Fee Request: $ 11,289,008.50
Requested Expenses
Firm Expenses
Pomerantz $ 137,406.62
Lite DePalma $ 38,517.20
Bashian $ 87.94
Gruhin $ 0
Total Expenses: $ 176,011.76
Grand Total Fee & Expense Request: $ 11,465,020.26
Chrysler replies that this figure is unreasonably excessive, and asserts that $95,389.23 would be a proper award of fees and expenses. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and expenses in the total amount of $4,654,433.14.1
To determine the proper amount of a statutory fee award under section 1021.5, California courts apply the so-called "lodestar adjustment method." See Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal.4th 1122, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 17 P.3d 735, 741-42 (2001) (citing Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal.3d 621, 186 Cal. Rptr. 754, 652 P.2d 985, 987-88 (1982) ("Serrano IV")). Under this method, the Court must first set a lodestar figure that represents the product of the "`time spent and reasonable hourly compensation of each attorney ... involved in the presentation of the case.'" Id. at 741 (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315, 569 P.2d 1303, 1316 (1977) ("Serrano III")). Then, the lodestar figure may be adjusted with a multiplier based on certain factors in order to fix the basic "fee at the fair market value for the particular action." Id.
The lodestar adjustment method serves to "anchor[] the trial court's analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney's services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary.'" Id. at 743 (quoting PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler, 22 Cal.4th 1084, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 198, 997 P.2d 511, 518 (2000)). The goal of the method is to arrive at a fee award that is "fully compensatory." Id. at 742.
The lodestar equals (1) "the reasonable hours spent," (2) "multiplied by the hourly prevailing rate for private attorneys in the community conducting noncontingent litigation of the same type." Id. (citing Serrano IV, 652 P.3d at 986-87). The verified time records submitted by Plaintiffs' attorneys will provide the starting point for the Court's lodestar determination. See Horsford v. Rd. of Trustees, 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 673 (2005). The "verified time statements of the attorneys, as officers of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous." Id.
The California Supreme Court has explained that "absent circumstances rendering the award unjust, fees recoverable under section 1021.5 ordinarily include compensation for all hours reasonably spent, including those necessary to establish and defend the fee claim." Serrano IV, 186 Cal.Rptr. 754, 652 P.2d at 997 (emphasis added). Lite DePalma, Pomerantz, Bashian, and Gruhin have submitted affidavits and a declaration detailing the 6,352.40 hours they allege were spent representing Plaintiff's from October 8, 1995 to the present.2 Chrysler contends that, for numerous reasons, a large number of these hours were not reasonably spent. These objections can be categorized into two groups. First, Chrysler argues that hours spent on activities that did not specifically help achieve the recalls are not compensable. Second, Chrysler contends that a number of claimed hours are "not subject to compensation" because they represent "`padding' in the form of inefficient or duplicative efforts." See Ketchum, 104 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 17 P.3d at 741.
(1) Hours Allegedly Not Spent to Obtain the Sought After Relief
"Attorney time spent on services which produce no tangible benefit for the client is not time `reasonably spent.'" Meister v. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 67 Cal.App.4th 437, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 913, 923 (1998). The Court has the discretion to "`reduce the amount of the attorney fees to be awarded where a prevailing party plaintiff is actually unsuccessful with regard to certain objectives of its lawsuit.'" Olson v. Auto. Club of So. Cal., 139 Cal.App.4th 552, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 7 (2006) (quoting Sokolow v. County of San Mateo, 213 Cal.App.3d 231, 261 Cal.Rptr. 520, 530 (1989)). In doing so, the "`court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply reduce the award to account for the limited success.'" Id. (quoting Sokolow, 261 Cal.Rptr. at 530).
Chrysler argues that Plaintiffs' attorneys spent 188.01 hours seeking to "prevent the notice of the recall" Chrysler initiated for its vehicles with the Bendix 10 Anti-Lock Breaking System ("AB S"), and that Plaintiff's should not receive fees for these hours. Chrysler contends that this work "was arguably antagonistic" to Plaintiffs' interests insofar as the relief sought included a recall, and consequently produced no tangible benefit.
Chrysler's characterization of Plaintiffs' work relating to Chrysler's notice of recall is misleading. Plaintiffs' attorneys did not seek to prevent Chrysler from executing the Bendix 10 recall. Nor did Plaintiffs' attorneys seek to prevent beneficiaries of the recall, including their own clients, from being notified. Plaintiff's sought, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d)(2), a Court order adding language to Chrysler's recall notice making clear that recipients could take advantage of the recall without waiving any rights or remedies they may be entitled to as potential class members of the Chin litigation. (See Supp. Reply Decl. of D. Brian Hufford ("Hufford Reply Deer), Ex. C, at 6-9, 11.) Far from being "antagonistic" to the proposed class, Plaintiffs' attorneys sought to protect their clients' interests.
However, Plaintiff's efforts were unsuccessful. On August 30, 1996, the Court issued an order denying Plaintiffs' motion. Therefore, even if not antagonistic to Plaintiffs' interests, Chrysler argues that this work did not contribute to any relief, and should not be compensated.
California courts have explained that the kind of limited litigation success that justifies a reduction in fees is best measured in terms of a party's failure to achieve ultimate litigation objectives, as opposed to mere unsuccessfully advanced legal theories in support of litigation objectives that were nevertheless achieved on other grounds. See Sokolow, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 530-31; Sundance v. Municipal Court, 192 Cal.App.3d 268, 237 Cal.Rptr. 269, 272-73 (1987); Olson, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d at 7-8. Where "`a lawsuit consists of related claims, and the plaintiff has won substantial relief, a trial court has discretion to award all or substantially all of the plaintiff's fees even if the court did not adopt each contention raised.'" Olson, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d at 7 (quoting Downey Cares v. Downey Comm'y Development Com., 196 Cal.App.3d 983, 242 Cal.Rptr. 272, 280 (1987)); see also Sokolow, 261 Cal.Rptr. at 531 (). The California Court of Appeal has recognized that
[c]ompensation should not be strictly limited to efforts that were demonstrably productive. ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Enron Corp. Securities
...Software Ass'n v. Granholm, No. 05-73634, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96429, at *7-8 (E.D.Mich. Nov. 30, 2006); Chin v. Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 520 F.Supp.2d 589, 608-09 (D.N.J.2007); and Citizens Ins. Co. of America v. KIC Chemicals, Inc., 2007 WL 2902213, **6-7, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73201, at ......
-
Roccisano v. Twp. of Franklin
...of billing for intra-office conferences, courts in this Circuit have come to different opinions. Compare Chin v. DaimlerChryler Corp., 520 F. Supp. 2d 589, 605 (D.N.J. 2007) reversed on other grounds 538 F. 3d 272 (3d Cir. 2008) ("There is nothing inherently excessive or duplicative in intr......
-
Pa. Chiropractic Ass'n v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n
...for associates, $150 to $210 for paralegals, and $90 for a legal assistant–but it was not an ERISA case. Chin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 520 F.Supp.2d 589, 608–09, 608 n. 6 (D.N.J.2007), rev'd sub nom. Chin v. Chrysler LLC, 538 F.3d 272 (3d Cir.2008) (reversing fee award because New Jersey r......
-
Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger
...view would be to hold that all conferencing by Plaintiffs attorneys was excessive and duplicative." Chin v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 520 F.Supp.2d 589, 605 (D.N.J.2007). However, Defendants have provided no evidence or argument that any conference was excessive or duplicative. Therefore, the ......