Chittenden v. Waterbury Ctr. Comm. Church

Decision Date11 December 1998
Docket NumberNo. 97-235.,97-235.
CourtVermont Supreme Court
PartiesEric CHITTENDEN, et al. v. WATERBURY CENTER COMMUNITY CHURCH, INC., et al.

Matthew C. Colburn, Law Office of Richard A. Unger, Montpelier, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Gene Ann Condon and Albert G. Besser (Of Counsel), Stowe, for Defendants-Appellees.

Thomas E. McCormick and Thomas P. Simon of McCormick, Fitzpatrick, Kasper & Burchard, P.C., Burlington, and Von G. Keetch and Randy Austin of Kirton & McConkie, Salt Lake City, Utah, for Amici Curiae Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, et al. Present DOOLEY, MORSE, JOHNSON and SKOGLUND, JJ., and KATZ, Superior Judge, Specially Assigned.

DOOLEY, J.

This case concerns a driveway that separates the Cold Hollow Cider Mill in Waterbury Center, one of the state's busiest tourist attractions, from a neighboring church. Plaintiffs and counterclaim defendants Eric and Francine Chittenden are the owners of the cider mill business and the real property it occupies. They appeal from a judgment entered in the Washington Superior Court concluding that the driveway in question is the property of defendant and counterclaim plaintiff Waterbury Center Community Church, Inc., free of any claim by plaintiffs. The heart of plaintiffs' case is that they are entitled to a prescriptive easement over the driveway. On appeal, plaintiffs contend that (1) 12 V.S.A. § 462, which effectively protects property belonging to religious institutions and certain other entities from claims of adverse possession, violates both the U.S. and Vermont constitutions,1 (2) notwithstanding § 462, plaintiffs enjoy an easement based on the doctrine of presumed grants, and (3) the church's claim of unencumbered title to the driveway is barred by laches. We affirm.

I. Background

The case was tried to the court, which issued extensive findings of fact, not challenged here, and conclusions of law. Accordingly, we draw our summary of the relevant facts from the trial court's findings.

Plaintiffs' business, the Cold Hollow Cider Mill, operates on a four-acre parcel of land located on the east side of Route 100 in Waterbury Center. Bordering plaintiffs' property on the south and also fronting on Route 100 is the real property owned by defendant, Waterbury Center Community Church, Inc., a Methodist congregation. Plaintiffs have run their business at its present location since April 1976, operating out of a series of buildings constructed in the early-to-mid-nineteenth century. The church building was constructed in 1833, and the church traces its title to the land to a "conditional lease" executed in the following year. The 1834 conveyance provides that the "premises shall be used and occupied by [grantees] as a site for [a] Meeting house and necessary appendages thereto, and for no other purpose."

Located between the buildings on plaintiffs' property and the church building is a gravel driveway, referred to in the record as the "north driveway" and leading eastward from Route 100.2 Branching off from the north driveway to the south is a second, semicircular driveway that provides direct access to the front of the church building. The church uses the north driveway for vehicular access to its semicircular driveway as well as for parking to the north of the church building. Plaintiffs use the north driveway to provide public access to their business.

Since 1834, the church has held weekly religious services, additional services on religious holidays, and occasional weddings and funerals on its premises. Church suppers have taken place there on an occasional basis throughout the twentieth century. During the 1960s and 70s, church attendance fell off, and the condition of the church building deteriorated. As a result, the church did not use the building during the winter months for several years. However, use of the church building increased in the 1980s, and it was restored. Various outside groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous and Weight Watchers use the church occasionally. The church holds three flea markets and three chicken pie suppers each year. Weekly Sunday services generally attract between 40 and 50 worshipers.

Plaintiffs' property was owned by Keith H. Gibbs and/or Colleen R. Gibbs from 1945 to 1973, the last year in which Mrs. Gibbs occupied the property as a widow. During this period, the owners used the property both for residential purposes and to conduct extensive commercial operations, including: a milk-hauling business; a dairy farm; marketing, auctioning and transportation of cattle; and the hauling of sand, gravel and fill. All social and business invitees of the owners used the disputed driveway for parking and access to the rear of the property, as did their tenants and employees. During this period, many large trucks used the driveway on a regular basis.

From 1973 to July 1976, plaintiffs' property was occupied by Richard and Linda Angelino. The Angelinos used the driveway for access for themselves and for tenants residing in an apartment on the premises, and for transporting horses onto and off the property. Farmers used the driveway during this period to access the Angelinos' barn for hay storage. The public was also permitted to use the driveway to gain access to farm pastures located to the east of the parties' property.

Since purchasing the property in 1976, plaintiffs have used it for both residential and business purposes. Their cider mill business has grown steadily during their ownership. By 1994, annual visitors had increased to more than 250,000. Mail-order and wholesale operations now account for more than half of the cider mill's business volume.

