Chouinard, In re

• Decision Date: 04 March 1971
• Parties: In re Arthur CHOUINARD, Petitioner.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 497

267 N.E.2d 497

358 Mass. 780

In re Arthur CHOUINARD, Petitioner.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Plymouth.

Argued Dec. 10, 1970.

Decided March 4, 1971.

Reuben Goodman, Boston (Owen S. Walker, Boston, with him), for petitioner.

John F. McGarry, Deputy Asst. Atty. Gen. (Walter H. Mayo, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., with him), for respondent.

Before TAURO, C.J., and SPALDING, CUTTER, REARDON and QUIRICO, JJ. TAURO, Chief Justice.

This petition for a writ of habeas corpus brought in the Superior Court was reported to this court upon the pleadings and a case stated. The petitioner is an inmate of the defective delinquent department of the Massachusetts Correctional Institution, Bridgewater. The facts of the case, as set forth in the case stated, are substantially as follows:

In January, 1965, the petitioner was indicted in Hampden County for the crime of assault and battery. On the basis of the charge, the Commonwealth filed a motion for his commitment to the defective delinquent department at Bridgewater under G.L. c. 123, § 113, as amended through St.1954, c. 685, § 1. The petitioner was examined by two psychiatrists who filed a written report with the clerk of the Superior Court that the petitioner was mentally defective. After due notice, a hearing, at which the petitioner was represented by counsel, was held on the motion in the Superior Court. After the hearing the judge found that the petitioner was mentally defective, that he had shown himself to be dangerous or showed a tendency toward becoming such, that such tendency was or might become a menace to the public, that he was not a proper subject for a school for the feeble minded or commitment as an insane person, and that he was a defective delinquent in accordance with G.L. c. 123, § 113. The judge then committed the petitioner to the defective delinquent department at Bridgewater, where he remains pursuant to that court order. The petitioner was never tried on the assault and battery indictment, and there was no other criminal charge pending against him at the time of his commitment.

1. The petitioner contends that G.L. c. 123, § 113, requires a finding of guilty of the crime charged as a basis for the commitment of a defective delinquent. Section 113 provides, in part, At any time prior to the final disposition of a case in which a defendant over the age of fifteen is charged with a crime, other than murder, the commission of which creates a danger to life or limb, a district attorney may file an application for the commitment of such offender to a department for defective delinquents * * *' (emphasis supplied). The relevant language of the statute is clearly contrary to the petitioner's argument. Nothing in the statute requires that a defendant must be convicted of the crime charged before he may be committed as a defective delinquent. Moreover, this court has stated that § 113 applies to 'persons accused of certain specified crimes who after a full hearing are found to be defective delinquents under a statutory definition that does not involve a finding of guilt of any crime.' Commonwealth v. Bigwood, 334 Mass. 46, 50, 133 N.E.2d 585, 588. The petitioner cites legislative history in support of his position; but, the general rule of statutory construction is that a statute that is not ambiguous cannot be interpreted by resort to legislative history. 'The plain meaning of a statute cannot be affected by resort to proceedings incident to its passage. Light may be sought from that source only to illumine statutory language of doubtful import. Other information than that afforded by the words of the statute can be examined only to aid in the solution of an ambiguity.' Allen v. Commissioner of Corps. & Taxn. 272 Mass. 502, 508, 172 N.E. 643, 646. ¹ 2. The petitioner further contends that if G.L. c. 123, § 113, does not require a finding of guilt as a prerequisite to commitment it is unconstitutional. The petitioner stresses the point that without a requirement of a finding of guilt the standards for commitment as a defective delinquent are vague and uncertain and '* * * (smack) of preventive detention.' We disagree. Under § 113, after the district attorney files an application for commitment of a defendant, the court is empowered to commit him for not more than thirty-five days observation in a defective delinquent 'department,' where he is examined by two medical experts with a view to determining whether or not he is 'mentally defective.' Within thirty-five days the medical experts submit a written report which is available to the defendant and his attorney. If this report concludes that the defendant is mentally defective, a hearing is held to determine whether he shall be committed to a defective delinquent department. 'If, after a hearing and examination of the person's record, character and personality of such person the court finds that such person has shown himself to be dangerous or shows a tendency toward becoming such, that such tendency is or may become a menace to the public, and that such person is not a proper subject for the school for the feeble-minded or commitment as an insane person, the court shall make a report of the finding to the effect that the person is a defective delinquent' (emphasis supplied). G.L. c. 123, § 113. In Dubois, petitioner, 331 Mass. 575, 120 N.E.2d 920, this court held St.1953, c. 645, to be constitutional. That statute provides for the new commitment of persons previously committed under § 113, by an improper procedure, if after further observation and examination they are found to be mentally defective and also dangerous or show a tendency toward becoming such and such tendency is or may become a menace to the public. Id. at 579, 120 N.E.2d 920. In upholding the statute, the court stated: 'The words 'mentally defective' * * * describe persons whose mentality is less than normal. * * * If used without restriction they would serve to describe all persons of deficient mentality whether the deficiency be great or small. The statute, however, provides a specific qualification. It states that, to justify the commitment of the person mentally defective, he must either be dangerous or show a tendency to become such, of such character that it is or may be a menace to the public. We think that this provision relieves the statute from any just claim that the class of persons made subject to commitment is too vague and indefinite. The term 'dangerous' is commonly understood, when applied to a person, as meaning one likely to cause or create danger. See Commonwealth v. M'Neill, 19 Pick. 127, 140--141. The danger may be either to the person himself or to others. See Look v. Dean, 108 Mass. 116, 120. Danger according to dictionary definition is the exposure or liability to injury, loss, pain, or other evil. See G.L. *...