Chopra v. Display Producers, Inc.

• Decision Date: 14 October 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96 Civ. 8492 (DC).,96 Civ. 8492 (DC).
• Citation: 980 F.Supp. 714
• Parties: Madhu CHOPRA, Plaintiff, v. DISPLAY PRODUCERS, INC. and Wims Fyilsiame, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

Page 714

980 F.Supp. 714

Madhu CHOPRA, Plaintiff, v. DISPLAY PRODUCERS, INC. and Wims Fyilsiame, Defendants.

No. 96 Civ. 8492 (DC).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

October 14, 1997.

Bragar & Wexler, P.C. by Gregory A. Blue, New York, NY, for plaintiff.

Meltzer, Lippe, Goldstein, Wolf, Schlissel & Sazer, P.C. by Jonathan D. Farrell, Mineola, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

CHIN, District Judge.

This motion for summary judgment raises the issue of whether an employee who is covered by a collective bargaining agreement with an arbitration provision is required to arbitrate her sexual harassment and discrimination claims prior to filing suit under Title VII. Because I find that such an employee need not first submit her claims to arbitration, defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Madhu Chopra worked as an assembly line worker for defendant Display Producers, Inc. ("Display Producers") from sometime in 1982 to August 2, 1996. (Compl. ¶¶ 9, 11-17). Since at least 1985, Local 2682, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America AFL-CIO (the "Union"), has represented Display Producers' employees. Display Producers and the Union are parties to a series of collective bargaining agreements. During early 1994 Display Producers entered into a successor collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA"), which provides that it would be in full force and effect from May 1, 1994 through April 30, 1997. (Conneely Aff. ¶ 3, Ex. A § 30(e)).

The 1994 CBA contains both antidiscrimination and arbitration clauses. In relevant part, § 9 of the CBA contains the following antidiscrimination provision:

There shall be no discrimination in hiring, rates of pay, classification, promotion or other working conditions because of race, color or sex except as may be required by law.

(Id. at § 9). Section 13(a) contains the CBA's arbitration provision:

All grievances arising between the Employer and the Employees shall be settled jointly in the first instance between the Employer on the one hand and the Shop Chairman and Shop Committee on the other; should they fail to reach an agreement, the Shop Chairman and Shop Committee shall immediately call the Union representative. In the event an agreement cannot be reached, then the dispute shall be submitted to arbitration.

(Id. at § 13(a)).

During the entire period of Chopra's employment with Display Producers, she worked under the supervision of Wims Fyilsiame. (Compl.¶ 9). In 1992, Fyilsiame received a promotion to floor supervisor. Chopra alleges that once Fyilsiame was so promoted, he began sexually harassing her. (Compl.¶¶ 10-13). Chopra claims that after she refused to submit to Fyilsiame's sexual advances, he became abusive and made her working conditions intolerable. Chopra alleges that she terminated her employment with defendants on August 2, 1996, as a result of these conditions. (Compl.¶¶ 11-17).

Chopra filed a charge of discrimination against defendants with the New York District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on or about August 6, 1996. On or about September 30, 1996, Chopra received a right to sue letter from the EEOC. (Compl.¶¶ 6-7). Then, on or about November 7, 1996, Chopra filed this suit against Display Producers and Fyilsiame, claiming that defendants' conduct violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Defendants now move for summary judgment, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), on the grounds that the arbitration clause in the CBA requires Chopra to arbitrate her sexual harassment and discrimination claims before filing suit in federal court.

DISCUSSION

Defendants advance two arguments in favor of summary judgment: (1) that Chopra's claims are covered by the arbitration clause in the CBA, and therefore must be sent to arbitration; and (2) that Chopra's claims are preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) et seq. ("Section 301"). Neither argument carries the day.

