Chornomaz v. Bristol-Myers Squib Co.

• Docket Number: Civil Action 22-5283 (MAS) (RLS)
• Decision Date: 05 July 2023
• Parties: OKSANA CHORNOMAZ, Plaintiff, v. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIB COMPANY et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

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OKSANA CHORNOMAZ, Plaintiff, v. BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIB COMPANY et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 22-5283 (MAS) (RLS)

United States District Court, D. New Jersey

July 5, 2023

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MICHAEL A. SHIPP, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This matter comes before the Court on a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings Pending Arbitration filed by Defendant Bristol-Myers Squib Company (“Defendant” or “BMS”). (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff Oksana Chomomaz (“Plaintiff' or “Chornomaz”) opposed (ECF No. 22), and Defendant replied (ECF No. 26). The Court has carefully considered the parties' submissions and decides the Motion without oral argument pursuant to Local Civil Rule 78.1. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of Plaintiff s employment with BMS from April 2020 until December 2021. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 58 ECF No. 4.)

In April 2020, Plaintiff was hired by BMS as an Executive Associate. (Id. ¶ 27.) As part of Plaintiffs hiring process, and in accordance with BMS's arbitration policy and program, Plaintiff was given a copy of the BMS Mutual Arbitration Agreement, dated January 2020 (“Arbitration Agreement”). (Deel, of Susan Small (“Small Deel.”) ¶¶ 2-4, ECF No. 10-2; see also Deel, of Mary Beth Nagy ¶¶ 4, 5 ECF No. 10-3.)

According to Defendant's records, on April 24, 2020, Plaintiff reviewed and electronically signed the Arbitration Agreement uploaded to her account on BMS's onboarding platform. (Small Deci. ¶ 5; Small Deci. Ex. B, ECF No. 10-2.) In doing so, Plaintiff accepted the following terms regarding resolving employment-related disputes by arbitration:

[A]ll disputes, claims, complaints, or controversies (“Claims”) that you have now, or at any time in the future may have, against Bristol-Myers Squibb Company and/or any of its parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, predecessors, successors, assigns, current, former, or future officers, directors, employees, and/or those acting as an agent of the Company (which make up the definition of the “Company ”), or that the Company has now or at any time in the future may have against you (“Covered Claims”), arising out of and/or related to your application for employment with the Company, your employment with the Company, and/or the termination of your employment with the Company will be resolved by arbitration and NOT by a court or jury.

THE PARTIES HEREBY FOREVER WAIVE AND GIVE UP THE RIGHT TO HAVE A JUDGE OR A JURY DECIDE ANY COVERED CLAIMS.

(Mutual Arbitration Agreement (“Agrmt.”) ¶ l.a., Small Deci., Ex. A, ECF No. 10-2.)

At the end of the Arbitration Agreement, it further explained:

You understand that your affirmative signature of this Agreement is not required for the Agreement to be enforced. If you commence work for the Company without signing this Agreement, this Agreement will be effective, and you will have agreed to, ratified and accepted this Agreement through your knowledge of it and your acceptance of and continued employment with the Company.

(Id. ¶ 7.)

On September 7,2021, in connection with the novel coronavirus (“COVID-19”) pandemic, BMS announced a revision to its company policy requiring employees to be fully vaccinated against COVID-19 by November 1, 2021 (“COVID-19 Vaccination Policy”). (Am. Compl. ¶ 30.) As part of BMS's rollout of the policy, it also stated that it would terminate “for cause” those employees who did not comply with the COVID-19 Vaccination Policy. (Id. ¶ 31.) The policy also included an exception provision, allowing BMS to accept and consider individual employees' requests for medical or religious accommodation. (Id. ¶ 32.) To apply for religious accommodation from the COVID-19 Vaccination Policy, BMS employees were required to complete a request form, which asked employees to identify “what their religious beliefs were, how [those beliefs] conflicted with the policy, the duration of the requested accommodation, and what accommodation they desired.” (Id. ¶ 40.)

