Chizmadia v. Smiley's Point Clinic
| Decision Date | 12 December 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. Civ. 4-86-942.,Civ. 4-86-942. |
| Citation | 726 F. Supp. 249 |
| Parties | Douglas CHIZMADIA, Plaintiff, v. SMILEY'S POINT CLINIC, Dr. Mark L. Norman, Dr. Mark L. Norman, III, Dr. D. Hamilton, Dr. D. DeGear, Dr. R. Woodworth, and Dr. P. Sletten, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Joanne Mary Schuler, Plymouth, Minn., for plaintiff.
William M. Hart, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant Smiley's Point Clinic.
Rebecca Egge Moos, and Mark D. Mattson, Bassford, Heckt, Lockhart, Truesdell & Briggs, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendants Dr. Mark L. Norman and Dr. Mark L. Norman, III.
Kathryn H. Davis, Lommen, Nelson, Cole & Stageberg, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendants Dr. D. Hamilton, Dr. D. DeGear, Dr. R. Woodworth, and Dr. P. Sletten.
Plaintiff Douglas Chizmadia brought this medical malpractice action against defendants Smiley's Point Clinic, Dr. Mark L. Norman, Dr. Mark L. Norman, III, Dr. D. Hamilton, Dr. D. DeGear, Dr. R. Woodworth, and Dr. P. Sletten. Diversity jurisdiction is alleged. Now before the court are motions by defendants for summary judgment.
Chizmadia is a resident of New York. In October 1984, while attending Augsburg College in Minnesota, Chizmadia sought treatment from Smiley's Point Clinic (the Clinic) and its affiliated physicians, Hamilton, DeGear, Woodworth, and Sletten, for pain in his right eye. On October 31, 1989, Chizmadia was referred to ophthalmologists Norman and Norman, III, for further treatment.
Chizmadia returned to New York in late December where he sought help from other physicians. Between December 20 and 26, 1984, it was determined that Chizmadia had a detached retina and surgery was performed. The surgery was unsuccessful, and Chizmadia is now blind in his right eye.
Chizmadia brought pro se actions in state court and in this court in December 1986. He alleges that defendants negligently failed to diagnose his problem and that their negligence greatly increased the injuries he suffered. Defendants moved for dismissal and for summary judgment in both cases. They contended that Chizmadia failed to provide affidavits of expert review required by Minn.Stat. § 145.682 and that the actions are time barred. The motions were granted in both this court and the state court on November 13, 1987 for failure to comply with § 145.682. Neither court reached the statute of limitations issue. Chizmadia appealed from both decisions.
The state court decision was affirmed on August 30, 1988. Chizmadia v. Smiley's Point Clinic, 428 N.W.2d 459 (Minn.Ct. App.), review denied, C5-88-478 (Minn. Oct. 26, 1988), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2109, 104 L.Ed.2d 669 (1989). The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that Chizmadia failed to meet the requirements of § 145.682. Id. at 461. It further addressed the statute of limitations question and held that Chizmadia's action was time barred. Id. at 461-62.
On May 8, 1989, the Eighth Circuit reversed the decision of this court. Chizmadia v. Smiley's Point Clinic, 873 F.2d 1163 (8th Cir.1989). It remanded the case and ordered this court to determine whether an expert opinion is required in this instance and, if so, to determine whether § 145.682 violates Chizmadia's constitutional rights. Id. at 1165-66.
Defendants have moved for summary judgment and each argues that the action is time barred.1 The Clinic and the Doctors Norman also argue that this action is barred under res judicata principles by the state trial court judgment.
The Clinic and the Doctors Norman argue that the judgment entered by the Minnesota District Court on December 1, 1987 should have res judicata effect here. They note that a federal court must give a state court judgment the same effect it would be given under Minnesota law. Paulucci v. City of Duluth, 826 F.2d 780, 784 (8th Cir.1987). The Clinic and the Doctors Norman state that, under Minnesota law:
A judgment on the merits constitutes an absolute bar to a second suit for the same cause of action, and is conclusive between parties and privies, not only as to every other matter which was actually litigated, but also as to every matter which might have been litigated therein.
Mattsen v. Packman, 358 N.W.2d 48, 49 (Minn.1984). They argue that the state trial court's entry of judgment dismissing Chizmadia's identical action was a judgment on the merits and requires dismissal of this action.
Chizmadia responds that this court's judgment, entered on November 16, 1987, should have had res judicata effect in the state court action and that the state court judgment, entered December 1, 1987, is "dead."