A. THE ARBITRATION CLAUSE IN THE CBA

In moving to dismiss Chopra's discrimination claims, defendants rely on the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 1651, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991), as well as a number of subsequent circuit and district court decisions, see, e.g., Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass, 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 432, 136 L.Ed.2d 330 (1996); Reece v. Houston Lighting & Power, 79 F.3d 485 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 171, 136 L.Ed.2d 112 (1996), for the proposition that "an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement bar[s] an individual worker from litigating statutory claims of discrimination in Federal Courts." (Def. Mem. at 4). Plaintiff, in opposing summary judgment, relies on the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974), the Second Circuit's decision in Tran v. Tran, 54 F.3d 115 (2d Cir.1995), and several other recent decisions, see, e.g., Humphrey v. Council of Jewish Fed'ns, 901 F.Supp. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354 (7th Cir.1997), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3783 (U.S. May 16, 1997) (No. 96-1830); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir.1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3137 (U.S. Aug. 6, 1997) (No. 97-232), in arguing that Chopra's union cannot waive her right to have her Title VII claims heard in federal court. (Pl. Mem. at 6-10). This Court must determine which line of precedent controls on the facts of this case.

1. Alexander

The seminal decision on "the proper relationship between federal courts and the grievance-arbitration machinery of collective bargaining agreements in the resolution and enforcement of an individual's rights to equal employment opportunities under Title VII" is Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 38, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 1015, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (1974). In that case, Harrell Alexander was a union-represented drill operator who had been fired by Gardner-Denver allegedly for producing too many defective or unusable parts. Alexander, who was African-American, claimed his discharge was racially motivated, and filed a grievance alleging a violation of the nondiscrimination clause in the collective bargaining agreement between his union and his employer. After the arbitrator denied the grievance without addressing the racial discrimination claim, Alexander filed a Title VII action in federal court on the same basis.

Gardner-Denver moved to dismiss Alexander's complaint on the grounds of election of remedies and waiver. The district court granted summary judgment to Gardner-Denver on the ground that Alexander was bound by the prior adverse decision of the arbitrator and was precluded from suing his former employer under Title VII. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court, however, reversed, concluding that Alexander's statutory right against discrimination was not foreclosed by his earlier submission of a discrimination claim to arbitration. Rather, the Court held that:

the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be accommodated by permitting an employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of a collective bargaining agreement and his cause of action under Title VII.

Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60, 94 S.Ct. at 1025. Central to the Court's decision was its finding that "a union cannot prospectively waive a member's Title VII rights in a collective bargaining situation." Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51, 94 S.Ct. at 1021. In two later decisions involving federal statutes other than Title VII, the Supreme Court adhered to the holding and reasoning of Alexander. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 U.S. 728, 737-38, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 1443, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981) (Fair Labor Standards Act); McDonald v. City of West Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284, 290-91, 104 S.Ct. 1799, 1803-04, 80 L.Ed.2d 302 (1984) (42 U.S.C. § 1983).

In Barrentine, the Supreme Court explained its holding in Alexander as follows:

The [Alexander] Court found that in enacting Title VII, Congress had granted individual employees a nonwaivable public law right to equal employment opportunities that was separate and distinct from the rights created through the "majoritarian processes" of collective bargaining.

Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 737-38, 101 S.Ct. at 1443. The Barrentine Court further explained that:

because Congress had granted aggrieved employees access to the courts, and because contractual grievances and arbitration procedures provided an inadequate forum for enforcement of Title VII rights, the [Alexander] Court concluded that Title VII claims should be resolved by the courts de novo.

Id. at 738, 101 S.Ct. at 1443.

2. Gilmer

In 1991, the Supreme Court decided Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991). Robert Gilmer was employed by Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation ("Interstate/Johnson") as a manager of financial services, and was required by his employment to register as a securities representative with several stock exchanges, including the New York Stock Exchange (the "NYSE"). The Securities Registration Form U-4 completed by Gilmer, commonly known as a Form U-4, includes a provision by which Gilmer agreed to arbitrate any claim that arose between him and his employer and that was required to be arbitrated under exchange rules. Id. at 23, 111 S.Ct. at 1650. Interstate/Johnson terminated Gilmer's employment in 1987, at which time Gilmer was 62 years old. After filing a charge of age discrimination with the EEOC, Gilmer brought suit alleging that the company discharged him because of his age, in violation of the ADEA.

Interstate/Johnson moved to compel arbitration of the ADEA claim,...