Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.
| Decision Date | 08 March 1909 |
| Docket Number | 239 |
| Citation | 73 A. 4,224 Pa. 13 |
| Parties | Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued January 14, 1909
Appeal, No. 239, Jan. T., 1908, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. No. 4, Phila. Co., June T., 1906, No. 3,808, on verdict for plaintiffs in case of Annie E. Chittick and John F. Chittick v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company. Reversed.
Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries. Before WILLSON P.J.
Verdict and judgment for Annie E. Chittick for $1,500 and for John F Chittick, her husband, for $1,200. Defendant appealed.
Error assigned was in refusing binding instructions for defendant.
Judgment reversed and is here entered for defendant.
Thomas Leaming, with him Russell Duane, for appellant. -- It being undisputed that such a result as the plaintiffs allege is unknown to science or practical experience, it is submitted that the defendant is not liable for a consequence which could not have been foreseen: Fox v. Borkey, 126 Pa. 164; Ewing v. Ry. Co., 147 Pa. 40; Huston v. Freemansburg Boro., 212 Pa. 548; South Side Pass. Ry. Co. v. Trich, 117 Pa. 390; Wood v. Penna. R.R. Co., 177 Pa. 306; Miller v. Cohen, 173 Pa. 488.
The law cannot undertake to deal with mere theories, such as the effect, if any, of rays of light: Collins v. Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143.
Robert B. Kelly, for appellees. -- The case at bar is similar to the recent case of Hess v. American Pipe Mfg. Co., 221 Pa. 67. See also Ewing v. Ry. Co., 147 Pa. 40; Huston v. Freemansburg Borough, 212 Pa. 548.
Before MITCHELL, C.J., FELL, POTTER, ELKIN and STEWART, JJ.
During the construction of the elevated railroad in West Philadelphia a steel brace, a necessary part of the superstructure, was being hoisted into position by the employees of the bridge company doing the work, when the trolley pole of a street railway car struck it with such force as to cause an electrical explosion by reason of the contact of the brace with the trolley wire. The negligence relied on to sustain a recovery is the failure of the motorman to stop his car after timely notice to do so in the face of an impending danger. The negligence of appellant in the respect charged is not denied, and if the injuries complained of resulted as a natural and probable consequence of the negligent act, which ought to have been foreseen and provided against, it would be a case for the jury. What occurred after the happening of the accident is of such an extraordinary character and the cause of the injuries of such an unusual nature that the facts must be briefly stated in order to have an intelligent understanding of the question raised by this appeal. When the trolley wire was forcibly brought into contact with the steel brace there was a brilliant flash of electricity, variously described by the witnesses as a ball of fire, a brilliant flash, a blinding light, and a powerful electrical flash of an explosive nature. A woman, one of the appellees here, was seated near an open window of her dwelling house 200 or 300 feet distant from the point at which the electrical manifestation occurred and was thrown, or in some manner fell, from her chair, to the floor. In the fall she received some bruises to her person, but these were of a temporary character and not serious. She was blinded temporarily by the brilliant electric flash, suffered pain in her eyes, followed by some impairment of vision and nervous weakness, and these are the injuries principally relied on to sustain this action for damages. It must now be determined whether upon such a state of facts appellant is answerable in law for injuries resulting from this unfortunate occurrence. The learned court below after patient and careful consideration submitted the case to the jury and upon more mature deliberation refused to enter judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto, although in arriving at that conclusion doubt was expressed as to the liability of the defendant under the circumstances. Whatever doubt there may have been in the mind of the learned trial judge was resolved in favor of the plaintiffs and the case is now here for final determination. At the beginning of our inquiry it may be remarked that the relation of common carrier and passenger, or of master and servant, did not exist between the parties, all of whom were in the enjoyment of their respective properties with the right to use and operate them in every lawful manner. The duty of each to the other was, not to so wantonly or recklessly or negligently, use her or its property as to cause...
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