Chmura Economics & Analytics, LLC v. Lombardo
| Decision Date | 29 July 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:19-cv-813 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | CHMURA ECONOMICS & ANALYTICS, LLC, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD LOMBARDO, Defendant. |
This matter is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant Chmura Economics & Analytics, LLC ("Chmura") filed PLAINTIFF AND COUNTERCLAIM DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ("Chmura Motion for Summary Judgment") (ECF No. 34) which requests that the Court enter an order in Chmura's favor on all four counts of the FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT ("FAC") (ECF No. 12) and all of the counts (functionally, Counts II, III, and VI)[1] of DEFENDANT RICHARD A. LOMBARDO'S COUNTERCLAIM AGAINST PLAINTIFF CHMURA ECONOMICS & ANALYTICS, LLC ("Counterclaim") (ECF No. 19) . In response Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff Richard Lombardo filed MOTION OF DEFENDANT RICHARD LOMBARDO FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV.P. 56 ("Lombardo Motion for Summary Judgment") (ECF No. 40) . The Lombardo Motion for Summary Judgment requests that the Court enter an order for Lombardo on all four counts of the FAC and four counts of the Counterclaim (functionally only Count VI of the Counterclaim). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Chmura's Motion for Summary judgment with respect to the confidentiality portions of FAC Count II and the Court will grant Lombardo's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the non-competition and non-solicitation portions of Counterclaim Count VI. The Court will further grant Chmura's Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to (1) FAC Count I, (2) FAC Count IV, and (3) the portions of Counterclaim Count II addressing the events of October 17, 2019. The Court reserves judgment on both parties' motions with respect to FAC Count III pending additional briefing. All other portions of the two motions will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
This case is, at its core, an employment dispute that arose after Richard A. Lombardo ("Lombardo") was terminated from his employment with Chmura Economics & Analytics LLC ("Chmura") in the fall of 2019. It is beyond dispute that, after the termination of his employment, Lombardo retained control over a work laptop which contained Lombardo's notes of meetings and interactions he had with potential customers at two trade conferences that he attended as an employee of Chmura. The parties dispute the true reason for Lombardo's termination and the legal effect of Lombardo's retention of the laptop and the conference notes.
Chmura is pursuing four claims against Lombardo:
A district court should grant a party's motion for summary judgment where the moving party demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). An issue is "genuine" if a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 568 (4th Cir. 2015). A fact is "material" if, based on the governing law, it could affect the outcome of the suit. Id. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
To successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must show that there are specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). "Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice to oppose a properly supported motion for summary judgment, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence." Matherly v. Andrews, 859 F.3d 264, 280 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Consequently, summary judgment is appropriate where "the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party . . . ." United States v. Lee, 943 F.2d 366, 368 (4th Cir. 1991) .
When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the district court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 568. That includes drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Ballinger v. North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service, 815 F.2d 1001, 1004 (4th Cir. 1987). The court must also refrain from weighing the evidence or making credibility determinations. Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 569. “'Summary judgment cannot be granted merely because the court believes that the movant will prevail if the action is tried on the merits.'" Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 568 ().
Of note for this case, when deciding cross-motions for summary judgment, the court must assess "each motion separately on its own merits." Rossiqnol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th Cir. 2003). Thus, for each individual motion, the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Rossignol, 316 F.3d at 523. Moreover, "the admission of each party is limited to the purposes of his or her own motion; it may not be applied in connection with the adversary's similar motion." 73 Am. Jur. 2d Summary Judgment § 45.
Guided by these principles, the Court will assess each summary judgment motion in turn - except, as discussed in the next section, the parties' arguments on FAC Count II and Counterclaim Count VI, which are opposite sides of the same coin.
In Count II of the FAC and Count VI of the Counterclaim, the parties essentially ask the Court to rule on the validity of the non-competition, non-solicitation, and confidentiality portions of Lombardo's employment contract ("the Agreement").[3] In Count II of the FAC, Chmura seeks to have the Court declare that the non-competition, non-solicitation, and confidentiality provisions of the Agreement are valid and enforceable and to issue an injunction requiring Lombardo to comply with the non-solicitation and noncompetition obligations. FAC ¶¶ 49-64, ECF No. 12. In Count VI of the Counterclaim, Lombardo seeks to have the Court declare that all of the restrictive covenants in the Agreement are void and unenforceable. Countercl. ¶¶ 84-87, ECF No. 19. Thus, Count II of the FAC is essentially the mirror image of Count VI of the Counterclaim.
As noted above, strictly speaking, where parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court should examine "each motion separately employing the familiar standard under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, L.L.C., 630 F.3d 351, 354 (4th Cir. 2011). But here, the parties have - quite literally - copy and pasted large swaths of their arguments about the validity of the Agreement in response to each other's arguments.[4] Because there do not appear to be any material differences between the parties' arguments in both sets of motions nor any material facts in dispute, in the interest of efficiency, for the parties' motions for summary judgment on FAC Count II and Counterclaim Count VI, the Court will address the parties' arguments all at once.
For the following reasons, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Chmura with respect to the Confidentiality portion of the agreement and in favor of Lombardo with respect to the Non-Competition and Non-Solicitation portion of the Agreement.
The validity (and thus, enforceability) of a restrictive covenant is a question of law. Simmons v. Miller, 544 S.E.2d 666, 678 (Va. 2001). A restrictive covenant "between an employer and an employee will be enforced if the contract [1] is narrowly drawn to protect the employer's legitimate business interest, [2] is not...
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