Choice Is Yours, Inc. v. Yours

• Decision Date: 21 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2:14-cv-01804,2:14-cv-01804
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania
• Parties: THE CHOICE IS YOURS, INC. et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE CHOICE IS YOURS et al., Defendants.

THE CHOICE IS YOURS, INC. et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE CHOICE IS YOURS et al., Defendants.

No. 2:14-cv-01804

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

September 21, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr. United States District Judge

I. Introduction

Presently before the Court are two partial motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, filed on behalf of two respective groups of Defendants to this action. Defendants The Choice Is Yours, District Attorney Seth Williams, and the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office ("District Attorney Defendants") seek the dismissal of (i) all claims against Defendants The Choice Is Yours and the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office, because these Defendants "are not entities that can be sued," (ii) Count I of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, seeking redress for "Fraud on the Public by an Elected Official and Office," which the District Attorney Defendants contend is not a valid cause of action, (iii) all claims against District Attorney Williams sounding in state tort law, because these claims are barred by the doctrines of municipal immunity and high public official immunity, (iv) Plaintiffs' demand for punitive damages against District Attorney Williams in his official capacity, because this demand is barred by the doctrine of municipal immunity, (v) Count IV of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, which seeks redress forviolations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), as asserted against District Attorney Williams in his official capacity, because this claim is barred by municipal immunity, and (vi) Count IX of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, which seeks redress for "Misappropriation of Name and Likeness," because Plaintiffs have failed to state a viable claim under this theory of liability. See Mem. Supp. District Attorney Defs.' Mot. Dismiss Pls.' Am. Compl. 1-2, ECF No. 96.

Defendants City of Philadelphia, City Solicitor Shelley Smith, and the Philadelphia Law Department ("City Defendants") also seek the dismissal of various aspects of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. After the City Defendants filed their motion, Plaintiffs filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss, among other parties, Defendants Smith and the Philadelphia Law Department, which the Court granted on June 17, 2015. Therefore, the only remaining City Defendant is the City of Philadelphia, and as a result, the portions of the City Defendants' motion that relate solely to Defendants Smith and the Philadelphia Law Department are moot. Defendant City of Philadelphia seeks the dismissal of (i) all claims sounding in state tort law, because these claims are barred by municipal immunity, (ii) Plaintiffs' demand for punitive damages, because this demand is barred municipal immunity, (iii) Count IV of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, which seeks redress for violations of RICO, because this claim is barred by municipal immunity, and (iv) Count IX of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, which seeks redress for "Misappropriation of Name and Likeness," because Plaintiffs have failed to state a viable claim under this theory of liability. See Mem. Supp. City Defs.' Mot. Dismiss Pls.' Am. Compl. 1-2, ECF No. 97.

For the reasons that follow, the Court grants the respective motions of both the District Attorney Defendants and the City of Philadelphia, the sole remaining City Defendant.

II. Factual Background¹

Plaintiff James Smallwood is the founder and chief executive officer of Plaintiff The Choice Is Yours, Inc., a non-profit organization that "trains mainly minority ex-convicts and other at-risk individuals for work in the construction trades . . . while teaching reading, math, and job-hunting skills." Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24-32. Plaintiff Smallwood himself was formerly homeless and suffered from addiction. Id. ¶ 26. As a result of his experience at a rehabilitation center, he decided to dedicate his life to helping others, which led him to found The Choice Is Yours in 1997. Id. ¶¶ 26-29. Since that time, over six hundred "ex-convicts, drug addicts, and homeless people" have participated in the program offered by The Choice Is Yours, Inc. Id. ¶ 36.

Plaintiffs' complaint, which asserts claims of trademark infringement, unfair competition, fraud, RICO violations, and other claims under Pennsylvania law, arises out of the creation of a program called "The Choice is Yours" by Defendant Williams, the District Attorney for the City of Philadelphia. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-8, 11. Announced on March 21, 2012, the program was an "alternative-to-incarceration" program that "offere[d] nonviolent felony drug offenders a chance to avoid prison sentences and instead receive education and workforce training, along with social services and supports." Am. Compl. Ex. 3, at 1, ECF No. 55-4. The program was modeled after "reentry and alternative sentencing programs across the country, particularly the Back on Track program in San Francisco." Id. At the time of the program's debut, donations from The Lenfest and William Penn Foundations funded the entirety of the program's expenses. Id. Approximately two years after the introduction of the program, the program was discontinued. See id. ¶ 115.

Plaintiffs' contend that the program launched by District Attorney Williams contained many similarities to the program run by Plaintiff Smallwood, see id. ¶ 23, and that District Attorney Williams in fact "stole" Plaintiff Smallwood's program, "shamelessly and falsely representing to the public that he was the founder and creator of an innovative diversionary program named 'The Choice is Yours,'" id. ¶ 7. On March 21, 2014, Plaintiffs initiated this action, seeking damages and other relief under various theories. The District Attorney Defendants and the City Defendants each filed motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint.

III. Legal standard - motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)). This Court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court recognized that "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Court subsequently laid out a two-part approach to reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

First, the Court observed, "the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. at 678. Thus, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice" to survive the motion; "instead, 'a complaint must allege facts suggestive of [the proscribed] conduct.'" Id.; Phillips, 515 F.3d at 233 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8). While Rule 8, which requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," was "a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, . . . it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 ("Rule 8 . . . demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). For "without some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only 'fair notice' but also the 'grounds' on which the claim rests." Phillips, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3).

Second, the Court emphasized, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Only if "the '[f]actual allegations . . . raise a right to relief above the speculative level'" has the plaintiff stated a plausible claim. Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). This is because Rule 8(a)(2) "requires not merely a short and plain statement, but instead mandates a statement 'showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" See id., 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). If "the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint hasalleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). "Detailed factual allegations" are not required, id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), but a claim must be "nudged . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible," id. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

"The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,'" but there must be "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement to relief."'" Id. (quoting Twombly,...