Chitwood v. King

• Decision Date: 11 June 1934
• Docket Number: 1339
• Citation: 155 So. 466
• Court: Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US
• Parties: CHITWOOD et ux. v. KING et al

155 So. 466

CHITWOOD et ux. v. KING et al

No. 1339

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit.

June 11, 1934

Rehearing denied June 30, 1934.

Hawthorn Stafford & Pitts, of Alexandria, for appellants.

Woosley & Cavanaugh, of Leesville, for appellees.

OPINION

MOUTON Judge.

This suit is brought by Milton D. Chitwood and his wife, Frances Chitwood, against Jean M. King, his wife, Ruth King, and the Maryland Casualty Company, in solido.

Mr Milton D. Chitwood is asking judgment for $ 817, for damage to his auto and for other items; and his wife is claiming damages in the sum of $ 2,100 for personal injuries suffered in the overturning of an auto her husband was driving in a near collision with a car Mrs. Ruth King was driving.

An appeal was taken by the three defendants from a judgment rendered against them in the sum of $ 517 with legal interest from November 11, 1932, in favor of Mr. Milton D. Chitwood, and for $ 2,100, with legal interest from said date, in favor of his wife, Mrs. Frances Chitwood.

This case must be decided under rule 9 of section 3, Act No. 21 of 1932, p. 162.

Rule 9 is as follows: "The driver of any vehicle on the public roads, highways and bridges of this State shall ascertain, before turning around upon any such road, highway or bridge, that there is no traffic, vehicular or pedestrian, approaching from either direction which will be unduly or unnecessarily delayed and shall yield right-of-way to such approaching traffic and shall not attempt to make a turn unless and until the said way is clear."

Mrs. Ruth King, on November 11, 1932, while traveling on the highway known as the Old Spanish Trail, westward from Lake Charles, at a point about three or four miles west of Sulphur, entered a side gravelled road connected with the highway from the north, with the intention to back her auto on the highway for the purpose of turning around eastward, towards Lake Charles. Mrs. King entered into this side gravelled road, but does not remember how far she "nosed in" before backing her auto in the highway for the purpose, above stated. Mrs. King says, when she started to go into this side road, that she first saw plaintiff's car coming eastward on the highway, and therefore in the direction of the place where she intended to turn the auto towards the east. When she saw plaintiff's auto, it was then, she says, near the guard rails of the highway, shown by a plat in the record, distant by 755 feet from where the side gravelled road connects with the highway. She testifies that before she started to "back out in the Highway" she looked to her left or westward. Her statement is that before she started to back she looked to her left, but she does not say that, as she was backing towards the highway, after she had started on into it, she looked westward.

The following question was then asked her: "Q. Now, after you backed out in the highway and had stopped your car, did you look any more to your left, or west of that point? A. No, I didn't look because I thought I had time to make it around."

After she had stopped her car to make the turn in the highway, as she did not look westward, it is evident that she did not see plaintiff's car as it was advancing towards her. She saw plaintiff's car only when it was near the guard rails, as before stated, because she testifies she "saw it the second time when she heard the crash and it was then in the ditch."

Rule 9 of Act No. 21 of 1932, §3, hereinabove copied says: "The driver of any vehicle on the public roads, highways (3)5C shall ascertain, before turning around upon any such road, highway, (3)5C that there is no traffic (3)5C approaching from either direction which will be unduly or unnecessarily delayed and shall yield right-of-way (3)5C and shall not attempt to make a turn unless and until the said way is clear."

Mrs. King had been driving on the north side of the highway when she entered the side road which ran into the highway from the north. As she was in the driver's seat, she was on the left or west side of her auto. From the position she occupied, by a mere glance to her left or west side, she could not have failed to see plaintiff's car coming eastward. The highway is 100 feet wide, and no doubt she could have stopped on the highway and could have remained at a standstill for the safe passage of plaintiff's auto. It is true that she stopped her car and left ample room for plaintiff to pass on the south side of the highway in the direction he was traveling. The trouble is that she did not remain at a standstill, where she had stopped, but, as she was not looking to her left or west after she had stopped, she did not see plaintiff's on-coming car, and, in her attempt to start eastward after making the turn, some way or other, she placed her car in the pathway of the plaintiff, forcing him either to run into Mrs. King's auto, to run against a post, which was ahead of him, or into a ditch along the roadside.

The testimony of Mr. Chitwood, plaintiff, is, on this subject, rather than to collide with Mrs. King's auto, or the post or rails ahead of him, he rolled over into the ditch, from which resulted the damages to his auto and the personal injuries to Mrs. Chitwood.

The foregoing statement is supported by the testimony of Mr Chitwood, to which we will...