On September 30, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a request form for a religious accommodation from the COVID-19 Vaccination Policy, claiming that her sincerely held religious beliefs precluded her from being vaccinated against COVID-19. (Id. ¶ 42.) Plaintiff's objections to the COVID-19 vaccine were based on her religious affiliation with the “Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, an Eastern Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite.” (Id.} She explained to BMS that she did not object to traditional medicine or traditional vaccines, but instead, objected to “the technology utilized in the available Covid vaccines.” (Id. ¶¶ 45-46.) Specifically, she objected to “mRNA/viral vectored vaccine technology, spike protein technology, the use of fetal stem cells or genetically modified, artificially preserved, or ‘immortalized human cell lines' as being against God's Will and the beliefs of her church.” (Id. ¶ 43.)

In correspondence dated November 18, 2021, to Plaintiff from Defendant Caitlin Freeland (“Freeland”), Executive Director of Human Resources for BMS, BMS denied Plaintiffs request for religious accommodation. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 47, 58.) BMS did so on the grounds that “Plaintiff did not sincerely hold a religious belief that precluded her from receiving the CO VID-19 vaccination” and that “any reasonable accommodation, such as to work remotely, would result in an undue burden to BMS.” (Id. ¶ 48.) Subsequently, because Plaintiff did not receive any COVID-19 vaccine, she was involuntarily terminated by BMS on or about December 6, 2021. (Id. ¶ 58.)

Thereafter, Plaintiff initiated the present lawsuit against Defendants BMS and Freeland (together, “Defendants”) on August 29, 2022. (ECF No. 1.) On September 8, 2022, Plaintiff amended her complaint, asserting six causes of action for religious discrimination: (1) failure to accommodate under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. S.A. §§ 10:5-12 etseq. (the “NJLAD”) (Count One); (2) wrongful termination under the NJLAD (Count Two); (3) aiding and abetting by Freeland in violation of the NJLAD (Count Three); (4) failure to accommodate under “Title XII” of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (the “Civil Rights Act”) (Count Four);^[1] (5) wrongful termination under “Title XII” of the Civil Rights Act (Count Five); and (6) declaratory judgment voiding the COVID-19 Vaccination Policy under the New Jersey Declaratory Judgment Act, N.J.S.A. §§ 2A: 16-50 et seq., and the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (Count Six). (Am. Compl. 12-36.)

In lieu of filing an answer, Defendant BMS now moves to compel arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 3 and 4 (the “FAA”), arguing that the Arbitration Agreement compels Plaintiff to arbitrate all claims related to her employment with Defendant, including all those asserted in the Amended Complaint. (Def.'s Moving Br. 5, ECF No. 10-1.)

IL LEGAL STANDARD

“The FAA declares that ‘ [a] written provision in any contract... to settle by arbitration ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.'” Preziosi v. JetSmarter, Inc., No. 19-13627, 2020 WL 978637, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2020) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). Because arbitration is a matter of contract, before compelling a party to arbitrate pursuant to the FAA, a court must determine that (1) there is a valid agreement to arbitrate and (2) the particular dispute at issue falls within the scope of the agreement. Id. (quoting Flintkote Co. v. Aviva PLC, 169 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2014)). “Whe[n] there is a contract between the parties that provides for arbitration, there is an ‘emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution.'” Hoover v. Sears Holding Corp.,lAo. 16-4520, 2017 WL 2577572, at *1 (D.N.J. June 14, 2017) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As such, “as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration[.]” Preziosi, 2020 WL 978637, at *2 (citations omitted); see also Kirleis v. Dickie, McCamey & Chilcote, P.C., 560 F.3d 156,160 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2003)) (“It is well established that the [FAA] reflects a ‘strong federal policy in favor of the resolution of disputes through arbitration.'”).

The Third Circuit has enumerated a standard for district courts to apply when deciding a motion to compel arbitration. The Third Circuit explained:

When it is apparent, based on the face of a complaint, and documents relied upon in the complaint, that certain of a party's claims are subject to an enforceable arbitration clause, a motion to compel arbitration should be considered under a Rule 12(b)(6) standard without discovery's delay. But if the complaint and its supporting documents are unclear regarding the agreement to arbitrate, or if the plaintiff has responded to a motion to compel arbitration with additional facts sufficient to place the agreement to arbitrate in issue, then the parties should be entitled to discovery on the question of arbitrability before a court entertains further briefing on [the] question. After limited discovery, the court may entertain a renewed motion to compel arbitration, this time judging the motion under a summary judgment standard.

Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 776 (3d Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Existence of a valid arbitration agreement

First Defendant argues that Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate her claims by signing and agreeing to the terms of the Arbitration Agreement as a condition of her...