Chipman v. Board of Auditors of Wayne County

• Decision Date: 10 July 1901
• Citation: 127 Mich. 490,86 N.W. 1024
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: CHIPMAN v. BOARD OF AUDITORS OF WAYNE COUNTY.

86 N.W. 1024

127 Mich. 490

CHIPMAN v. BOARD OF AUDITORS OF WAYNE COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 10, 1901

Certiorari to circuit court, Wayne county, Byron S. Waite, Judge.

Mandamus by Harry F. Chipman against the board of county auditors of Wayne county. From an order denying the writ, relator brings certiorari. Reversed.

Jasper C. Gates and Charles D. Joslyn, for relator.

Ormond F. Hunt, Pros. Atty., for respondents.

MONTGOMERY C.J.

Relator applied for a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to audit and allow claims for services rendered by him as sheriff of Wayne county during the years 1897 and 1898. The application was denied, and this is certiorari to review the decision of the circuit judge. The claim for services consists of items (1) Of $7,000 a year for attendance on the circuit court for the county of Wayne; (2) for care and custody of prisoners, $2,500 a years; (3) for transferring prisoners to and from recorder's court; (4) for taking prisoners sentenced by the recorder's court from the county jail to the house of correction; (5) for transferring prisoners to and from circuit court, and for taking prisoners sentenced by the circuit court to the house of correction; (6) turnkey fees, not first commitments or final discharges, $2,158. The answer of respondents in the court below showed that opportunity was given the relator to present his claims, and that relator had several hearings upon the questions of fact relative to the items in his bill, and that every showing was made by the relator to the respondents for which the relator made a request, and that the respondents passed upon the merits of the claims, both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law. The relator asked for issues to be framed on this return, and among the issues was No. 8: 'Did said respondents give said relator a full and fair opportunity to prove before them the facts and circumstances in relation to the matters stated in said petition, and, if so, when, where and under what circumstances?' The issue also presented the following questions: 'Did said respondents, in disallowing the claim of relator, mentioned in said petition act upon their own judgment as to the equity and justice of said claim? Or did said respondents therein rely upon the advice of the 'legal adviser of said board,' mentioned in the answer of said respondents, on file in this cause?' And, tenth: 'Did said respondents disallow said claim because 'adviser had given to said respondents an opinion that said claim of relator was without foundation in law,' or such advice in substance and effect?'

It appears that no finding of facts was entered, the judge returning that he was not aware that such an order had been made by his associate until after the writ of certiorari was granted. We think the testimony fairly shows that the claim of relator was disallowed upon the advice of the prosecuting attorney, and that the merits of the claim were not considered. In other words, the reason for the disallowance, as appears by the record, was, not that the claim was in all respects deemed inequitable, but that the board had no power to audit or allow the claim. The letter in which they informed the relator of their action, after stating the advice of the prosecuting attorney, added 'We have no course to pursue except to follow his advice.' We think, under these circumstances, that, if there was any item in the claim which the respondents had the power to allow, they should have been required to consider and audit the claim. This involves some examination of the items of relator's claim. As to the first item, it is contended that, as the relator was required to attend upon the court, under Comp. Laws 1897, � 430, even in the absence of statutory fees being fixed, the respondents had the power to allow him reasonable compensation. Section 430, it should be stated, does not require the attendance of the sheriff, except as required by the circuit judge. There was some evidence from which it might be inferred that such attendance was required, and, if this should prove to be the fact, it was within the power of the board of auditors to allow him reasonable compensation for such services. Their action, when taken, it is true, would be final, and not reviewable by the court. See Mixer v. Supervisors, 26 Mich. 422; Tucker v. Common Council, 104 Mich. 621, 62 N.W. 1013, and cases cited. But it is insisted that the relator had the right to the allowance of this item as a matter of right. Act 77 of the Laws of 1895 fixes the compensation of sheriffs for attending upon circuit court...