Chira v. Columbia University in New York City

• Decision Date: 31 October 2003
• Docket Number: No. 03 CV 0840 HB.,03 CV 0840 HB.
• Citation: 289 F.Supp.2d 477
• Parties: Richard CHIRA Plaintiff, v. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN NEW YORK CITY and "John Doe" 1-10. Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

289 F.Supp.2d 477

Richard CHIRA Plaintiff, v. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY IN NEW YORK CITY and "John Doe" 1-10. Defendants.

No. 03 CV 0840 HB.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

October 31, 2003.

Richard Chira, Germantown, TN, Pro se.

OPINION AND ORDER

BAER, District Judge.

Defendant, The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York ("Columbia") move to dismiss each of the eight claims in plaintiff's amended complaint. For the following reasons, Columbia's motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

In September 1998, plaintiff Richard Chira ("Chira") enrolled in a masters-degree program in East Asian Studies at Columbia's Graduate School of Arts and Sciences ("GSAS") for the 1998-1999 academic year. (Compl.¶ 3) This one-year program (hereinafter occasionally referred to as the "MARSEA program") was in its inaugural year. Chira, a long-time resident of California, was 65 years old at the time of his enrollment and sought to change careers¹ to become an advisor or consultant on Southeast Asian affairs. (Compl.¶ 8)

While enrolled in GSAS, Chira rented an apartment from Columbia at 15 Claremont Avenue, where he lived from September 1998 to January 31, 2000.² (Compl.¶¶ 4-5) Chira alleges that Columbia leased the apartment "for the purpose of providing a suitable residence and suitable residential environment in which to carry on scholarly postgraduate study." (Compl.¶ 8) However, during the period of his occupancy, the apartment and the building were allegedly "unsuitable as a graduate student residence, was inimical to scholarly pursuit, inhospitable and unhealthy" due to poor lighting, poor ventilation, and noise. (Compl.¶ 9) He also alleges that he was exposed to a variety of hazards, such as masonry and brick reconstruction of the building's exterior, "incessant sandblasting," and "perennial toxic omissions and pollution." (Compl.¶ 9) Chira contends that these circumstances "constituted, singly and cumulatively, a serious, continuing private nuisance" and caused him to seek escape and to study on campus, "only to be confronted there with detrimental personal physical conditions as hereunder explained." (Compl.¶¶ 9-10)

Chira alleges that Columbia knew about but failed to remedy these conditions, which "were likely to and did cause direct and proximate personal injury and diverse harm to plaintiff." (Compl.¶¶ 11-13, 15) Chira contends that Columbia's acts and omissions³ were negligent, reckless, willful, wanton breaches of defendant's duty of care owed to him as a tenant and as a student.⁴ (Compl.¶ 14) Moreover, Columbia's conduct was in "direct repudiation" of its representations and promises, express or implied, oral or written, to provide a nuisance-free ... suitable graduate residential accommodation, and that these "conditions of private nuisance" thwarted his "declared, intended, known and understood academic and career purposes." (Compl.¶¶ 14, 16) Chira alleges that Columbia had additional housing available but that it deliberately steered him to this apartment in bad faith for pecuniary motives, fully aware of its unsuitability and the presence of hazardous conditions. (Compl.¶ 17) Moreover, Columbia knew that these conditions were likely to cause him personal injury, given its knowledge of his medical conditions. (Compl.¶ 17) Although Chira viewed the apartment, the true conditions and risks were not visually apparent and thus he had no knowledge of these conditions. (Compl.¶ 18) He was offered the apartment on a take-it-or-leave it basis and was not given any other options if he declined. (Compl.¶ 19) Chira alleges that he requested alternative housing at other locations, which would not have created an undue burden, but that these were all denied. (Compl.¶¶ 18, 44) (He also claims he sought but was refused enrolment in a physical strengthening course. (Compl.¶ 45)) Columbia's Office of Disability Services and Office of Institutional Real Estate were informed in advance and aware of his medical conditions and thus understood his susceptibility and vulnerability to these conditions. (Compl.¶ 19) He alleges that Columbia's assignment of him to this unsuitable housing and its failure to give him access to suitable facilities "constituted in fact and legal effect an essential failure to make `reasonable accommodation' to his medical condition and medical impairments." Chira alleges that he suffered and continues to suffer numerous physical injuries as a result of this private nuisance and was caused to undergo medical examinations and treatments at various clinics and hospitals.⁵