A significant aspect of plaintiffs' business involves patrons arriving by bus. From the onset of operations through June 1991, defendant made no objection to buses gaining access to plaintiffs' property via the north driveway. During the first year plaintiffs operated their business, approximately fifty buses visited the facility. By the late 1980s, the volume had increased to approximately 600 buses per year, ninety percent of which make their visits between late August and late October. During this peak period, as many as thirty buses visit daily. The buses unload their passengers on the north driveway and park behind the church on plaintiffs' property. Occasionally, a bus remains next to the church with its engine idling to wait for another vehicle ahead of it to unload.

Over the many years that plaintiffs or their predecessors in title have used the north driveway, they performed nearly all of the maintenance on it. This work included grading, graveling and snow plowing, all of which have gradually widened the driveway approximately 1½ feet onto the lawn of the church. No one associated with the church ever gave the plaintiffs or their predecessors permission to use the driveway and, indeed, no such permission was ever requested.

The church engaged a surveyor in 1973 who determined that the north driveway is located entirely on the church's property. A second survey commissioned by the church in 1991 also confirmed that the church owned the north driveway.

Church trustees invited plaintiffs to attend their meeting on June 13, 1991. At that meeting, the church trustees disclosed for the first time that they contended that the church owned the north driveway and that plaintiffs had no right to its use. The church demanded deeded rights to parking on plaintiffs' property in exchange for deeded rights to the north driveway. Plaintiffs refused, maintaining they owned the driveway. The church trustees warned the plaintiffs they would close off the north driveway for one complete day at some point before July 13, 1991.

On an unspecified date in July 1991, while the cider mill was open for business, one of defendant's trustees placed a barricade across the north driveway bearing a sign reading "driveway closed today." Plaintiff Eric Chittenden immediately removed the barricade and placed it behind the church. A similar incident occurred on Thanksgiving Day of 1991. Twice in 1992, work parties from the church erected fences across part or all of the north driveway. On the last occasion, plaintiff had to use a forklift to remove the fence. When it became clear that the church would continue to block the driveway, plaintiffs brought this action and sought a preliminary injunction. The complaint named as defendants the church, the chairman of its trustees and six other individuals whom plaintiffs contended were acting on the church's behalf. Defendants counterclaimed, asserting trespass and seeking a declaratory judgment in their favor on the easement issue. In lieu of the requested preliminary injunctive relief, the parties agreed to preserve the status quo ante — permitting plaintiffs to continue their use of the north driveway pending the ultimate resolution of the dispute. The court bifurcated the case, deferring the issue of damages and conducting a bench trial to resolve the parties' competing ownership claims. Following trial and the extensive findings summarized above, the court concluded that plaintiffs did not acquire an interest in the north driveway via adverse possession, a prescriptive easement or a presumptive grant. On motion of plaintiffs, the court amended its findings and conclusions to determine, in relevant part, that the equitable doctrine of laches has no application to this case. The court entered its judgment on May 12, 1997, and this appeal followed.

II. Constitutionality of 12 V.S.A. § 462

Plaintiffs' first claim on appeal is that 12 V.S.A. § 462 is unconstitutional. The trial court relied on this statute in determining that plaintiffs have no claim to the north driveway by adverse possession or prescriptive easement.

Generally, Vermont law applies a fifteen-year limitation period to actions seeking recovery or possession of land. See 12 V.S.A. § 502. Accordingly, one who seeks to maintain a claim of adverse...

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    • 9 Octubre 2009
    ...L.Ed.2d 660 (2000) (plurality opinion). Not all "entanglements" are constitutionally proscribed. Chittenden v. Waterbury Ctr. Cmty. Church, Inc., 168 Vt. 478, 487, 726 A.2d 20, 26 (1998). Excessive entanglement between church and state may occur when governmental regulation necessitates an ......
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    ...sufficiently benevolent to warrant a perpetual exemption from adverse possession claims or prescriptive easements.” 168 Vt. 478, 484, 726 A.2d 20, 25 (1998). Indeed, in an early decision construing the statute, the U.S. Supreme Court itself recognized that “good grounds” and sound public po......
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    ...sufficiently benevolent to warrant a perpetual exemption from adverse possession claims or prescriptive easements." 168 Vt. 478, 484, 726 A.2d 20, 25 (1998). Indeed, in an early decision construing the statute, the U.S. Supreme Court itself recognized that "good grounds" and sound public po......
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1 books & journal articles
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    • United States
    • Vermont Bar Association Vermont Bar Journal No. 46-3, September 2020
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    ...Inc. v. Patten, 131 Vt. 187, 193, 303 A.2d 811, 815 (1973). [36] Chittenden v. Waterbury Center Community Church, Inc., 168 Vt. 478, 494, 726 A.2d 20, 31 (1998). [37] J.H. Thomas, ed., Systematic Arrangement of Lord Coke’s First Institute of the Laws of England I (Philadelphia: Alexander To......

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