Chizmadia is correct that the Minnesota Court of Appeals could have, and perhaps should have, affirmed the trial court's judgment based on the res judicata effect of this court's prior judgment.2 Chizmadia is also correct that the state trial court judgment did not have preclusive effect in this case when the Eighth Circuit considered it. Once this court's judgment was reversed, however, it lost its preclusive effect. Simpson v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 850, 854 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 901, 95 S.Ct. 184, 42 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974); 1B J. Moore, J. Lucas & T. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.4162, at 517 (2d ed. 1988). At that time, the state court's December 1, 1987 judgment became a prior judgment for purposes of this action, and it now meets the requirements of Minnesota's res judicata doctrine. Res judicata applies even in these unusual circumstances where application of the doctrine would give effect to a judgment which is inconsistent with the Eighth Circuit's holding. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398-402, 101 S.Ct. 2424, 2428-2430, 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981); Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 199-201, 52 S.Ct. 532, 533-534, 76 L.Ed. 1054 (1932); Deposit Bank v. Board of Councilmen, 191 U.S. 499, 520, 24 S.Ct. 154, 161, 48 L.Ed. 276 (1903).
Chizmadia offers an alternative response to the res judicata argument. He asserts that, regardless of the applicability of the res judicata doctrine, the Eighth Circuit's mandate is controlling in this instance. Chizmadia notes that the Eighth Circuit was privy to the holdings in the state court action. He suggests the Eighth Circuit remanded the case with the intent and expectation that its holding would be controlling on the issue of his compliance with Minn.Stat. § 145.682. The Clinic and the Doctors Norman did not address this point.
This court is bound by the mandate of the Eighth Circuit. On remand, this court must implement both the spirit and the letter of the mandate from the Court of Appeals. Bankers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 761 F.2d 943, 949 (3d Cir.1985); Span-Deck, Inc. v. Fabcon, Inc., 570 F.Supp. 81, 88-89 (D.Minn.1983). All matters encompassed by the appellate decision are beyond this court's power to alter. Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 627 F.2d 858, 865 (8th Cir.1980); see also 1B J. Moore, J. Lucas & T. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 0.40410 (2d ed. 1988) (); 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4478, at 792-94 (1981).
The mandate in this case precludes dismissal on res judicata grounds. This court and the state trial court both dismissed Chizmadia's claim based on his failure to provide an expert affidavit pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 145.682. The Eighth Circuit reversed the holding in this case and ordered the court to determine whether an expert affidavit was required under all the circumstances. The Eighth Circuit was aware of the state court decision and implicitly rejected it. The mandate is not so narrow as to permit dismissal of the action based on a state court holding which is nearly identical to the one which the Eighth Circuit reversed. Rather, the spirit of the mandate requires that the litigation should move forward beyond the issue of Chizmadia's failure to provide an expert affidavit. Accordingly, under the rule of mandate, the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable in this instance.
This court is free on remand to consider issues not expressly or implicitly disposed of by the Eighth Circuit. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347 n. 18, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1148 n. 18, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979). Defendants' arguments that this action is time barred should therefore be considered.
A two year statute of limitations, Minn. Stat. § 541.07(1), applies to this action. The parties dispute both when the cause of action accrued and when the action was commenced.
Chizmadia argues that, under Fed. R.Civ.P. 3, a federal action is commenced at the time the complaint is filed. In this diversity action, however, Minnesota law controls when the action is commenced. Sieg v. Karnes, 693 F.2d 803, 804-05 (8th Cir.1982). Accordingly, the controlling provision is Minn.R.Civ.P. 3.01 which provides:
A civil action is commenced against each defendant:
Defendants contend that, since they were served by mail, this action was commenced under Rule 3.01(b) between December 23, 1986 and January 8, 1987 when they signed the Acknowledgements of Receipt of Summons and Complaint.
The action more appropriately should be considered to have been commenced pursuant to Rule 3.01(c). Federal law governs the service of process in this case. See Gulley v. Mayo Found., 886 F.2d 161, 164 (8th Cir.1989). Chizmadia effected service pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(2)(B)(i) by delivering the summons and complaint...
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Chizmadia v. Smiley's Point Clinic
...and the res judicata effect of the parallel state court proceedings. Defendants' motions were denied in an order dated December 12, 1989, 726 F.Supp. 249, and a motion for reconsideration was denied on January 26, 1990. No motions were ever filed by any party related to a prima facie case p......