Chira identifies four causes of action based on the foregoing allegations: 1) private nuisance, 2) strict liability based on abnormally hazardous activities, namely the sandblasting, masonry work, toxic emissions, and pollution at the building, 3) negligence due to Columbia's failure to prevent injury or harm to him in this apartment, 4) failure to make reasonable accommodations for medical conditions in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act⁶ (42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq.) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.⁷ These four claims are contained in Chira's initial complaint, which was received on January 16, 2003 in the Pro Se Office of this Court, filed with the Clerk of the Court on February 5, 2003, and served on Columbia on June 2, 2003. On June 19, 2003, Chira filed an amended complaint which added four additional claims: 5) breach of contract, 6) monies had and received and monies had and received under false pretext, 7) misrepresentation, 8) educational discrimination. The prayer for relief in his amended complaint includes claims for compensatory damages of $500,000 on all eight counts, $225,000 in punitive damages, attorneys fees and costs, and various equitable relief.⁸

In his amended complaint, he claims that defendant breached a contract, partly written and partly oral, whereby Columbia agreed to admit Chira to the Masters Degree Program and provide "a comprehensive, suitable educational program" for the new career he sought as a adviser or consultant. (Am.Compl.¶ 49) Chira alleges that Columbia deprived him of the benefit of the bargain in that the MARSEA program was not yet fully accredited by the relevant state and federal authorities,⁹ was significantly deficient as to courses and language training, and was taught by doctoral candidates rather than professors. (Am.Compl.¶ 50) He also complains that the program did not provide an academic advisor and that the criteria for the degree had not been definitively approved and were constantly in flux. (Am.Compl.¶ 50) For example, Columbia apparently imposed a requirement of a thesis and did so belatedly but refused to allow him to enroll for a second year at Harvard where there were the appropriate resources to complete such a thesis. Chira alleges that Columbia repudiated the contract in several respects — such as misleading plaintiff about the program and its requirements, by misleading him about the time required to complete the degree and imposing unrealistic and inconsistent time-frames and changing the criteria for the program. (Am.Compl.¶ 51) He also claims that he was denied access to the deans of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, and that Columbia breached its contract by arbitrarily withholding his academic transcripts and for failing to make reasonable accommodations as required by Title III of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. (Am.Compl.¶ 51) Finally, he claims that Columbia breached its contract to provide suitable housing.

With respect to damages he allegedly suffered as a result of these breaches and repudiations, he claims that he "suffered a devastating material failure of contract consideration" and "has expended thousands upon thousands of dollars and incurred loans only to be deprived of a fair opportunity to pursue and make a livelihood in [my] second career." (Am. Compl.¶ 52) He seeks full restitution of the monies he paid and full restitution to New York and the federal government for the monies paid. He also seeks unspecified contract damages. (Am.Compl.¶ 53) Chira's sixth cause of action, which is for monies had and received, and his seventh cause of action, which is for misrepresentation, are based on these same facts. Chira contends that Columbia made numerous misrepresentations about the MARSEA program "deliberately, recklessly, cavalierly to hype, to promote and to induce [Chira] into the MARSEA program" and that he also alleges that he reasonably relied on these misrepresentations — that is, if he had known the true circumstances of the program he would not have enrolled. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 58-59) On his claim for monies had and received, he seeks "the cancellation of any direct loans (if any) from defendant" in addition to the restitution he seeks for himself and the state and federal governments in his breach-of-contract claim. (Am.Compl.¶ 55) For his misrepresentation claim, he seeks compensatory damages, including damages for emotional distress, and exemplary damages and equitable relief. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 61-62)

Chira's eighth cause of action is for "educational discrimination" under Title II of the ADA. The essence of this claim is that Columbia denied him admission to a Masters in International Affairs at the School of International and Public Affairs based upon "age discrimination viewed as a disability in violation of Title II and related civil rights Federal and state laws." (Am. Compl. ¶ 64 (emphasis in original)) He further contends that Columbia steered him to the MARSEA program to be a guinea pig for this fledgling program and away from the "well-established, more suitable and advantageous MIA Degree." (Am. Compl.¶ 64)

II. DISCUSSION

Columbia moves to dismiss each of the eight claims in Chira's amended complaint on various grounds, including failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the statute of limitations, and failure to exhaust remedies under the Americans with...