Chisom v. Roemer

Decision Date19 August 1988
Docket NumberNo. 88-3492,88-3492
Citation853 F.2d 1186
PartiesRonald CHISOM, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Buddy ROEMER, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Robert G. Pugh, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Shreveport, La., William J. Guste, Jr., Atty Gen., New Orleans, La., M. Truman Woodward, Jr., Moise W. Dennery, Blake G. Arata, A.R. Christovich, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., La. Dept. of Justice, New Orleans, La., for defendants-appellants.

Pamela S. Karlan, Charlottesville, Va., William P. Quigley, Roy Rodney, New Orleans, La., Charles Stephen Ralston, New York City, Ron Wilson, New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Mark Gross, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Appellate Section, Civil Rights Div., Washington, D.C., for amicus curiae U.S.

Peter J. Butler, New Orleans, La., for amicus curiae Marcus.

Charles A. Kronlage, Jr., George M. Strickler, Jr., New Orleans, La., for amicus curiae Calogero.

Ira J. Rosenzweig, New Orleans, La., for amicus curiae Dixon.

Darleen Jacobs, New Orleans, La., for Brian C. Beckwith, New Orleans, La., for amicus curiae Jacobs.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.

Before CLARK, Chief Judge, GARZA and POLITZ, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Circuit Judge:

On August 3, 1988, following an expedited appeal, we vacated the preliminary injunction issued by the district court which had enjoined the election of a justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court from the First Supreme Court District, and ordered that "said election shall be conducted in accordance with the laws of the State of Louisiana at the times and in the manner specified therein." Consistent with a reservation then made, we now assign our reasons for that decision.

Background

On September 19, 1986 complainants, black registered voters in Orleans Parish, Louisiana, and an organization active in voting-rights issues, filed the instant suit, alleging that the present system of electing two justices to the Louisiana Supreme Court from the First Supreme Court District violates section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as amended. 1 Their complaint was met with a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which the court granted, essentially based on the conclusion that section 2 did not apply to judicial elections. 2 On appeal we reversed and remanded. 3

After an application for panel rehearing and for a rehearing en banc was declined, the case was returned to the district court. Thereafter, complainants applied for a preliminary injunction to prevent the election scheduled for October 1, 1988 of a justice from the First Supreme Court District, a position held by Justice Pascal F. Calogero, Jr. since 1972. 4 Based on the evidence presented 5 the district judge concluded that the election should be enjoined. Defendants appealed and sought a stay pending appeal, Fed.R.App.P. 8. A divided motions panel of this court expedited the appeal and stayed the injunction to the extent it related to the qualifying activities of candidates. 850 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir.1988). As noted, after hearing the expedited appeal this merits panel vacated the remainder of the preliminary injunction.

Factual Context

The thoughtful and comprehensive opinion of the trial court, which gleans the sparse record and reaches out and takes judicial notice of other relevant judicially-found facts, 6 reveals the following factual scenario.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana is composed of "a chief justice and six associate justices, four of whom must concur to render judgment," who are elected for ten-year terms. 7 The justices are elected from six Supreme Court districts, all of which are single-member districts except the First Supreme Court District which elects two justices, 8 a tradition dating back more than a century. The districts and the number of justices assigned to each are "subject to change by law enacted by two-thirds of the elected members of each house of the legislature." 9

The First Supreme Court District is largely composed of the metropolitan New Orleans area and includes four parishes: Orleans, Jefferson, St. Bernard, and Plaquemines. This district is the largest in population, with a 1980 census total of 1,102,253. The next largest Supreme Court district has a 1980 census population of just over 861,000, while the smallest contains approximately 411,000 Louisianans. The average of the five other districts, using 1980 census figures, is 620, 729.

