Chiplock v. Steuart Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 04 November 1952
• Docket Number: No. 1256.,1256.
• Citation: 91 A.2d 851
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals
• Parties: CHIPLOCK v. STEUART MOTOR CO.

91 A.2d 851

CHIPLOCK v. STEUART MOTOR CO.

No. 1256.

Municipal Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.

Argued October 6, 1952.

Decided November 4, 1952.

Howard J. McGrath, Washington, D. C., with whom H. Grady Warburton, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.

Louis H. Mann, Washington, D. C., for appellee.

Before CAYTON, Chief Judge, and HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges.

CAYTON, Chief Judge.

Involved in this appeal is a dispute between a man who sold his automobile and received in payment a forged check, and a dealer who later bought the automobile and paid value therefor. The case was tried on an agreed statement of facts, to which we must refer at some length for a proper understanding of the circumstances and the legal questions presented.

Plaintiff, an Army officer, having been ordered to Korea, advertised his Buick automobile for sale in a newspaper at a price of $1600. About 8:30 in the evening of July 27, 1951, he received a telephone call from one who said his name was Gallop of the Gallop Motor Company and that he was an automobile dealer and would like to come out and look at the car. About 15 minutes later the same person telephoned plaintiff and said that he could not come but that he would send a representative whose name was Fred Updergraff. Upon inquiry plaintiff stated that he would accept a company check.

Later the same evening a man arrived and said that he was Updergraff, that Mr. Gallop had sent him to look at the car, and that Gallop Motor Company had a quick sale for a car of the kind that plaintiff had advertised. He looked the car over, ran the motor a while and then said he would take it. He produced a check of the Gallop Motor Company, signed "Mark Gallop," made payable to plaintiff, the amount of $1600 being filled in with a check-writer. Plaintiff produced his certificate of title and suggested that the assignment of it should be executed before a notary public and the name of the purchaser, Gallop Motor Company, filled in. Updergraff asked him not to do that, that a buyer was waiting for the car and all that was necessary was that the plaintiff sign the assignment of title. This the plaintiff did after being assured that Mr. Gallop would complete the assignment. Updergraff requested that plaintiff's license plates be left on the car and said they would be returned the following morning. Plaintiff removed some personal effects from the trunk of the car and it was driven off by Updergraff. By this time it was around 11:30 p. m.

The next morning plaintiff remembered that his operator's permit and insurance card and the registration card for the vehicle had been left in a plastic case attached to the steering column of the car. When he telephoned the Gallop Motor Company to obtain these items he was informed that the company had no knowledge of the transaction, did not know Updergraff and that the office of the company had been broken into some time prior thereto and company checks and a check-writer had been stolen. Thereupon plaintiff called the police. The man representing himself as Updergraff and as an employee of the Gallop Motor Company was subsequently identified as one Albert Crapulli.

Early on the day following the transaction referred to, one Wear (a confederate of Crapulli), brought the car to the place of business of the defendant motor company, represented that he was George E. Chiplock the owner of the car and offered to sell it to defendant. Wear dealt with a Mr. Jenkins, one of defendant's salesmen, and was offered $1200 for the automobile but refused that offer as being too low.

Wear then left with the car but returned about 30 minutes later and told Jenkins that his offer was as good as anyone else had made so he would sell him the car. When asked if he had the title with him Wear took it from his pocket. Jenkins informed Wear that he, Wear, would be required to assign the title. When Jenkins went to check the motor and serial numbers on the car Wear picked up a pen as though he were about to sign the title. Jenkins returned from checking the motor and serial numbers and was handed the registration card and certificate of title which bore the signature of plaintiff, George E. Chiplock. Jenkins then asked if, Wear had any identification and Wear handed him Chiplock's driver's license and insurance card. Jenkins compared the signature on the driver's license with the signature on the title and of course they corresponded since they had both in fact been made by the same person, Chiplock.

Wear arranged with Jenkins to have a Steuart Motor Company check drawn on a bank in Maryland payable to George E. Chiplock. He said that he wanted to get cash for the car and asked that someone go with him to the bank to aid him in cashing the check. Jenkins accompanied Wear to the bank where Wear forged the endorsement with the name of George E. Chiplock, Jenkins endorsed it and the amount of the check was given to Wear in cash.

Jenkins is a notary public of the State of Maryland and after entering that state he asked if Wear made oath to the assignment on the certificate of title, to which Wear responded that he did. Jenkins intended to complete the oath on the title but had not done so prior to reading in the newspapers the next morning of the Chiplock incident. The assignment had not been completed as of the date of trial.

Plaintiff sued defendant Steuart Motor Company for return of the automobile or its value. Defendant denied that plaintiff was entitled to the automobile and by a counterclaim demanded that it be given title thereto. The case was tried on the agreed statement of facts to which we have referred. The trial judge filed a written opinion, awarding his decision to defendant. He based his decision on certain findings of fact and conclusions of law, which we shall discuss in connection with appellant's claims of error.

Appellant argues that it was error for the trial judge to rule that "good but voidable title" passed from plaintiff to Crapulli. Whether or not title passes is usually a question of intent. We think it is correct to say that when a seller purports to transfer title to one who is in fact a stranger to the transaction, no title (void, voidable, or otherwise) flows from the seller to a wrongdoer who has fraudulently held himself out as agent of such stranger. This is so because one of the supposed parties to the legal transaction is actually wanting. In such a situation the seller may usually follow the property and recover it from an innocent purchaser. Russell Willis, Inc., v. Page, 213 S.C. 156, 48 S.E.2d 627; Rodliff v. Dallinger, 141 Mass. 1, 4 N.E. 805; Mayhew v. Mather, 82 Wis. 355, 52 N.W. 436; Alexander v. Swackhamer, 105 Ind. 81, 4 N.E. 433, 5 N.E. 908. Cf. Dudley v. Lovins, 310 Ky. 491, 220 S.W.2d 978. But this is to be distinguished from a case where a seller intends to transfer title to one with whom he deals though he was deceived as to the buyer's real identity. It is usually held that such an impostor receives a title which is voidable. See, e. g., Dresher v. Roy Wilmeth Co., 118 Ind.App. 542, 82 N.E.2d 260.

This plaintiff at all times apparently supposed himself to be dealing with a representative of Gallop Motor Company. The check he received was on a stolen blank and was filled in with a stolen Gallop Motor Company check-writer and was apparently signed by Mark Gallop. Plaintiff was assured that the Gallop Company would complete his assignment on the certificate of title. Therefore we think it is correct to say that plaintiff intended to sell his automobile to the Gallop Motor Company and not to the impostor before him¹ and the impostor obtained no title.

But it does not necessarily follow that plaintiff is entitled to prevail. He is confronted with the rule of estoppel. The doctrine that an owner may follow his property, stated in the cases above cited, does not operate to defeat a bona fide purchaser for value where the owner has been negligent or is otherwise estopped from asserting his title or denying the wrongdoer's authority to sell. Russell Willis, Inc., v. Page, supra; Petty v. Borg, 106 Utah 524, 150 P.2d 776 are among the many cases supporting that position. Congress gave legislative approval to this rule of law when it enacted the Uniform Sales Act into our Code, and provided:

"Subject to the provisions of chapters 11-16 of this title, where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell." Code 1951, 28-1207(...