In 1980, the most recent data available to the trial court, the four parishes in the First Supreme Court District had the following population distribution:

                Orleans      557,515  (55.25% black)
                Jefferson    454,592  (13.89% black)
                St. Bernard  64,097   ( 3.73% black)
                Plaquemines  26,049   (21.12% black)
                

Voter registration data as of March 31, 1987 reflected the following totals and percentages of black voters:

                Orleans      251,359  (52.4% black)
                Jefferson    199,534  (11.9% black)
                St. Bernard  40,086   ( 3.9% black)
                Plaquemines  15,198   (18.6% black)
                

As the trial court found, at present blacks comprise a majority of the total population, the voting-age population, and the registered voters in Orleans Parish. Orleans Parish constitutes just over one-half of the total population of the First Supreme Court District.

The trial court concluded that complainants had satisfied the tetrad test for issuance of a preliminary injunction which was synthesized, although not originated, in the oft-cited case of Canal Authority of State of Florida v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir.1974), by showing:

(1) a substantial likelihood that plaintiff will prevail on the merits;

(2) a substantial threat that plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted;

(3) that the threatened injury to plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm the injunction may do to defendant; and

(4) that granting the preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest.

Analysis

Inasmuch as our decision is powered by a consideration of the essence and ramifications of the third and fourth factors, we pretermit a discussion of the first two, except for these limited comments. It remains to be seen whether the complainants will prevail on the merits, indeed the Supreme Court has yet to speak on the critical issue whether section 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies to judicial elections. And we can only speculate as to the state of the record in this case after trial on the merits.

As to irreparable injury, complainants urge a black-letter, per se rule to the effect that if an electoral standard, practice, or procedure abridges section 2 of the Voting Rights Act it automatically does irreparable injury to all or a portion of the body politic. Some district courts would agree. See Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 640 F.Supp. 1347 (M.D.Ala.1986); Harris v. Graddick, 593 F.Supp. 128 (M.D.Ala.1984); Cook v. Luckett, 575 F.Supp. 479 (S.D.Miss.1983). We do not. We are not prepared to adopt a per se rule in such a vital area of state-federal relations. We recognize and are in full accord with the teachings of the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1378, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964), that "[t]he right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of the essence of a democratic society and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government. And the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise." We are cognizant, however, that " '[t]he possibility that ... other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation, weighs heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.' " Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 70, 94 S.Ct. 937, 943, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974) (quoting Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Assn. v. FPC, 104 U.S.App.D.C. 106, 110, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (1958)). In this we agree with the commentators who suggest that "[o]nly when the threatened harm would impair the court's ability to grant an effective remedy is there really a need for preliminary relief." Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2948 at 431-34 (1973).

Should the election be enjoined?

Assuming per arguendo that there has been a prima facie showing of likelihood of success on the merits, and irreparable injury, our disposition of this appeal turns on a negative response to the question: Does the public interest require that this election be enjoined? Would such an injunction be in the best interests of: all of the citizens of the State of Louisiana; the citizens of the First Supreme Court District; the black citizenry of Louisiana; that of the First Supreme Court District; or the black electorate of Orleans Parish? We are persuaded beyond peradventure that the answer must be a resounding "no" on behalf of all of these groupings of Louisianians.

Our analysis begins with the staunch admonition that a federal court should jealously guard and sparingly use its awesome powers to ignore or brush aside long-standing state constitutional provisions, statutes, and practices. There can be no doubt that under the Supremacy Clause, 10 federal courts do and indeed must have this authority in our unique form of government. It is the use of this power that must be maintained in the balance, a balance which is more delicate than usual when a state's judicial process is involved.

It cannot be gainsaid that federal courts have the power to enjoin state elections. Watson v. Commissioner's Court of Harrison County, 616 F.2d 105 (5th Cir.1980); Hamer v. Campbell, 358 F.2d 215 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 851, 87 S.Ct. 76, 17 L.Ed.2d 79 (1966). But, "intervention by the federal courts in state elections has always been a serious business," Oden v. Brittain, 396 U.S. 1210, 90 S.Ct. 4, 24 L.Ed.2d 32 (1969...

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